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INTRODUCTION
We do not think of local governments, such as towns and cities, as im-
portant components of the federal constitutional structure. The text of the
Constitution does not mention local governments, and black-letter constitu-
tional law formally deems them to be the mere administrative appendages of
the states that "create" them.1 This doctrinal depiction accords with a deep-
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I See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978) (upholding a state
statute giving extraterritorial force to a municipal ordinance on the grounds that political
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seated intuition that local governments are islands of private parochialism
which are likely to frustrate the effective enforcement of federal constitu-
tional rights. Indeed, the Supreme Court's recent defense of what has sar-
donically been termed "our localism,"'2 in cases such as Milliken v. Bradley3
and San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,4 has been the
subdivisions such as cities and counties are created by the state and that states have
"extraordinarily wide latitude ... in creating various types of political subdivisions and
conferring authority upon them"); Williams v. Mayor & City Council, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933)
("A municipal corporation, created by a state for the better ordering of government, has no
privileges or immunities under the federal Constitution which it may invoke in opposition to
the will of its creator."); City of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192, 196 (1923) ("The
regulation of municipalities is a matter peculiarly within the domain of the State."); City of
Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) (maintaining that "[a] municipality is merely
a department of the State, and the State may withold, grant or withdraw powers and privileges
as it sees fit"); Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (stating that
"[m]unicipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State .... Neither their charters,
nor any law conferring governmental powers... constitutes a contract with the State within
the meaning of the Federal Constitution"); New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works Co.,
142 U.S. 79, 89-90 (1891) (holding that a municipality may not invoke the Fourteenth
Amendment in a suit alleging that a state statute impaired the obligation of a contract);
Commissioners of Laramie County v. Commissioners of Albany County, 92 U.S. 307, 312
(1875) (affirming the state's power to diminish or enlarge the area of a county). The Supreme
Court has recognized that local governments are important political institutions in the course
of recognizing individual rights of participation in the local governmental political process.
See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335-60 (1972) (striking down a durational
residence requirement for voting); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1969) (striking
down a city charter amendment making it more difficult to enact an anti-race discrimination
ordinance by limiting the authority of the city council); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S.
474, 476 (1968) (extending the "one person, one vote" principle to local governments). These
cases, however, did not recognize rights of local governments against states, or even rights of
local governments to protect individuals from states. See generally Frank I. Michelman,
Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L.
REV. 443, 488-89 (1989) (noting that the Supreme Court has embraced only a right to political
participation on an equal basis with other citizens in one's jurisdiction, not a "fundamental"
right to political self-government at the local level).
2 Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLuM. L. REv. 1, 1 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism Part 1] (arguing that local
governments possess considerable power, despite widely held suppositions to the contrary);
Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part lI-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
346, 346 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism Part I] (offering a critical analysis of the
political and economic arguments for local governmental autonomy).
3 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (striking down a federal district court decree requiring interdistrict
busing to remedy school segregation).
4 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (upholding a state school fimancing system against an equal
protection challenge); see also Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 268-71 (1977) (upholding a municipality's denial of a rezoning application against an
equal protection challenge); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 672-79
(1976) (upholding a local zoning referendum); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373-81 (1976)
(striking down a federal district court decree requiring a local police department to develop
guidelines for handling citizen complaints of police misconduct); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 498-517 (1975) (denying standing in a challenge to a local zoning policy); Village of
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subject of substantial scholarly criticism precisely because it has appeared to
insulate homogeneous suburbs from judicially enforceable constitutional
obligations.
5
If the arguments against the constitutional recognition of local govern-
mental independence are familiar, the arguments in favor of such recogni-
6tion have not been fully explored. This Article offers a different view of
the role that local governments play in the federal constitutional frame-
work. It rejects the conception of local governments as either administra-
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1974) (upholding a local decision to prohibit group
homes); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-97 (1926) (upholding
local zoning power).
5 See Briffault, Our Localism Part I, supra note 2, at 85-111 (discussing local autonomy
and federal constitutional law); Briffault, Our Localism Part 1H, supra note 2, at 382-92
(arguing that a "suburban model" has contributed to the Court's deference to local autonomy);
Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1843, 1860-85 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court's local
government decisions have perpetuated racial segregation); Jerry Frug, Decentering
Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 263-73 (1993) [hereinafter Frug, Decentering]
(criticizing the Court's preference for suburban interests); Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular
Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 91
HARV. L. REv. 1373, 1418-23 (1978) (arguing that the Court's reluctance to review local
zoning decisions jeopardizes "substantial constitutional values"); Joan C. Williams, The
Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The Politics of City Status in
American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REv. 83, 105-11 (noting the Court's use of Jeffersonian rhetoric
favoring local sovereignty in San Antonio School District and Milliken); see also Joseph P.
Viteritti & Gerald J. Russello, Community and American Federalism: Images Romantic and
Real, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 683, 687 (1997) (questioning the assumption that "refocusing
politics down to the community level will lead to a form of governance that is more public-
spirited and less susceptible to the forces of self-interest").
6 Those scholars who have focused on the state/local relationship, and who have argued
for increased local power, have not rooted their arguments in constitutional law. They have
based their pleas for greater local autonomy on more general contentions about legal and
political theory as well as notions of democratic self-government generally. See, e.g., Ford,
supra note 5, at 1908-09 (arguing that local autonomy sustains participatory democracy and
fosters diverse communities); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REv.
1057, 1067-73 (1980) [hereinafter Frug, The City as a Legal Concept] (arguing that "city
powerlessness" undermines freedom); Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1047, 1107 (1996) [hereinafter Frug, The Geography of Community] (advocating the
"allocat[ion of] local entitlements through an inter-local negotiation rather than through state
law"). To the extent that these scholars have considered how localism operates within
constitutional law, they, too, are quite hostile to the Court's defense of localism and therefore
show a surprising solicitude for reforms that would make existing local governmental
institutions less central than they presently are. See Ford, supra note 5, at 1909 ("I propose
semi-autonomous local governments with permeable boundaries."); Frug, Decentering, supra
note 5, at 323 ("[W]e have to stop building local governmental law on residency and on the
importance of local jurisdictional boundaries."). They therefore pay relatively little attention
to how local governments might perform an affirmative, structural role in protecting
individual constitutional rights at the more mundane level of constitutional doctrine.
7 Some scholars have begun to examine the connection between liberty and localism.
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1201
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tive agents of the states that "create" them or as insular forums for register-
ing the private preferences of the persons who inhabit them. It proceeds
from the contrary premise that our towns and cities are what we know them
to be: important political institutions that are directly responsible for shap-
ing the contours of "ordinary civic life in a free society."
8
(1991) ("[P]opulism and federalism-liberty and localism-work together."); H. Jefferson
Powell, The Principles of '98: An Essay in Historical Retrieval, 80 VA. L. REv. 689, 690-92
(1994) (noting the centrality of states' rights in Jeffersonian Republicanism, as embodied in
the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions). The main focus, however, has been on the
relationship between the federal government and the states, and thus these defenses tend to be
defenses of federalism rather than defenses of localism as such. See, e.g., Amar, supra, at
1199-200, (discussing popular sovereignty in terms of federalism's protection of state power);
Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REv. 917, 964-80 (1985) (discussing
the possibility of restoring federalism in terms of federal policy concerning federal grants to
states); see also Frank I. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of
"Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1183 (1977)
[hereinafter Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles] ("States are said to have rights to
their 'integrity' including, most particularly, rights to 'structure' their internal governmental
affairs as seems to them best .... These rights are compendiously called the states'
'sovereignty."'); Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New
Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1065, 1103-04 (1977) (conflating state and local governments in concluding that the Tenth
Amendment may protect an individual right to governmental services). But see Michelman,
supra, at 1191-92 & n.86 (recognizing the distinction between states and their political
subdivisions). To the extent that scholars root the practice of constitutionalism in "local"
institutions other than states, they generally ignore local governments in favor of "local"
institutions such as the jury, the militia, the church, and private associations. See, e.g., Amar,
supra, at 1137-201 (discussing the jury, the militia, and the church); Frank Michelman,
Universities, Racist Speech and Democracy in America: An Essay for the ACLU, 27 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 357 (1992) [hereinafter Michelman, Universities, Racist Speech and
Democracy] (discussing private associations). But see David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional
Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 675, 730 (1992) (noting that the protection of local public schools from central
interference serves important First Amendment values); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel,
A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 316-23 (1998)
(discussing the important role that localism should play in the constitutional framework);
Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: The
Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 303-19 (1989) [hereinafter
Michelman, The Case of Pornography Regulation] (explaining that judicial deference to local
antipornography ordinances may promote a positive conception of the First Amendment by
creating a public space for speech for those silenced by pornography); Nicholas S. Zeppos,
The Dynamics of Democracy: Travel, Premature Predation, and the Components of Political
Identity, 50 VAND. L. REV. 445, 445-58 (1997) (arguing that the Court's decision in Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), suggests the importance of political participation at a local level).
To be sure, the constitutional text does not mention local governments-while it does mention
the jury, the militia, and the church-but the scholarly omission is curious nonetheless given
the obviously central role that local governments play in organizing our daily lives at the sub-
state level. As these scholars suggest, to the extent that the constitutional Framers intended to
connect localism and constitutionalism, it would be surprising if they did not intend for local
governments to play some role in translating that intended connection into reality.
s Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
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The unique public function that local governments perform in fashion-
ing communal political life calls into question their current treatment as in-
stitutions that are no different from state environmental agencies on the one
hand, or private homeowner associations on the other. Towns and cities are
often the institutions that are most directly responsible for structuring politi-
cal struggles over the most contentious of public questions, whether they
concern the proper means of overcoming racial stratification, securing qual-
ity public education, or protecting disfavored groups from private discrimi-
nation.9 For that reason, local governments are often uniquely well posi-
tioned to give content to the substantive constitutional principles that should
inform the consideration of such public questions-better positioned in
some instances, that is, than either federal or state institutions.
It is necessary to inquire, therefore, whether the Federal Constitution
may be understood to protect local governments from state attempts to pre-
vent local governments from bringing their special institutional capacities to
bear in these constitutional contexts. Such an understanding would not re-
lieve local governments of their obligations to enforce the Constitution. It
would instead free local governments from state law constraints that pre-
clude them from exercising their discretion in fulfilling those constitutional
obligations.
To pursue the connection between localism and constitutionalism, the
first half of this Article reviews the nineteenth-century debate over the con-
stitutional status of local governments. It shows that Thomas Cooley, the
prominent nineteenth-century treatise writer and State of Michigan Supreme
Court justice, offered an important, but long-neglected response to the still
dominant view that local governments are the passive creatures of their
states. The now-forgotten defense of localism that Cooley put forth is worth
reconsideration for two reasons. First, Cooley's subtle analysis of the role
that local governments could play in the constitutional framework deserves
attention simply by virtue of the care with which it was offered. Second,
Cooley was a key participant in the important late nineteenth-century debate
over the role of local governments in our constitutional system, a debate that
has renewed relevance in an era in which localism is increasingly a key
component of the national governmental framework.
Cooley's unique contribution to the debate was to link a structural de-
fense of local governmental independence to substantive constitutional en-
9 See generally Buzz BISSiNGER, A PRAYER FOR THE CITY (1997) (providing a detailed
account of how the city of Philadelphia confronted and structured public questions in the
1990s); Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 35-45 (1998) (arguing for the
potential of the city to promote "community building"); Frug, The Geography of Community,
supra note 6, at 1077-81.
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forcement. He subscribed to a substantive constitutional vision that was
hostile to public attempts to lend aid to powerful private associations, but he
believed that this substantive constitutional vision could not be given life
without the assistance of local political institutions. Cooley argued tfiat lo-
cal communities, by virtue of their familiarity with local needs, would play
a critical extrajudicial role in securing what he termed "constitutional free-
dom" by forestalling state legislative efforts to favor private interests. 10 Lo-
cal governments would, if provided a measure of protection from state con-
trol, give particularized meaning to the substantive constitutional value of
public impartiality that Cooley believed judges were often poorly positioned
to enforce. In this way, Cooley embraced localism to give life to substan-
tive constitutional values, even as his substantive constitutional commit-
ments defined the scope of the local governmental autonomy that he recog-
nized.1
The second half of this Article turns to modem doctrine to show that it
may be understood to incorporate a structural connection between substan-
tive constitutional enforcement and local governmental independence that
harkens back to the connection that Cooley drew more than a century be-
fore. In doing so, this Article reveals that, just as Cooley's defense of local
constitutionalism represented something more than a crude effort to protect
private-propertied interests from public politics, the modem defense of lo-
calism represents something more than a bare attempt to insulate private
homeowners from constitutional obligations. By demonstrating that there is
"something more" to localism than privatism, this Article argues against the
10 See People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 106 (1871) (Cooley, J., concurring).
11 There is a growing body of recent scholarly literature examining Cooley's
constitutional philosophy. See, e.g., ALAN R. JoNEs, THE CONSTrrUTIONAL CONSERVATISM
OF THOMAS McINTYRE COOLEY 122-65 (Harold Hyman & Stuart Bnichey eds., 1987)
(discussing Cooley's due process philosophy); PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY IN HISTORY 73-
77 (1992) (describing Cooley's philosophy as "combin[ing] history and science by identifying
constitutional law with the common law"); PHILLIP S. PALUDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH
249-73 (1975) (documenting the connection between Cooley's Jacksonian roots and his
constitutional jurisprudence); Paul D. Carrington, Law as "The Common Thoughts of Men".
The Law-Teaching and Judging of Thomas McIntyre Cooley, 49 STAN. L. REV. 495, 504-32
(1997) (discussing the origins of Cooley's constitutional jurisprudence and comparing his
philosophies to those of Langdell and Holmes); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical
Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1618-23 (1988) (summarizing
Cooley's position on the Contract Clause and its relationship to his position on substantive
due process); Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in Late Nineteenth-Century Constitutional
Thought, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1431, 1502-15 (analyzing Cooley's philosophy through an
examination of historism, "a network of assumptions and aspirations that undergirded and
significantly influenced most branches of nineteenth-century social thought"). Only Joan
Williams, however, has devoted sustained attention to Cooley's constitutional defense of local
governmental independence. See Williams, supra note 5, at 88-90 (explaining Cooley's
concept of inherent local government sovereignty).
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tendency of modem critics of localism to embrace the state creature meta-
phor and thereby to confine our towns and cities to a wholly passive role in
the construction of constitutional law.
To be sure, cases such as San Antonio School District and Milliken have
been legitimately criticized for defending localism in order to protect a pri-
vatized conception of local political life from federal judicial intervention.
Considered alone, however, these cases provide only a partial picture of the
role that localism plays in current constitutional case law. This Article
demonstrates that they should be read in conjunction with Washington v.
Seattle School District No. 1,12 Papasan v. Allain,
13 and Romer v. Evans,14
in which the Supreme Court enforced public constitutional values by strik-
ing down state attempts to control the political discretion of towns and cit-
ies.
Strikingly, in each of the modem cases considered, the Court has con-
fronted constitutional claims for positive public action: sweeping remedies
to desegregate the public schools in Milliken and Seattle School District;
equitable financing of public education in San Antonio School District and
Papasan; and protection from private discrimination in Romer. Such claims
to enforce positive constitutional rights seek intrusive judicial remedies that
threaten to overwhelm political processes and to obliterate distinctions be-
tween private choices and public actions. 15 Rather than simply concluding
12 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (holding that a State of Washington initiative terminating local
school assignment plans that was intended to promote racial integration violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
13 478 U.S. 265 (1986) (holding that a breach of trust claim for school land grants was
not immune to equal protection challenges).
14 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that a State of Colorado constitutional amendment
prohibiting local ordinances against discrimination based on sexual orientation violated the-
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
15 There are a number of important discussions of positive constitutional rights to compel
affirmative governmental action in order to correct for private inequities or discrimination,
and how these positive constitutional rights differ from the classically negative constitutional
right against governmental interference into private affairs. See generally Susan Bandes, The
Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2308-26 (1990) (reviewing the
theory of the Constitution as a charter of negative liberties and tracing this theory through
common law thought); Charles L. Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, Foreword: "State
Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 85-91
(1967) (addressing the development of the state action doctrine in the field of racial
discrimination); David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. Cm-. L.
REV. 864, 872-86 (1986) (questioning the theory that the Constitution contains only negative
rights by demonstrating the existence of positive rights in civil rights and equal protection
cases); Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of
Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 39, 55-58 (proposing that the Supreme
Court, in Reitman v. Mulkey, established an affirmative duty to prohibit private
discrimination); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in
a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1324-26 (1984) (questioning the desirability of
1999]
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that such claims would impermissibly extend the scope of federal judicial
power,16 however, the Court may be understood to employ localism in these
cases as a structural means of giving life to positive constitutional values
through the practice of local politics. By recognizing the important institu-
tional role that local governments play in shaping community life, and by
enforcing limits on the power of more central institutions to control them,
the Court may be understood to have secured a means by which positive
constitutional rights may be enforced.
An examination of the traces of local constitutionalism that span more
than a century of constitutional thought reveals the limits of the current con-
ception of local governments as either passive state creatures or protected
private zones. Each of the standard depictions ignores the important role
that the political institutions that most directly shape our public lives may
play in shaping the constitutional principles that define our national identity.
As a result, each depiction reflects a constricted conception of the very
dichotomizing constitutional rights into positive and negative rights); Frank I. Michelman,
The Supreme Court 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 33-40 (1969) (describing the various ways in which the
Fourteenth Amendment can be used to protect the poor); Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little
Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767,
767-93 (1969) (exploring the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to "exclusionary
zoning"); Louis Michael Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case
for Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006, 1006-59 (1987)
[hereinafter Seidman, Public Principle] (examining constitutional rights in a post-Lochner
world); Louis Michael Seidman, Romer's Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren
Court Activism, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 86-96 [hereinafter Seidman, Romer's Radicalism]
(discussing the Court's approach in Romer as resting on a positive conception of
constitutional rights); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 886-88
(1987) (examining negative and positive rights through an analysis of state action and private
discrimination); Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights,
Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 335-43 (1985)
(reexamining the interaction of individual, inalienable, and negative rights through the
example of abortion funding); Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space:
What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8-17 (1989)
[hereinafter Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space] (examining the role of government
inaction in child abuse and abortion cases through the concept of "curved space").
16 See, e.g., William E. Forbath, Why Is This Rights Talk Different from All Other Rights
Talk? Demoting the Court and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1771, 1777-
80 (1994) (explaining the problems with the judicial enforcement of positive constitutional
rights); see also Bandes, supra note 15, at 2326, 2326-42 (stating that "by recognizing only
the negative governmental duty to avoid direct harm, courts avoid the need for difficult
decisions about motivation, causation, duty, allocation of governmental resources, allocation
ofjudicial resources and a host of other thorny issues"); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure:
The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L REV. 1212, 1217-20
(1978) (discussing judicial restraint in equal protection cases); Alan Effron, Note, Federalism
and Federal Consent Decrees Against State Governmental Entities, 88 COLuM. L. REV. 1796,
1797-808 (1988) (examining the constraints federalism places on the scope of federal
equitable remedial power).
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meaning of what Thomas Cooley termed "constitutional freedom."'17 For in
the end, as Cooley argued, constitutional freedom cannot be secured simply
through the judicial enforcement of limitations upon the political process or
the enactment into law of the prevailing preferences of a reigning majority.
Constitutional freedom can be secured only if diverse communities, organ-
ized in various towns and cities across the Nation, are encouraged (and
permitted) to govern themselves in accordance with a set of common prin-
ciples that they know to be more enduring than the preferences of any tem-
porary majority.'
8
That is not to deny that there is an important substantive divergence
between the defense of local constitutionalism that Cooley offered in the
nineteenth century and the defense of local constitutionalism that is offered
here-there clearly is. Cooley defended local governmental independence
to promote a substantive constitutional vision that sought to constrain the
power of government to intervene in the private market. The defense of lo-
cal governmental independence that is offered here is intended to promote a
substantive constitutional vision that is far more sanguine about the virtues
of governmental intervention.
This divergence reflects the substantive shift in post-Lochner constitu-
tional theory, which has rightly called into question the merits of the nine-
teenth-century distinction that Cooley defended between the public realm of
governmental power and the private realm of the market. This substantive
divergence should not, however, obscure the deeper structural point. There
is an important and often overlooked connection between localism and con-
stitutionalism that may be discerned once we are willing to cast aside fa-
miliar, but incomplete, images of local governments as passive administra-
tive agents or autonomous private associations. The emphasis here,
therefore, is on structural affinities rather than substantive discontinuities.
Through Cooley's pre-Lochner structural defense of localism, we may un-
cover a localist vocabulary that will permit us to comprehend the important
role that our towns and cities may play in giving life to the quite different
17 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional freedom).
is Joan Williams covered somewhat similar terrain in her path-breaking article comparing
Cooley's nineteenth-century conceptions of the state/local relationship with those of the
Burger Court. See Williams, supra note 5, at 101-15 (discussing the conservative posture of
the Burger Court in formulating a definition of city status). Williams concluded, however,
that the underlying affinity between defenses of localism across the centuries is a fear of
governmental power, and that localism (or antilocalism) merely serves as the empty vessel
into which such fears are poured. See id. at 149-53 (summarizing Dillon's, Cooley's,
Burger's, and Brennan's theories of city status and its relationship to government power).
This Article suggests, by contrast, that the underlying affimity is that public political power
provides an important affirmative means of giving life to constitutionalism, and, thus, that
local governments are critical components of the federal constitutional structure.
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substantive constitutional norms that define the post-New Deal legal world
that we now inhabit.
Part I examines the basis for the still influential nineteenth-century
doctrinal rule-crafted first by Chief Justice Marshall and later modified by
Cooley's contemporary, John Dillon-that local governments possess only
those legal rights that their state legislatures grant them. It shows that the
seemingly identical defenses of state supremacy that Marshall and Dillon
offered in the nineteenth century flowed from strikingly different substan-
tive constitutional visions and dramatically divergent conceptions of the
connection between political engagement and constitutional development.
Parts II and III show that Thomas Cooley constructed his constitutional
defense of local governmental independence by synthesizing the competing
substantive (as well as structural) constitutional visions that underlie the de-
fenses of state power that Marshall and Dillon advanced. Part IV shows that
Cooley remained committed to his structural constitutional defense of local
independence despite the emergence of the great cities of the late nineteenth
century, which appeared to pose a significant threat to his substantive con-
stitutional vision.
Parts V and VI draw upon the nineteenth-century debate over the con-
stitutional status of local governments to show how modem doctrine may
bear important traces of the structural connection that Cooley drew between
localism and constitutionalism. These Parts read modem case law to incor-
porate structural premises that are similar to those that guided Cooley, even
as they are employed to vindicate substantive constitutional rights that
would no doubt have been unimaginable to him. Part VII concludes the in-
quiry by offering some general principles concerning when, and to what
extent, federal constitutional recognition should be accorded to local gov-
ernmental institutions.
I. MARSHALL AND DILLON: LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AS CREATURES OF
THEIR STATES
A. Introduction
A critical debate in nineteenth-century jurisprudence concerned the
proper understanding of the constitutional relationship between states and
their local governments. This debate centered in large part on the degree to
which a positivist conception of localism, making state law the sole deter-
minant of local governmental power, was warranted or whether a more so-
cial conception of localism should be adopted in its stead. The debate fea-
tured a now little-remembered defense of the social conception of local
governments that Thomas Cooley offered, in which he sought to connect
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local governmental independence with substantive constitutional freedom.
Cooley's argument on behalf of localism, an argument that met with only
limited success in its own time, illuminates the manner in which modem
doctrine may be understood to have drawn a connection between local gov-
ernmental independence and extrajudicial, substantive constitutional en-
forcement.
Before turning directly to the connection that Thomas Cooley drew
between localism and constitutionalism, however, it is important to set forth
the competing nineteenth-century understanding that Chief Justice Marshall
first advanced, and that Cooley's contemporary, John Dillon, later modified.
Both Marshall and Dillon crafted a rule of state supremacy to constrain the
ability of local majorities to interfere with the private realm. Marshall's
conclusion in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward19 that local gov-
ernments were the creatures of their states differed in important respects,
however, from Dillon's seemingly identical determination more than a half
century later. A consideration of the points of divergence between Marshall
and Dillon sets the stage for an examination of the challenge to the state
creature metaphor that Cooley lodged at the close of the century, as well as
for the connection between localism and extra-judicial constitutional en-
forcement that he would draw.
B. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward
Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Dartmouth College set forth the ba-
sic contours of the constitutional doctrine that Cooley would later question.
The case concerned a Contract Clause challenge to the New Hampshire
legislature's attempt to restructure Dartmouth College's governing board.
The trustees of Dartmouth College claimed a contractual right in their cor-
porate charter. The state defended on the ground that such a public charter
did not give rise to a constitutionally protected contract. Chief Justice Mar-
shall ruled for the trustees.2°
Dartmouth College required the Court to determine whether corporate
charters constituted constitutionally protected contracts. In broad terms, the
dispute raised the same question that had been first addressed in Fletcher v.
Peck:. whether any public governmental action, a legislatively conferred
19 17 U.S. 250, 4 Wheat. 518 (1819) (holding that a state attempt to alter the charter of a
private college violates the Contract Clause).
20 See id. at 311-12,4 Wheat. 652-54.
21 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). Marshall held that the Contract Clause prohibited the
Georgia legislature from repudiating a land grant that had vested in a subsequent purchaser
even though the initial grant had apparently been secured through corrupt legislative dealing.
See id. at 139. In reaching his conclusion, Marshall rejected the argument that the Contract
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grant of land or charter of incorporation, could be deemed a contract for
purposes of the Contract Clause. At the same time, because the case con-
cerned the legal status of a state-conferred corporate charter, it implicated a
constitutional issue that had not arisen in Fletcher-the constitutional rela-
tionship between states and their local governments.
At the time the Dartmouth College case came to the Court, no settled
legal distinction had yet emerged between municipal corporations, such as
towns and cities, and private business or eleemosynary corporations.22 A
judicial decision regarding the constitutional protection to be afforded pri-
vate corporate charters therefore arguably constituted a judicial decision re-
garding the protection to be afforded municipal charters. As a result, both
parties framed their constitutional arguments concerning the scope of con-
stitutional protection for corporate charters with the state/local relationship
very much in mind. The state defendants attempted to link Dartmouth Col-
lege to public corporations such as towns, cities, and villages. They hoped
to show that the trustees were attempting to use the Constitution to separate
the government from the people as a whole by immunizing corporate char-
ters from legislative alteration.23 The state's argument in Dartmouth Col-
lege drew upon the powerful post-Revolutionary sentiment that all corpora-
tions, whether commercial or municipal, constituted unwarranted,
24antidemocratic exceptions to a norm of popular control. That generalized
Clause could not provide protection for a legal grant from the government--the land grant-
and that the Contract Clause was intended solely to protect contracts between private parties
frompublic interference. See id. at 137.
2T See generally GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
319-20 (1991) (discussing the practice of granting corporate charters in early America and the
lack of distinction between public and private entities); Frug, The City as a Legal Concept,
supra note 6, at 1076 (discussing how cities were conceived of "partly as creations of the
state, yet... partly as creations of the individuals who lived within them"); Joan Williams,
The Development of the Public/Private Distinction in American Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 225
(1985) (discussing the status of corporation law in early American history); Joan Williams,
The Invention of the Municipal Corporation: A Case Study in Legal Change, 34 AM. U. L.
REv. 369, 392-400 (1985) (same); Jon C. Teaford, The Birth of a Public Corporation, 83
MICH. L. REV. 690 (1985) (reviewing HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE
POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW (1983)).
23 As the state attorney general explained, in arguing that Dartmouth College was a
public entity, "[c]harters to public corporations, for purposes of public policy, are necessarily
subject to legislative discretion, which may revoke or modify them, as the continually
fluctuating exigencies of the society may require." Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 291, 4
Wheat. at 609.
24
It was heatedly contended in the press and in the legislature in the sort of argument
that carried well into the next century that all corporate grants, even when their
public purpose was obvious, like those for the College of Philadelphia, the Bank of
America, or the city of Philadelphia, were repugnant to the spirit of the American
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sentiment was applied with particular force to municipal corporations.
Notwithstanding the continuing resonance of the idealized New England
town and the deep attachment to local community life that persisted
throughout the early nineteenth century, there was a pervasive hostility to-
ward so-called municipal corporations. If the state's grant of public power
to certain privileged incorporators was, as a general matter, thought to be
incompatible with revolutionary notions of egalitarianism, such a grant was
thought to be particularly offensive when the incorporators were given
charge of an entire community rather than simply a single business.
To many, it seemed fundamentally undemocratic to entrust public
power to a closed class of select persons and to authorize such persons to
determine the degree to which public participation in local political affairs
would be tolerated. Moreover, the legal conception of the idealized town as
a closed corporation rather than as a public commons seemed to make a
mockery of the very notion of community. Early efforts to increase state
power over municipal corporations, therefore, were commonly pressed on
behalf of those seeking to expand local suffrage and to diminish the power
of local oligarchies.2 5 Thus, municipal corporations bore the brunt of the
republican argument against corporate privilege, and "by 1790 many
Americans were urging either radical reform or total abandonment of the
municipal corporation as an instrument of urban law."
26
Where the state's defenders sought to bolster their contention by linking
Dartmouth College's charter to those granted to towns and cities, Daniel
Webster, arguing for the College's trustees, skillfully sought to bolster his
competing claim by carefully drawing a distinction between these types of
27charters. He responded to the generalized democratic argument against
the conferral of constitutional protection on corporate charters by exploiting
his opponents' implicit concession that the provision of legal protection to
republics, "which does not admit of granting peculiar privileges to any body of
men."
GORDON VOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 401 (1969)
(quoting PHILA. PA. GAZETrE, Mar. 31, 1779).
25 See Jon Teaford, City Versus State: The Struggle for Legal Ascendancy, 17 AM. J.
LEGAL HIsT. 51, 60-63 (1973) (discussing attacks on city charters as establishing local
oligarchies and describing the consequent state intervention that followed).26 ,
Id. at 54. Teaford notes that "men of the post-revolutionary era repeatedly linked
despotism and aristocracy with the institution of the municipal corporation." Id. As Gerald
Frug has further explained:
This attack on the privileged control of city corporations and the concomitant
expansion of participation in corporate governance made it increasingly difficult to
separate the city corporation from the people as a whole, that is, to view city
corporate rights as distinct from the rights of the public at large.
Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1101.
27 See Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 270, 4 Wheat. at 561.
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municipal charters would be uniquely offensive to a constitutional system
intended to facilitate the practice of self-government. If such protection
were particularly offensive to such a constitutional system, then, necessar-
ily, there would be room for a constitutional rule that distinguished between
types of corporate charters.
Webster construed the Contract Clause in a manner that would ensure
that states would maintain control of their municipal corporations even as it
constricted the scope of their control over private business corporations. He
argued that only those institutions that needed protection from the vagaries
of public politics should be deemed private entities entitled to the protection
afforded by the Contract Clause. Colleges, Webster contended, were such
institutions.
It will be a dangerous, a most dangerous experiment, to hold those institutions
subject to the rise and fall of popular parties, and the fluctuation of political
opinions. If the franchise may be, at any time, taken away or impaired, the
property also may be taken away, or its use perverted. Benefactors will have
no certainty of effecting the object of their bounty; and learned men will be
deterred from devoting themselves to the service of such institutions, from the
precarious title of their officers. Colleges and halls will be deserted by all
better spirits, and become a theatre for the contention of politics, party and
faction will be cherished in the places consecrated to 
piety and learning.
Webster argued that the Contract Clause served to confine "the conten-
tion of politics" to the public realm of government, and to secure zones of
private freedom from political "theatre." 29 He saw no need to explain why
corporations "for government and political argument; such for example, as
cities, counties, and towns in New England," could "be changed and modi-
fied, as public convenience may require, due regard being always had to the
rights of property., 30 The Framers of the Contract Clause did not intend to
rid politics from the necessarily political realm of governmental administra-
tion. They intended only to ensure that private mediating institutions, free
from legislative control, would develop to advance civic goals. Municipal
corporations constituted public entities, and thus they lacked constitutional
protection from legislative control.
31
Moreover, for a federalist such as Webster, once the distinction between
public and private corporations had been drawn, no legal basis remained for
the contention that the Constitution protected local political institutions
28 Id. at 287, 4 Wheat. at 599.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 270, 4 Wheat. at 562.
31 See id. at 288, 4 Wheat. at 601 ("The convention who framed the [C]onstitution, did
not intend to interfere in the exercise of the political powers reserved to the state governments.
That was left to be regulated by their own local laws and constitutions ....").
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from state control. Madison's essay in The Federalist No. 10 revealed the
flaw in any argument that the Constitution protected local political majori-
ties from central ones. The Constitution had been designed to constrain the
power of local majorities, not to protect it.
32
By distinguishing public contracts with "private" corporations from
public contracts with "public" corporations, Webster cleverly blunted the
force of the threshold contention that the Contract Clause had no application
to public grants of incorporation rights. Against the view that the Contract
Clause only served to protect contracts between private parties from public
interference, he had drawn a public/private line that seemed to cabin the
novel expansion of the Contract Clause for which he argued. His new line
would distinguish contracts that the public effected with private parties from
contracts that it had essentially effected with itself. In so doing, he could
call for a dramatic expansion of the Contract Clause while professing obei-
sance to the public/private distinction on which the argument for a narrower
construction of the Contract Clause had initially hinged.
Chief Justice Marshall adopted much of Webster's argument in ruling
for the trustees.33 He rejected a construction of the Constitution that would
"convert a literary institution, moulded according to the will of its founders,
and placed under the control of private literary men, into a machine entirely
subservient to the will of government."34 As Marshall explained in a private
letter, "'I consider the interference of the legislature in the management of
our private affairs, whether those affairs are committed to a company or re-
main under individual direction, as equally dangerous and unwise.'
35
By adopting Webster's logic, Chief Justice Marshall easily distin-
guished private colleges from local governments. He explained that it
would be formalistic to equate local governments with other corporations
32
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests
composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a
majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals
composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the
more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 63-64 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
[A] rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property,
or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole
body of the Union, than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a
malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.
Id. at 65.
33 See Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 301, 4 Wheat. at 630.
34 Id. at 311, 4 Wheat. at 653.
35 4 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 479-80 (1919) (quoting
Letter from John Marshall to Greenhow (Oct. 17, 1809)).
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merely because both were "corporations" in a technical sense. "The right to
change [local governments] is not founded on their being incorporated, but
on their being instruments of government, created for its purposes. The
same institutions, created for the same objects, though not incorporated,
would be public institutions, and, of course, be controllable by the legisla-
ture."
36
The "of course" reflected Marshall's view that, although the Constitu-
tion protected certain institutions from the "influence of legislative bodies,"
it did not protect political bodies from themselves. 37  Private decision
making was sufficiently neutral to be free from legal constraints. The pro-
tection that the Contract Clause provided private business corporations from
political interference would not extend to local governments. The latter
were governed by politics by their very nature.38 The rhetoric of democracy
thus could be employed to provide political institutions less constitutional
protection than private ones, and it could be reconciled with the federal ju-
dicial review of "contracts" that the public itself had forged through the ex-
ercise of legislative powers.
The "of course" also reflected Marshall's federalist assumption that the
Constitution served to centralize, rather than devolve, political power.
Given the hostility towards state and local majorities that Marshall ex-
pressed in his Contract Clause decisions and the deference that he afforded
national majorities in his Commerce Clause decisions, it is not surprising
that Marshall fashioned a constitutional rule that preserved central political
control. 39 If the public realm of government needed constitutional protec-
36 Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 304, 4 Wheat. at 638.
37 Id. at 308, 4 Wheat. at 648.
38 Marshall already had made clear that he did not believe that the Constitution protected
political institutions from themselves in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), in
which he first articulated the proper scope of the Contract Clause. There, he declined to
permit the legislature to revoke a land grant on the ground that the initial grant was the
product of corruption. Unwise grants could not be revoked at the legislature's will; the people
would have to protect themselves through politics from such imprudent grants initially.
Courts were simply incapable of distinguishing the wise from the unwise grant. "If the
majority of the legislature be corrupted, it may well be doubted, whether it be within the
province of the judiciary to control their conduct, and, if less than a majority act from impure
motives, the principle by which judicial interference would be regulated, is not clearly
discerned." Id. at 130.
39 See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35,
at 485-594, in 3-4 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Paul A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds., 1988) (proposing
that Marshall's Contract Clause and Commerce Clause decisions were animated by his belief
that the Constitution embodied the American people's resolve to create a general government
with sovereign powers to serve as a "bulwark against the evils... [and] chaos of the pre-
framing period").
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tion, it was generally to be provided by placing constitutional restraints on
the power of local majorities and not the other way around.
There was more to Marshall's decision, however, than a simplistic, fed-
eralist defense of private over public, and central over local, power. Not-
withstanding Marshall's rhetoric about the dangers of "embarrass[ing]" state
legislative interference in the private realm, there was an important public
constitutional dimension to his decision.40 Marshall acknowledged that, at
bottom, his construction of the Contract Clause stemmed from his belief that
the public political realm must intervene to promote private institutions, as
such institutions were needed to give life to the broader constitutional vision
to which he was committed. Marshall explained that it would often prove
impossible for "[c]haritable or public-spirited individuals" to undertake their
charitable and public-spirited missions unless they were permitted by law to
incorporate.4' Private mediating institutions would not simply spring up
through the efforts of industrious individuals. They would need the public's
support, as well as the grant of legal rights to incorporate that the govern-
ment alone could confer.
The public's compensation for the grant of incorporation would stem
from the "benefit to the public" to be derived from the corporation's fulfill-
ment of its public-sponsored mission.42 There was therefore no need to ex-
act further compensation through a right of future interference.43 Indeed,
Marshall argued that if private persons could obtain the right to incorporate
only on pain of future governmental interference in their public mission,
then their incentive to seek incorporation in the first instance would be di-
minished. The public's ability to obtain the benefits of public-spirited in-
stitutions would be frustrated by recognizing the public's right to revise its
corporate grants.
It is probable, that no man ever was, and no man ever will be, the founder of a
college, believing at the time, that an act of incorporation constitutes no secu-
rity for the institution; believing, that it is immediately to be deemed a public
institution, whose funds are to be governed and applied, not by the will of the
donor, but by the will of the legislature. All such gifts are made in the pleas-
ing, perhaps, delusive hope, that the charity will flow for ever in the channel
which the givers have marked for it.
44
40 See Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 299, 4 Wheat. at 627 (discussing potentially
"unprofitable and vexatious interference with the internal concerns of a state" if the Contract
Clause were construed in its broadest latitude).
41 Id. at 304,4 Wheat. at 637.
42 Id., 4 Wheat. at 638.
43 See id.
44 Id. at 308, 4 Wheat. at 647.
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For Marshall, then, the Dartmouth College case concerned more than
the rights of private parties. His decision depended on a constitutional vi-
sion that conceived of constitutional limitations as something more than
checks on political institutions that would protect private freedom. It was a
vision that conceived of constitutional limitations as legal rules that would
facilitate the public's capacity to promote the growth of important civic in-
stitutions, such as those private colleges that would foster education.
"These eleemosynary institutions," the Chief Justice explained, "do not fill
the place, which would otherwise be occupied by government, but that
which would otherwise remain vacant. They are complete acquisitions to
literature. They are donations to education; donations, which any govern-
ment must be disposed rather to encourage than to discountenance. ''4S The
constitutional protection that he accorded the "private" corporate charter in
this way became a means of facilitating the public's capacity to promote
those civic institutions on which constitutional governance depended.
Given its undeniably public focus, Marshall's defense of constitution-
alism also paradoxically pointed in the direction of expanding local power
to facilitate the creation of private corporations, while attempting to con-
strain the power of local majorities to revise corporate charters. It sug-
gested, on the one hand, that local political interference might undermine
constitutionalism by interfering with private rights. It reflected, on the
other, a belief that the promotion of constitutionalism might depend upon
the intervention of public politics through the grant of legal rights to partici-
pants within the private market.
Marshall's conclusion-that the Contract Clause did not provide mu-
nicipal corporations with the same constitutional right against retrospective
legislative interference that it provided to private corporations-did not
necessarily imply a need to constrict the scope of local governmental power
as a general matter. If Marshall's decision suggested that local governments
possessed only that authority granted by their states, it provided no basis for
inferring that Marshall would have taken a narrow view of the scope of
those powers that states had granted local governments in municipal char-
ters. He defended state power to rebuff arguments that local political bodies
should not be considered the functional equivalents of private business cor-
porations, not because he believed that there were no instances in which the
sober exercise of local political power might serve to promote a public con-
stitutionalism.
If Marshall embraced the state creature metaphor in Dartmouth College,
then he did so in the context of a particular constitutional claim and for rea-
45 Id.
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sons that are far more compatible with a defense of localism than is com-
monly supposed. While his federalist commitments made him sympathetic
to centralized forms of political control, the opinion was more than a re-
sounding defense of state political supremacy. Indeed, Marshall's belief
that public political intervention was necessary to promote the establishment
of vital private institutions such as Dartmouth College could even be read to
support a liberal construction of local governmental charters. Such a con-
struction would promote public facilitation of the private market. This
contention had particular force in a young republic in which there was only
a skeletal federal bureaucracy and local governmental institutions played a
critical role in building the new nation.
46
That Marshall's decision was less than the sweeping defense of state
power than is sometimes suggested may be further discerned from the sub-
sequent Supreme Court doctrine that it generated. In the century that fol-
lowed Dartmouth College, the Supreme Court did not subscribe to the view
that Marshall had intended to circumscribe the power of local governments
to promote private industry. In a series of municipal bonding cases inspired
by Dartmouth College's broad construction of the Contract Clause, the
Court repeatedly stretched the boundaries of federal court deference to state
law to affirm local governmental efforts to promote private industry. Even
in cases in which it appeared undisputed that local governmental efforts to
facilitate private corporate enterprise exceeded their state-conferred powers,
the Court readily concluded that locally granted subsidies to private corpo-
rations were immune from "retrospective" repudiation by the state legisla-
ture.
47
46 See HARTOG, supra note 22, at 78 ("Several studies have demonstrated the ways that
public agencies were used as entrepreneurs and as central economic actors in the life of the
new republic.").
47 See CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88: PART ONE, 918-
1116, in 6 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES (Paul A. Freund ed., 1971) (focusing on the Court's treatment of
municipal bonds during the Reconstruction period). Fairman explains, for example, that the
Court went so far in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall) 175, 190 (1863), as to treat
a state court's overruling of a prior state court decision "on which investors might have relied"
as "impairing the obligation of a contract." Id. at 1010; see also Charles A. Heckman,
Establishing the Basis for Local Financing of American Railroad Construction in the
Nineteenth Century: From City of Bridgeport v. The Housatonic Railroad Company to
Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 236, 256 (1988) ("However we may
regard the late case in Iowa as affecting the future, it can have no effect upon the past.")
(citing Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 190).
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C. Dillon's Rule
If Dartmouth College reflected a complex understanding of the proper
constitutional relationship between state and local governments, John Dil-
lon, the most famous nineteenth-century scholar of municipal governance,
had reformulated that understanding by the end of the century to constrict
local power far more than Marshall's opinion required. 48 Dillon's logic was
simple. Corporations in general were aligned with the private realm. Mu-
nicipal corporations in particular were aligned with the public realm. The
private realm had to be protected from the passion of public politics, and
thus local governments, being by their nature public, deserved no constitu-
tional protection from state political interference, at least with respect to
their governmental powers.49
On the surface, Dillon's defense of state power seemed to follow natu-
rally from Marshall's earlier determination that local governments were
public entities established solely to carry out governmental duties. As Judge
Dillon explained in language that the Court would later adopt in the early
twentieth-century case of Hunter v. City ofPittsburgh:
50
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights
wholly from, the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without
which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. If it may destroy, it
may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation... the
legislature might, by a single act, if we can suppose it capable of so great a
folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corpora-
tions in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no
48 See 1 JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d rev. ed. New
York, James Cockroft & Co. 1873). There are a number of examinations of Dillon's legal
philosophy. See generally FAIRMAN, supra note 47, at 1102-04 (analyzing Judge Dillon's
holding in Commercial Nat'l Bank v. lola, 6 F. Cas. 221 (C.C.D. Kan. 1873) (No. 3061), and
noting that Dillon felt that taxation "could be only for a public purpose"); Frug, The City as a
Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1109-13 (discussing Dillon's commitment to the
public/private distinction); Edwin A. Gere, Jr., Dillon's Rule and the Cooley Doctrine:
Reflections of the Political Culture, 8 J. URB. HIST. 271, 277 (1982) (indicating that Dillon
limited the scope of power available to local governments); Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at
1638-40 (comparing Dillon to Cooley and noting Dillon's opinions regarding the relationship
between the public purpose doctrine and general incorporation); Williams, supra note 5, at 84
(discussing Dillon's concerns about limiting governmental power).
49 See Gere, supra note 48, at 277 (citing a portion of Dillon's opinion in City of Clinton
v. Cedar Rapids & Missouri R.R., 24 Iowa 455 (1868), in which the judge stated that courts,
when presented with "substantial doubf' as to the existence of a corporation's governmental
power, should decide against the corporation and deny the power).
so 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
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limitation on this right so far as the corporations themselves are concerned.
They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.
5 1
Dillon's approach also appeared to be consistent with the federalist
premise underlying Dartmouth College's affirmation of the state's power to
control its political subdivisions-that the Constitution was intended to
centralize, rather than to devolve majoritarian power. Dillon explained,
echoing Madison's The Federalist No. 10, that a legal regime that subjected
local governments to the strict supervision of state judges and central legis-
latures ensured that public power would be exercised by the men "best fitted
by their intelligence."
52
Despite the apparent similarity between the constitutional conception of
the state/local relationship that Dillon offered and the one that Marshall had
set forth, there was an important shift in emphasis. Marshall's vision did
not preclude the public from playing an important role. Marshall's consti-
tutional vision expressly sought to ensure that the public sphere would take
an active role in facilitating the private market's ability to establish mediat-
ing institutions like Dartmouth College. Dillon, by contrast, subscribed to a
more classically liberal economic vision of constitutionalism. He viewed
public interventions to promote the creation of private, civic institutions as
dangerous breaches of the public/private line. His defense of central power,
therefore, not only precluded local majorities from unwisely deterring pri-
vate persons from seeking public assistance in the future, but also precluded
the local public from providing assistance to the private sphere in the first
instance.
5 3
Working from these contrary substantive constitutional premises, Dillon
elaborated upon Marshall's conclusions in Dartmouth College to constrain
further the proper scope of local governmental power and to extend the state
creature metaphor. In a passage that soon became known as "Dillon's
Rule," he concluded that "[a]ny fair, reasonable, doubt concerning the exis-
tence of power is resolved by the courts against the [municipal] corporation,
51 City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868) (Dillon,
C.J.). The Supreme Court adopted similar language in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S.
161, 178 (1907).
52 1 DILLON, supra note 48, at 85; see also Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, supra note
6, at 1110 (noting that in Dillon's judgment "it was the role of the best people to assume
responsibility by recognizing and fulfilling their communal obligations").
5 See Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 1601-27 (examining Marshall's, Dillon's, and
Cooley's differing constitutional visions); see also Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, supra
note 6, at 1109-13 (noting that Dillon believed that the common good could be served best by
placing the cities under the control of the states and under judicial supervision); Williams,
supra note 5, at 84 (discussing Dillon's aversion to public intervention in the private market).
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and the power is denied., 54 Dillon's Rule severed Dartmouth College's rule
of state supremacy from its more public-regarding underpinnings and
thereby elaborated upon Marshall's defense of state power to serve a dra-
matically different substantive end. Dillon's new rule precluded local gov-
ernments from exercising any powers that had not been expressly granted
by the legislature, and thus, it thwarted the very kinds of public intervention
that Marshall had sought to encourage as a necessary incident of his more
public constitutional vision.
Under the new approach, the public's sole constitutional obligation was
to avoid interfering with private market orderings. For example, in Hanson
v. Vernon,55 Dillon struck down a state statute that authorized municipalities
to levy taxes to aid the railroads. He concluded that such a statute violated
constitutional due process because it lacked a permissible "public" pur-
pose.56 The statute in question benefited a particular private party and thus
distorted the neutral market. Though Dillon claimed to desire upholding the
statute, he explained that he could not see a way to do so without creating "a
dangerous breach in those barriers which the Constitution has erected to
protect private property from legislative invasion."57
In Dillon's hands, Marshall's rule of state supremacy reinforced a bleak
view of the relationship between constitutionalism and public political life.
It retained all of Marshall's pessimism about the relationship between public
politics and constitutionalism but showed none of the relationship's opti-
mism. It reflected a seemingly unwavering constitutional faith in the private
market that Marshall had been unwilling to accept. To the extent that Dillon
looked to the public sphere to promote constitutionalism, he looked solely to
central institutions, where the "men bestfitted by their intelligence" 58 and
culled from the state at large might keep popular politics from intruding on
the private sphere. Because central legislatures might fail to live up to their
responsibilities to respect the market's ways, Dillon ultimately placed his
54 1 DILLON, supra note 48, at 173.
55 27 Iowa 28 (1869).
56 See id. at 47-48.
57 Id. at 34-35. There are several useful discussions of Dillon's decision in Hanson. See,
e.g., FARMAN, supra note 47, at 978-79 (examining the facts out of which Hanson arose and
commenting on the judges involved in that case); Williams, supra note 5, at 95-96 ("Dillon set
forth in Hanson the framework of laissez-faire jurisprudence which most American lawyers
know as the constitutionalism of the Lochner Court .... [B]y focusing the issue around the
central metaphor of a clash between government and property, [Dillon] introduced the central
framework of laissez-faire constitutionalism.").
58 1 DILLON, supra note 48, at 85; see Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, supra note 6, at
1110 ("[l]t was the role of the best people to assume responsibility by recognizing and
fulfilling their communal obligations.").
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faith in the prospect that enlightened state judges would enforce the private
boundary that public politics would likely breach.
II. THOMAS COOLEY'S DEFENSE OF LOCAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
A. Introduction
Dillon's work has become such an established part of modem legal
culture that, if there is one rule concerning local governments about which
most persons are aware, it is his assertion that state law alone defines the
scope of local governmental independence. This now seemingly settled
doctrinal position, however, was the subject of almost immediate attack by
Thomas Cooley, who was perhaps the leading constitutional theorist of his
age.
That these two men should have diverged on the question of localism
becomes understandable only through a careful examination of their com-
peting legal visions. In many respects, Thomas Cooley and John Dillon
shared a similar substantive constitutional philosophy. Not so many years
ago, progressive legal historians portrayed both Cooley and Dillon as the
originators of laissez-faire constitutionalism and the leading intellectual
forerunners of Lochnerism. 59 In recent years, however, revisionist histori-
ans have offered a somewhat different portrait of men such as Cooley and
Dillon, one that points the way to an understanding of their differing atti-
tudes towards local governmental autonomy.
The revisionists have shown that the progressive legal historians mis-
understood the import of the laissez-faire inclinations of the leading consti-
tutional theorists of the late nineteenth century. They have persuasively
demonstrated that if Cooley and Dillon were conservatives, they were old
59 See CLYDE E. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS 112-14, 116-19 (1954)
(noting the impact of Dillon and Cooley's laissez-faire ideas on their holdings as well as the
impact of Dillon's ideas on the Constitution of Iowa); ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE
CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895, at 12-13, 78
(1969) (describing Cooley's contributions to laissez-faire constitutionalism as "path-
breaking," and noting that "Judge Dillon was never a laissez-faire extremist.... But now,
under the impact of advancing social radicalism, Dillon was to urge a philosophy of
constitutional conservatism ... that would align him not too far from the most outspoken
advocates of laissez faire"); BENJAMIN R. Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: HOW
LAISSEZ-FAIRE CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 18-41 (1942) (describing Cooley's
background and ideology). The progressive legal historians particularly reviled Cooley's
enormously influential 1868 treatise on state constitutional law, see THOMAS M. COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE
POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (Da Capo Press 1972) (1868), which one
described as the means by which laissez-faire capitalism "was supplied with a legal ideology."
TwIss, supra, at 18. Cooley's work was even described as "a direct counter to the appearance
a year earlier of Karl Marx's Das Kapital." Id.
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conservatives who sought to protect private individuals from the dangerous
combination of corporate and governmental power. These "old conserva-
tives believed that decentralized economic and political institutions-a
'self-regulating, competitive market economy presided over by a neutral,
impartial, and decentralized "night-watchman" state'-were the fundamen-
tal conditions of American freedom."
60
The revisionists' reconsideration of Cooley has been particularly illu-
minating, however, because it has shown that Cooley was far less fearful of
the public realm of politics than old conservatives such as Dillon typically
were. The progressive legal historians emphasized Cooley's defense of in-
dividual autonomy and his willingness to substitute judicial predilection for
democratic will. The revisionists, by contrast, have focused on Cooley's
Jacksonian faith in the people. The result has been a portrait of Cooley as a
"common law Jacksonian" who sought at once to embrace and to tame
popular rule.
61
60 Daniel R. Ernst, The Critical Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 102
YALE L.J. 1019, 1037 (1993) (reviewing MORTON J. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERicAN LAW, 1870-1960 (1993) [hereinafter HORwrrz, TRANSFORMATION II]) (quoting
HORwrrz, TRANSFORMATION II, supra, at 4). There are many important discussions of the
"old conservative" constitutional vision in addition to the one offered by Ernst. See, e.g.,
HoRwrrz, TRANSFORMATION II, supra, at 65-74 (tracing the development of corporate theory
through the late nineteenth century); Louise A. Halper, Christopher G. Tiedeman, 'Laissez-
Faire Constitutionalism' and the Dilemmas of Small-Scale Property in the Gilded Age, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 1349, 1350 (1990) (examining Tiedeman's jurisprudence along with his views
regarding government and economics); Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the
Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970, 987 (1975) (discussing late-nineteenth-
century judicial concern with the "reconciliation of private rights and governmental powers");
Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy Over
Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (1984) (arguing that the "legal
controversies of the Lochner period" were a "dual struggle"-both methodological and
substantive, and using the controversies surrounding railroad utility rate regulation to illustrate
the argument); Stephen A. Siegel, Let Us Now Praise Infamous Men, 73 TEX. L. REV. 661,
672-86 (1995) (reviewing OwEN M. FISS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910 (1993)) (describing the
influences of Justices Brewer and Peckham on the Fuller Court).
61 See PALUDAN, supra note 11, at 259 ("Cooley's common law respected Jacksonian
goals when it emphasized the idea that constitutional government was limited government,
and that under just law all men's rights were equal."); see also JONES, supra note 11, at 25
("Contact with Strong [Cooley's legal mentor in 1842] ... placed Cooley in the Jacksonian
pattern of New York politics ......); KAHN, supra note 11, at 73-74 (discussing Cooley's
study of the history of common law and constitutional case law and linking them to the
common law aspects of constitutional government); Carrington, supra note 11, at 527
(discussing Cooley's ideas and identifying them as Jacksonian in nature); Siegel, supra note
11, at 1489-515 (discussing Cooley's theories of constitutional interpretation, thoughts on the
common law, and thoughts on the role of the American legislatures in private enterprise). The
revisionist transformation of Cooley's constitutional legacy has been remarkable. Paul
Carrington's recent praise for Cooley's ideas as a preferably populist alternative to the elitist
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It is important to emphasize that the revisionist portrait of Cooley as a
misunderstood Jacksonian has, at times, overreached.62 He was most assur-
edly something less than a fiery populist. Indeed, the very description of
Cooley as a "common law Jacksonian" implicitly acknowledges the compli-
cated nature of Cooley's Jacksonian legal philosophy. A pure Jacksonian
faith in the people would tend towards defenses of codification, celebrations
of majoritarianism, and attacks on the common law.63 Cooley's more tem-
pered, protoprogressive Jacksonianism led him in a different direction. He
embraced a common law conception of legal development, 64 and he empha-
sized the need for constitutional limitations on popular rule. He then sought
to demonstrate how such a seemingly antidemocratic vision of the law could
be reconciled with a commitment to popular sovereignty. As we shall see,
Cooley's constitutional defense of local governmental independence
stemmed from this unique, common law Jacksonian vision.
It is important to note at the outset that, as a formal matter, Cooley
rooted his legal defense of local independence in an interpretation of the
state constitution. His defense did not rest, however, on the specific textual
provisions of the Michigan Constitution, but rather on a more general asser-
tion of basic, unwritten constitutional norms that were not tethered to a par-
ticular body of state law. This organic approach to constitutionalism was
typical of his time. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, the legal
interpretation of state laws and state constitutions was thought to provide a
model for, even as it was reflective of, federal constitutional interpretation
tendencies of Lochner's great dissenter, Justice Holmes, provides particularly powerfiul
confirmation that Cooley at last has escaped the clutches of the progressive historians. See
Carrington, supra note 11, at 527 (noting, however, that "Holmes and Cooley came to their
similar positions on judicial self-restraint from very different premises"); see also Paul D.
Carrington, Law and Economics in the Creation of Federal Administrative Law: Thomas
Cooley, Elder to the Republic, 83 IOWA L. REv. 363, 364 (1998) (describing Cooley's
acceptance of the Jacksonian equal rights doctrine and the Jacksonian belief "that any more
ambitious scheme of government regulation would almost surely be captured and used for the
selfish advantage of those whom it purported to regulate").
62 For example, Cooley has been allied with populism. See Carrington, supra note 11, at
498 ("mhe populist traditions and values represented by Cooley will attract more adherence
in the century to come than they have in the eleven decades that have passed since 1886.").
63 See, e.g., HORWrrz, TRANSFORMATION II, supra note 60, at 117-21 (discussing
codification of the common law as a perennial issue in American legal history and, for
exam6le, tracing the codification of the New York and California civil codes).
In particular, Cooley rejected arguments in favor of codification. See COOLEY, supra
note 58, at 22 ("It was the peculiar excellence of the common law that it recognized the worth,
and sought specifically to protect the rights and the privileges of the individual man.... The
system was the opposite of servile; its features implied boldness and independent self-reliance
on the part of the people .... ").
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65in a way that our present legal context should not obscure. As a result,
Cooley's defense of local governmental independence, although formally
based in state law norms, was rooted in a larger constitutional vision that he
believed to be capable of generalization.
Cooley offered a constitutional vision that sought to secure a norm of
public neutrality through the popular practice of local self-government,
rather than simply through the judicial imposition of restraints on demo-
cratic politics. In doing so, Cooley sought less to protect the private sphere
from public intrusion than to protect the public sphere from private influ-
ence. Cooley's defense of local independence, therefore, broke from both
Dillon's pessimistic view of the public's capacity to foster constitutionalism
and Marshall's assumption that constitutionalism required public interven-
tion in the private sphere. He instead offered a vision of local constitution-
alism in which public municipal corporations-such as towns and cities-
would be responsible for imparting important values to the public in much
the same manner that Marshall had previously imagined private civic
corporations such as Dartmouth College would be.
B. Cooley 's Break with Marshall's Decision in Dartmouth College
For Cooley, the Constitution was not a privatizing charter that protected
individuals from government. It was a publicizing document that protected
the community from self-interested public officials, corrupted by powerful
private interests. This conception of constitutionalism reoriented the tradi-
tional understanding of the constitutional boundary line between the public
and the private spheres.66 The Constitution should be understood to provide
protection against both political intrusions into the private market and pri-
vate corruption of the public sphere.
67
65 See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 109-10 ("Since
Congress had tacitly allowed the states to take the lead in regulating entrepreneurial activity,
the pattern of regulation tolerated by state courts came to serve as a pattern for the nation.").
66 See MORTON J. HORWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at
255-56 (1977) (discussing the traditional nineteenth-century distinction between the public
and the private spheres); HORwrrz, TRANSFORMATION II, supra note 60, at 11 ("All of these
conceptualizations [of the public/private distinction] sought to establish a separate, 'natural'
realm of non-coercive and non-political transactions free from the dangers of state
interference and redistribution."); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's
Commentaries, 28 BuFF. L. REv. 205, 234 (1979) ("The liberal argument was that the
exercise of state power was legitimate only to ... facilitate-] intercourse between individuals
in... civil society by promoting their rights against one another; or... [to] protect[] those
same individual rights against attempts by the state ... to establish itself as a private power
center.").
67 In this respect, Cooley's constitutional vision accorded with the more general
nineteenth-century defense of what have been termed "public rights." See Harry N. Scheiber,
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Cooley rejected Dartmouth College's application of the public/private
distinction precisely because he believed that it would neither ensure that
individual reason would trump popular passion nor prevent private interests
from capturing public power. The broad construction of the Contract
Clause that Chief Justice Marshall adopted would simply accord legal rec-
ognition to the corrupt deals that powerful private interests might strike with
public officials.
68
The unique conception of the constitutional distinction that Cooley
drew between the public and the private spheres stemmed from the com-
mitment to constitutional equality that animated it. Cooley, like Jacksonian
constitutional theorists generally, believed in "equality of freedom" and not
"equality in the sense of achieving distributive justice., 69 For Cooley, the
preservation of equality "affirm[ed] the autonomy and liberty of persons to
order their own affairs, subject to general laws which do not create favored
or disfavored classes of citizens."
70
Cooley's commitment to a constitutional norm of equality led him to
distrust public attempts to empower the private realm. Such public efforts
threatened to deprive the people of a government administered pursuant to
neutral rules and tended to steer the law away from the general interest and
towards the particular. The private sphere's success in capturing public
power would result in the passage of class legislation that would confer spe-
cial privileges on powerful, favored persons. Cooley therefore premised his
commitment to the public/private distinction less on a faith in the private
market than in a belief that, as Cooley put it in his 1868 treatise on state
constitutional law, "every one has a right to ... be governed by general
rules.
' 7 1
Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal History, 72 CAL. L. REV. 217, 219
(1984) (arguing that "American judges and legal commentators have not given sustained,
explicit, and systematic attention to the notion that the public, and not only private parties,
have 'rights' that must be recognized and honored if there is to be true rule of law").
68 See JONES, supra note 11, at 132-33 (discussing Cooley's ideology regarding the
power of corporations); see also HORwvrrz, TRANSFORMATION II, supra note 60, at 65-74
(discussing the hostility of the legal elite in the late nineteenth century to the Dartmouth
Colllee decision).
Mark G. Yudof, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Sex Discrimination: One
Small Cheer for Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1366, 1372
(1990) (reviewing WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988)); see also Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection,
Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245, 251-68 (1997) (discussing the
Jacksonian conception of equality and Cooley's conception of equality in particular).
70 Yudof, supra note 69, at 1372.
71 THoMAs M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIoNs VHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 459 (3d ed.
Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1874); see also Yudof, supra note 69, at 1374 (discussing this
quotation).
1999]
514 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW
More than speculation underlie Cooley's fear that private interests
would corrupt the public realm. By the middle part of the nineteenth cen-
tury, many had come to see the state legislature as "'a counter over which
private groups could acquire legal rights and privileges, without undue
squeamishness about the methods employed by lobbyist or legislator."'
72
There was a "widespread folk mood which identified legislation with spe-
cial privilege." 73 A similar mood had inspired Chief Justice Taney, Presi-
dent Jackson's chosen successor to Chief Justice Marshall, to set forth the
basic premises of the constitutional vision that Cooley would come to em-
brace. Taney's vision broke sharply from Marshall's conception of the
public/private distinction:
"It would be against the spirit of our free institutions, by which equal rights are
intended to be secured to all, to grant peculiar franchises and privileges to a
body of individuals merely for the purpose of enabling them more conven-
iently and effectually to advance their own private interests... . The consid-
eration upon which alone, such peculiar privileges can be granted is the ex-
pectation and prospect of promoting thereby some public interest.... ,74
By embracing Taney's antagonism towards federalist constitutional
theory's tendency to favor private power, Cooley severely limited the per-
missible scope of public legislation. Public laws could be deemed constitu-
tional only if they served some intelligible public purpose. At the same
time, Cooley, like Taney before him, understood his constitutional vision to
be far more respectful of public power than Marshall's. Taney explained in
the Charles River Bridge case, in which he severely curtailed Marshall's de-
cision in Dartmouth College, that
the object and end of all government is to promote the happiness and prosper-
ity of the community by which it is established; and it can never be assumed,
that the government intended to diminish its power of accomplishing the end
for which it was created.... The continued existence of a government would
be of no great value, if, by implications and presumptions, it was disarmed of
the powers necessary to accomplish the ends of its creation, and the functions
it was designed to perform, transferred to the hands of privileged corpora-
tions.
75
72 Heckman, supra note 47, at 247-48 (quoting ROBERT S. HUNT, LAW AND
LOCOMOTIVES: THE IMPACT OF THE RAILROAD ON WIsCONsIN LAW IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 33-34 (1958)).
73 JONES, supra note 11, at 41.
74 CARL BRENT SWIsHER, ROGER B. TANEY 366-67 (1935) (quoting Memorandum from
Chief Justice Roger Taney to President Andrew Jackson (June 20, 1836)).
75 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 547-48, 1 Pet. 341, 430-31
(1837).
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Cooley agreed with Taney's assessment. The strong defense of private
power that Marshall advanced threatened to "diminish" the public's power
to serve the ends for which government had been created. It permitted pri-
vate parties to wrest control of the public power, and then to give legal
sanction to their claims of a right to continue to exercise that publicly con-
ferred power even in the face of a popular conclusion to the contrary. As
Cooley explained in a footnote appended to the 1874 edition of his treatise
on state constitutional law:
It is under the protection of the decision in [Dartmouth College] that the most
enormous and threatening powers in our country have been created; some of
the great and wealthy corporations actually having greater influence in the
country at large and upon the legislation of the country than the States to which
they owe their corporate existence. Every privilege granted or right con-
ferred-no matter by what means or on what pretence-being made inviolable
by the Constitution, the government is frequently found stripped of its author-
ity in very important particulars, by unwise, careless, or corrupt legislation;
and a clause of the Federal Constitution, whose purpose was to preclude the
repudiation of debts and just contracts, protects and perpetuates the evil.
76
C. Cooley's Break with Dillon's Rule
Cooley's substantive constitutional vision gave rise to a paradox. He
broke from Marshall's defense of private power in order to defend the rights
of the public. Cooley's substantive desire to keep public institutions free
from private control appeared to depend, however, upon the antidemocratic
judicial assessment of the "public" nature of duly enacted legislation. His
substantive constitutional vision, though ostensibly rooted in a defense of
popular political power, threatened to make the judiciary, rather than the
people, supreme.
Cooley resolved the paradox by arguing that the contours of substantive
constitutional principles may be fully defined only through judicial atten-
tiveness to, and respect for, popular democratic practices. He became a
leading proponent of the turn towards an organic or historical conception of
constitutional development that emerged in late-nineteenth-century consti-
tutional theory. He argued that constitutional principles could not be di-
vined solely from the written text. Their meanings and scopes acquired
their shapes through the habits and customs of the people as they developed
over time.77 Constitutional development occurred in much the same way
76 COOLEY, supra note 70, at 315-16 n.2.
77 See JONEs, supra note 11, at 231-46 (explaining that Cooley's approach to law
"combined the idea of law as a changing response to common sentiments and needs and the
idea of law as a reservoir of right reason and valued prescription"); KAN, supra note 11, at
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that common law development occurred. Constitutional principles flowed
from the "'common thoughts of men"'78 and the daily experiences of people
living together in particular communities just as
"[t]he noble Common Law of England is the code enacted by the common
people of England, carefully elaborated and perfected through long centuries,
at their firesides, and in their shops, and only declared in Parliament and in the
courts. Its peculiar excellence is that it is forever adapted to the people, and
expands to accommodate new circumstances and new and higher conditions of
society.
" 79
Because Cooley understood constitutionalism as a public practice that
the people experienced through politics, and because, as we have seen, he
believed himself to be enforcing public rights against private power, he did
not share Dillon's attraction to a regime of constitutional enforcement that
depended solely upon judicial review.80  Cooley broke from Dillon's de-
76 (explaining Cooley's belief that "constitutionalism must be an expression of
reasonableness" and that Cooley linked "reason to popular government through a model of
growth .... [T]he pattern of growth is the development of reason in an institutional form that
receives support from the contemporary community"); Siegel, supra note 11, at 1514
(explaining that "Cooley's historism allows him to see principles in the Constitution's text
that modem scholars see as nontextual; it allows him to find determinate law where modem
scholars see discretionary value choices"); see also Carrington, supra note 11, at 525-33
(contrasting Holmes's positivism with Cooley's historism). It is important to note, however,
that the initial version of Cooley's treatise on state constitutional law contained a lengthy
introductory section that purported to defend a more conventionally strict construction of the
constitutional text. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE
AMERICAN UNION 3-4 (photo. reprint 1972) (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1868); see also
Thomas H. Peebles, A Call to High Debate: The Organic Constitution in Its Formative Era,
1890-1920, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 49, 71 n.92 (1980) (finding Cooley to be more enamored of
a fixed view of constitutionalism than other late-nineteenth-century constitutional theorists).
Cooley's organic conception of constitutionalism became quite pronounced, however, by the
last decades of the century. See, e.g., Thomas M. Cooley, Comparative Merits of Written and
Prescriptive Constitutions, 2 HARV. L. REV. 341, 349 (1889) ("A good constitution must be
of gradual formation; it must result from the history and experiences of the people, and be the
natural and deliberate expression of their thoughts, wishes, and aspirations in government.");
Thomas M. Cooley, The Federal Supreme Court-Its Place in the American Constitutional
System, in CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 29 (G.P. Putnam's Sons,
1890) (providing a general survey of the origins of federal judicial authority).
78 Carrington, supra note 11, at 499 (quoting Thomas M. Cooley, Address at Harvard
Univ. (Nov. 1886), in HARVARD UNIVERSITY, A RECORD OF THE COMMEMORATION,
NOVEMBER FIrT TO EIGHTH, 1886, ON THE Two HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY
OF THE FOUNDING OF HARVARD COLLEGE (1887)).
79 JONES, supra note 11, at 115-16 (quoting ADDRESS BY HON. THOMAS M. COOLEY ON
THE DEDICATION OF THE LAW LECTURE HALL OF MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY 5-6 (Ann Arbor
1863)).
80 See JONES, supra note 11, at 150 (explaining that Cooley "did not overvalue the role of
the judiciary in setting its own arbitrary standards of what was arbitrary, and his influence
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fense of state judicial and legislative power. by subscribing to a social rather
than a positivist conception of constitutional meaning. Popular institutional
practices, not simply legal texts, would give life to constitutional principles.
This more democratic conception of constitutionalism led Cooley to
connect his substantive constitutional commitment with equality and to
connect neutral public governance to a structural defense of the practice of
local self-government.81  Local political institutions provided the fora
through which people could engage in the practice of constitutionalism for
themselves. The practice of local self-government would directly inculcate
constitutional values in the public sphere by affording the local citizenry an
opportunity to practice democracy within constitutional limitations.
Through the practice of public politics at the local level, citizens would be
forced in a direct and immediate way to determine for themselves which de-
cisions would serve the "public" interests of their own communities and
which would not. That experience would provide citizens with a greater
understanding of what it meant to govern themselves in accord with consti-
tutional limitations than would be possible under a regime of either central-
ized state legislative control or judicial supremacy.
Like Dillon, Cooley feared that public politics would intrude on the pri-
vate market. Unlike Dillon, however, he demanded that local political in-
stitutions assume responsibility for enforcing the constitutional imperative
that the public sphere should not intrude upon the private realm. He argued
that constitutionalism could not achieve a "living and breathing spirit"
82
unless local political entities possessed a measure of freedom to give con-
tent to the substantive constitutional limitations on untoward public inter-
ventions that judges were often poorly positioned to enforce.
Cooley neatly summarized his beliefs in his great treatise on constitu-
tional limitations. The American constitutional framework was intended to
ensure "that the powers of government are not concentrated in any one body
of men, but are carefully distributed, with a view to being easily, cheaply,
and intelligently exercised, and as far as possible by the persons more im-
emphatically lay in the direction ofjudicial self-restraint rather than in the direction ofjudicial
usur ?ation" (footnote omitted)).
Local self-government having always been a part of the English and American
system, we shall look for its recognition in any such instrument. And even if not
expressly recognized, it is still to be understood that all these instruments are framed
with its present existence and anticipated continuance in view.
COOLEY, supra note 77, at 35; see also PALUDAN, supra note 11, at 258 (explaining that
"Cooley came more and more to believe that an institutional framework, such as that provided
by the common law, was imperative for liberty"); Carrington, supra note 11, at 535-39
(linking Cooley's defense of local self-government to his Jacksonian constitutional vision).
82 People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 107-08 (1871) (Cooley, J., concurring).
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mediately interested. 83 As a result, Cooley later argued, the judicial pro-
tection of local governmental independence would not undermine, as Dillon
seemed to contend, basic constitutional values. Instead, Cooley explained,
such protection would be necessary in certain circumstances in order to se-
cure what he termed "constitutional freedom. 84
Cooley noted that constitutional freedom demanded more than the en-
forcement of negative rights against the public. "Constitutional freedom
certainly does not consist in exemption from governmental interference in
the citizen's private affairs; in his being unmolested in his family, suffered
to buy, sell and enjoy property, and generally to seek happiness in his own
way. 85 Such a constricted conception of freedom "might be permitted by
the most arbitrary rule, even though [the ruler] allowed his subjects no de-
gree of political liberty." 86 Cooley sought to prove that there was a public
dimension to constitutional freedom by appealing to the intuitions of his
readers.
The government of an oligarchy may be as just, as regardful of private rights,
and as little burdensome as any other; but if it were sought to establish such a
government over our cities by law it would hardly do to call upon a protesting
people to show where in the constitution the power to establish it was prohib-
ited .... 87
Cooley's defense of local governmental independence, therefore, rested
upon a partial rejection of a purely privatized conception of the purpose of
constitutional protection. To be sure, Cooley conceded, there was no ex-
press constitutional protection for the rights of the local public. This textual
omission only served, however, to reinforce his belief in the merits of an or-
ganic conception of constitutional meaning. "Some things," Cooley ex-
plained, "are too plain to be written.
88
Given its localist dimension, Cooley's substantive hostility toward pri-
vate-interested legislation should not be mistaken for an embrace of a nine-
83 COOLEY, supra note 77, at 190-91. The passage echoes de Tocqueville's earlier
statement that
[a] nation may establish a system of free government, but without the spirit of
municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty. The transient passions and
the interests of an hour, or the chance of circumstances, may have created the
external forms of independence; but the despotic tendency which has been repelled
will, sooner or later, inevitably reappear on the surface.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 60 (Henry Reeve trans., Colonial Press
rev. ed. 1900) (1835).
84 Hurlbut, 24 Mich. at 106 (Cooley, J., concurring).
85 Id.
86 Id. at 106-07.
87 Id. at 107.
88 Id.
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teenth-century version of public choice theory. 89 He agreed with Marshall,
and broke with Dillon, in arguing that the practice of public politics could
serve public interests, and he elaborated upon that intuition in arguing that
only a strong system of local self-governance would protect "constitutional
freedom."90 The "public" realm was not to be divined from the aggregate
preferences of the largest territorial majority that spoke on a given legal
question. It was to be culled from the
usages, the customs, the maxims, that have sprung from the habits of life,
modes of thought, methods of trying facts by the neighborhood, and mutual re-
sponsibility in neighborhood interests, the precepts which have come from the
revolutions which overturned tyrannies, the sentiments of manly independence
and self-control which impelled our ancestors to summon the local community
to redress local evils, instead of relying upon king or legislature at a distance to
do so-if a recognition of all these were to be stricken from the body of our
constitutional law, a lifeless skeleton might remain, but the living spirit, that
which gives it force and attraction, which makes it valuable and draws to it the
affections of the people, that which distinguishes it from the numberless con-
stitutions, so called, which in Europe have been set up and thrown down within
the last hundred years, many of which, in their expressions, have seemed
equally far and to possess equal promise with ours, and have only been want-
ing in the support and vitality which these alone can give-this living and
breathing spirit, which supplies the interpretation of the words of the written
charter, would be utterly lost and gone.
91
Here, Cooley relied on (and indeed, cited to) the insights of Francis
Lieber, the German legal philosopher who had become an influential pro-
fessor of law at the University of South Carolina. Lieber argued that local
political institutions served as the primary means by which it was possible
to "unite self-government and self-government."92 Local institutions con-
stituted the "political embodiment of self-reliance and mutual acknow-
ledgement of self-rule. It is in this view the political realization of equal-
89
Like all good Jacksonians, [Cooley] fully appreciated the core of truth in public
choice theory-hat the legislatures and courts are easily deflected from pursuing the
common good by their own self-interests-but he maintained a base of optimism
(disturbingly absent in public choice theory) that professionals committed to serving
the common good can enjoy some success.
Carrington, supra note 11, at 527 (footnote omitted).
90 Hurlbut, 24 Mich. at 108-09 (Cooley, J., concurring).
91 Id. at 107.
92 FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 320 (Theodore D.
Woolsey ed., 3d rev. ed. J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1859). Cooley's defense of local
governmental independence in Hurlbut relied on Lieber's work. See Hurlbut, 24 Mich. at 99
(Cooley, J., concurring) (relying on Lieber in expressing concerns about a centralized
government).
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ity. 9 3 The "absence of a love of institutions leads to a remarkable tendency
to worship one man, to centralization, or, in some cases, to the very oppo-
site-a desire to abolish all government, and establish the 'sovereignty of
the individual.' All extremes in politics meet."
94
The exercise of self-government through local governmental institu-
tions, Lieber contended, ensured the preservation of liberty in a way that the
practice of self-government through more centralized political mechanisms
could not.
Yet the self-government of our country or of England would be considered by
us little more than oil floating on the surface of the water, did it consist only in
a congress and state legislatures with us, and in a parliament in England. Self-
government, to be of a penetrative character, requires the institutional self-
government of the county or district; it requires that everything which, without
general inconvenience, can be left to the circle to which it belongs, be thus left
to its own management; it consists in the presenting grand jury, in the petty
jury, in the fact that much which is called on the European continent the ad-
ministrative branch be left to the people. It requires, in one word, all the local
appliances of government which are termed local self-government; and Nie-
buhr says that British liberty depends at least as much on these as on parlia-
ment, and in contradistinction to them he calls the governments of the conti-
nent Staats-Regierungen, (state governments, meaning A ovemments in which
all detail is directed by the general and supreme power).
Cooley added content to Lieber's abstract, structural argument in favor
of local governmental independence by linking it to Cooley's substantive,
common law Jacksonian commitment to constitutional equality. Cooley did
not believe that local governments were entitled to complete freedom of ac-
tion. He acknowledged that, at some level, local governments were crea-
tures of their states, subject to a substantial degree of state supervision.
96
Indeed, he believed that a contrary conclusion would simply authorize local
governments to become arbitrary sovereigns in their own right. He did not
concur, however, in Dillon's contention that the essentially subordinate
status of local governments deprived them of constitutional protection from
state interference or precluded them from assuming an affirmative role in
protecting constitutional liberty. Local governments were critical institu-
tions for checking the arbitrary tendencies of public power and for infusing
the public realm with those substantive constitutional principles that made
the practice of self-government worthy ofjudicial respect.
93 LIEBER, supra note 92, at 320.
94 Id. at 286.
95 Id. at 321 (footnotes omitted).
96 See COOLEY, supra note 77, at 191-93 (explaining some of the restrictions on local
governmental power and describing some of the powers of the states over municipalities).
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Thus, where Dillon feared the tendency of local majorities to ignore
substantive constitutional limitations, Cooley believed that local govern-
ments were often the fora in which the "mutual acknowledgement of self-
rule" 97 would take root. Local political institutions might be well posi-
tioned-indeed, better positioned than judges or state legislatures-to de-
termine whether governmental action served a "public" rather than a "pri-
vate" purpose. They might be the institutions best situated to ensure that a
constitutional norm of equal protection would be respected. Or, at least, to
the extent that this empirical prediction proved incorrect, Cooley argued that
a meaningful constitutionalism depended upon local political institutions
striving towards, and being encouraged to strive towards, this ideal.
State attempts to preclude local governments from ensuring respect for
the public/private boundary, therefore, were constitutionally suspect. Such
attempts directly interfered with the institutional means by which the sub-
stantive boundary line that separated the public from the private could be
fully secured. For Cooley, a defense of local independence could be justi-
fied as a structural means by which the substantive constitutional principle
of public equality could be defended. In this way, the judicial protection of
the local community from state interference served as a means by which the
individual right to equal administration of the laws could be protected.
D. Conclusion
Cooley believed that a substantive conception of constitutional princi-
ples, rather than an abstract, a priori commitment to local autonomy, defined
the limits of local independence from state control. Judges should intervene
to protect local independence only when the state's interference threatened
the locality's capacity to act in accord with a substantive constitutional re-
quirement of neutral, public governance. Moreover, Cooley argued that
constitutionalism required more than the conscientious enforcement of judi-
cially imposed substantive restraints on public intrusions into the neutral,
private realm. It required an institutional framework that would, on the one
hand, preclude powerful private interests from dominating the public politi-
cal realm, and, on the other, provide a space for the practice of local self-
government in accord with substantive constitutional limitations.
The maintenance of such a framework would sometimes require judi-
cial deference to a state judgment that local governments were in need of
supervision-but only sometimes. Judges could ensure that the people
would use their lawmaking powers to serve public rather than private ends
97 See supra note 94 and accompanying text (explaining Lieber's view that institutional,
local self-government was distinct from government by majority rle).
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by sensitively employing constitutional limitations to allocate institutional
power between state and local governments. The difficulty, of course, lay
in distinguishing the types of state intrusions on local affairs that merited
skeptical judicial inquiry from those that did not. We now turn to Cooley's
attempt to draw such distinctions.
III. COOLEY'S LOCAL CONSTITUTIONALISM APPLIED
A. Introduction
To see how .Cooley employed his unique vision of local constitutional-
ism in order to enforce substantive constitutional constraints on state legis-
lative action and in order to infuse the local political realm with substantive
constitutional principles, the next two Subparts examine two particular doc-
trinal areas that Cooley examined through his unique, localist lens. Each
area concerns a pressing problem that faced local governments in the late
nineteenth century. The first concerns the increasing power of large corpo-
rations in the supply of public services. The second concerns the increasing
power of political parties in the control of popular political life.
Each of these potentially menacing private forces-private corporations
and private political parties-threatened to overwhelm the local public
sphere. Both forces, particularly when joined with the power of state gov-
ernment, threatened to undermine the constitutional principle of equal ad-
ministration of the law that Cooley held so dear. Thus, in each doctrinal
area, Cooley employed a defense of local governmental independence to se-
cure a public space within which the people could conduct themselves in
accord with substantive constitutional limitations on governmental power.
In each area, Cooley employed that defense to extend a constitutional norm
of public neutrality that served to protect an individual right to equality, as
he conceived it, that would otherwise lie beyond judicial competence to en-
force. The examination that follows, therefore, reveals how Cooley con-
ceived of local governments as extrajudicial agents of constitutional free-
dom rather than either passive agents of state will or protected zones of
private freedom.
B. The Private Supply of Public Services
A key issue in the late nineteenth century concerned the authority of lo-
cal governments to raise capital for proposed railroad construction projects.
Municipalities, eager to take advantage of a growing national transportation
market, often assumed huge debts through publicly issued securities to en-
sure that a proposed rail would pass through their borders. When towns
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proved reluctant to assume such debts, state legislatures, under heavy pres-
sure from railroad interests, would often command them to do so.
98
Cooley found offensive the mad scramble to fund the new rails and
found unseemly the attempts by the railroads to claim a vested right in the
locally issued securities that, if honored, would often bankrupt the commu-
nity. He believed that the resulting municipal bankruptcies were less the
consequence of public imprudence than private selfishness. The railroad
companies maneuvered themselves to lay claim to public funds by exerting
political pressure to secure the bond issues and then seeking to immunize
their ill-gotten gains from public correction by relying on the constitutional
protection afforded private contracts. The legal claims of the railroads-
claims made legitimate by Marshall's opinion in Trustees of Dartmouth Col-
lege v. Woodward 99-- constituted little more than private efforts to capture
the public realm.
00
Cooley addressed the crisis occasioned by the disputes over such bond
issues in his famous decision for the Michigan Supreme Court in People ex
rel. Detroit & Howell Railroad v. Township Board of Salem10' and in his
earlier treatise on state constitutional limitations. 10 2 In each instance, Coo-
ley conceived of the problem as one that implicated both substantive con-
stitutional limitations on the capacity of public majorities to lend capital in
aid of private business ventures and structural constitutional limitations on
the authority of state majorities to intervene in local affairs. In his most
trenchant response to the problem, set forth in his treatise discussion, Coo-
ley conjoined his substantive and structural analyses to enforce a substantive
constitutional limitation on the influence of private power through the in-
stitutional mechanism of enhanced local governmental independence.1
0 3
In Township Board of Salem, Cooley considered the constitutionality of
an 1864 state law that permitted several Michigan townships to pledge their
credit to aid in the construction of a privately owned railroad running from
Detroit to the village of Howell. By writ of mandamus, the private railroad
98 See generally FAIRMAN, supra note 47, at 918-1116 (describing the legal debates over
states commanding localities to issue municipal bonds); Heckman, supra note 47, at 241-69
(showing the importance of, and some legal arguments concerning, municipality-organized
railroad financing).
99 17 U.S. 250,4 Wheat. 518 (1819).
100 See JONES, supra note 11, at 131-38 (describing, inter alia, Cooley's distaste for the
new powers of railroads and other corporations, and his fears of their exercising "more
influence over the state legislatures than both political parties").
101 20 Mich. 452, 494 (1870) (holding that a state cannot compel a locality to issue bonds
for the benefit of a private corporation).
102 See infira text accompanying note 125.
103 See infra text accompanying notes 125-27.
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sued to enforce the bonds issued, pursuant to the state statute, against mu-
nicipalities that had refused to pay them. The towns defended the suit on
the ground that the securities were void. They argued that the taxing power
conferred by the state constitution contained inherent limits that precluded
the government from raising money for private purposes. 10 4 The railroad
countered that the state constitution protected its rights in the securities from
retrospective repudiation.
10 5
Cooley approached the constitutional question at issue in Township
Board of Salem deeply suspicious of the railroad's claim. Cooley's belief
that the traditional application of the public/private distinction had dimin-
ished public power informed his analysis in Salem. The court had instructed
the parties to address whether the towns had entered into an enforceable
contract with the railroad,10 6 but Cooley concentrated on a prior question.
He asked whether private persons could compel the exercise of the public
taxing power by asserting a constitutional right to specific performance of a
contractual agreement with a public entity.
10 7
For Cooley, it would not do to follow Marshall in Dartmouth College
and to check a public attempt to renege on a contract with a private party.
Such an approach would only facilitate an irrevocable blending of the public
and private spheres. It would tend to diminish the public's ability to ensure
the impartial administration of the law by conferring upon a private industry
the power to compel the exercise of public power. Thus, for Cooley, reso-
lution would turn on whether the state constitution protected the public
sphere from private influence, not on whether it protected the private market
from political incursion.
104 See Township Bd. of Salem, 20 Mich. at 453-60 ("A construction of [specific
segments of the state constitution], which shall leave it in the power of the Legislature to
authorize or compel each city and township ... to grant or loan its credit to, or subscribe to
the stock of railroad companies ... would render these sections nugatory.").
105 See id. at 460-69 (arguing that railroads are public improvements and "to encourage
and aid their construction would seem to be directly within the powers usually conferred upon
municipal corporations").
106
Did the proceedings which were had create a contract, or any relation or obligation
in the nature of a contract, between the township and the railroad company? What
was its precise character? If not, what is the specific ground upon which the
company is entitled to the mandamus prayed for?
Id. at 469.
107 See id. at 472 ("The railroad company therefore apply [sic] for a writ of mandamus to
compel the delivery of the securities, and an issue of law having been joined upon that
application, we are required to consider the important constitutional question which the
objection of the township board presents.").
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Cooley began by stating that the state taxing power
must be imposed for a public, and not for a mere private purpose. Taxation is
a mode of raising revenue for public purposes only, and, as is said in some of'
the cases, when it is prostituted to objects in no way connected with the public
interests or welfare, it ceases to be taxation and becomes plunder.
10 8
Cooley conceded that the legislature must not be prevented from "taking
broad views of State interest, necessity or policy, or from giving those views
effect by means of the public revenues." 10 9 He argued, however, that "[i]n
the present case it appears that the object of the burden is not to raise money
for a purpose of general State interest."110 The railroads were "not, when in
private hands, the people's highways; but they are private property, whose
owners make it their business to transport persons and merchandise in their
own carriages, over their own land, for such pecuniary compensation as
may be stipulated." ' Private parties were attempting to "prostitute" the
public realm under the guise of enforcing constitutional property rights .
1 12
The requirement that state taxation further a public purpose served to
"distinguish the object for which, according to settled usage, the govern-
ment is to provide, from those which, by the like usage, are left to private
inclination, interest or liberality."'1 13 This "line of distinction" 1 4 made it
immediately clear that the present case fell outside the scope of the public
purpose requirement. Public actors did not oversee the provision of railroad
service; private actors did. The "public may reap many and large benefits
from them, and indeed are expected to do so." 115 They would reap them,
however, "only incidentally, and only as they might reap similar benefits
from other modes of investing private capital."' 1 6 Such public efforts to
privilege private parties offended Cooley's "old conservative" conception of
constitutional equality.
Where Marshall emphasized the need to protect the private sphere from
public control so that important civic institutions could serve the public's
interests, Cooley emphasized the need to protect the public sphere from the
corrupting influence of the private market. Where Marshall deemed corpo-
rate charters useful private contracts, Cooley concluded that they were
108 Id. at 474.
109 Id. at 475.
110 Id. at 476.
I"I Id. at478-79.
112 See id. at 474.
113 Id. at 485.
"14 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
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problematic private subsidies. As Cooley explained, "when the State once
enters upon the business of subsidies, we shall not fail to discover that the
strong and powerful interests are those most likely to control legislation, and
that the weaker will be taxed to enhance the profits of the stronger.""
' 17
To this point, Cooley's approach in Township Board of Salem appeared
to be substantially similar to the approach that John Dillon had employed in
Hanson v. Vernon."18 There, as we have seen, Dillon concluded that a state
statute that authorized municipalities to raise railroad bonds trenched on the
constitutional line separating the public from the private sphere. Dillon un-
apologetically asserted the importance of judicial review in voiding that
state law. In justifying his decision to do so, Dillon relied on the judicial
capacity to enforce a formal line that would distinguish between public and
private legislation. Cooley's decision in Township Board of Salem did not,
however, betray a similar confidence in the judicial power or a similar
skepticism about the role that public politics might play in fostering consti-
tutionalism.
The dissent in Township Board of Salem noted that Cooley had con-
ceded that the state possessed the authority to exercise the power of eminent
domain on behalf of railroads, even though such a power could only be ex-
ercised for a "public" purpose. 119 How, then, could Cooley legitimately
contend that the state's exercise of its taxing power was not similarly "pub-
lic"? Was Cooley not relying on his own unmoored assumptions about the
impurity of legislative motives in striking down the state law? How could a
Jacksonian jurist reject a popular determination of what constituted a public
purpose?
120
To blunt the force of the dissent's objection, Cooley turned to a defense
of localism that departed dramatically from Dillon's more privatized con-
stitutional vision. Cooley noted that the towns responsible for exercising
the state-delegated taxing power perceived (no doubt somewhat self-
servingly) the state law authorization to serve private rather than public pur-
poses. Judges should not ignore the local community's democratic determi-
nation that such legislation failed to serve constitutionally permissible pub-
lic ends. Cooley explained that the scope of the state's power to determine
117 Id. at 487.
118 27 Iowa 28 (1869); see supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing the
Hanson opinion).
119 See Township Bd. of Salem, 20 Mich. at 510 (Graves, J., dissenting).
120 Indeed, Justice Graves's dissent opened with a blistering assault on what he perceived
to be a majority opinion rooted in an unjustified assumption ofjudicial supremacy. See id. at
502-08 (Graves, J., dissenting).
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municipal tax policy must be construed in light of the prevailing system of
municipal governance.
The power of coercion and control is nevertheless to be exercised in view of
and in subordination to those maxims of local self-government which pervade
our whole system, and which preclude arbitrary and unaccustomed imposi-
tions, however desirable in the opinion of the Legislature, the object to be at-
tained may appear to be.121
Cooley elaborated on the point by noting that, as a general matter, gov-
ernment should "leave with the local communities, in managing the public
affairs which concern them, the largest possible liberty of action which
is consistent with the general public order and good government."122 Here,
the state claimed to be acting consistently with that principle by permitting a
locality to raise taxes to "encourage a local enterprise."' 23 By so framing
the state's interest in enacting the law, however, Cooley could easily rejoin
that the state law did not serve the state's interest. A single local commu-
nity would be raising money-not for a public purpose that would directly
serve that community-but rather, for a private enterprise that would serve
the needs of the community that would bear the financial burden of sup-
porting it.
124
Thus, if the result in Township Board of Salem did not differ from the
one that Dillon had reached in Hanson, the mode of argumentation did.
Cooley portrayed his decision as a structural defense of local governmental
prerogatives, rather than simply as a defense of an objectified distinction
between the public and the private realms. He conceded that there were
limits on the scope of judicial power, but he believed that these limitations
did not preclude the judicial imposition of structural limitations on state
authority. Cooley therefore accorded the local political realm a primary role
in enforcing the very constitutional line that Dillon assumed local govern-
mental institutions would be particularly likely to breach.
In addition, through his defense of a measured form of local govern-
mental independence, Cooley recast the judicial role in more democratic
terms than Dillon thought necessary. The court, in striking down the state
law authorizing local bond issues, was not second-guessing the legisla-
ture's motives. It was defending a long-standing tradition of local self-
government and protecting a valuable institution-the government itself-
from unseemly, state-sponsored private corruption. To be effective, Cooley
121 Id. at488.
122 id. at 476.
123 Id. at 476-77.
124 See id. at 477 (stating that although the project would benefit the public, that benefit
would be secondary to the benefit to the private corporation).
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suggested that any challenge to the court's decision would have to explain
why the communities most directly affected by the consequences of the de-
cision to issue securities should not be entitled to resist their strict enforce-
ment.
The state's error in concluding that municipalities could issue these
bonds, and then be held accountable for their payment, did not lay simply in
a substantive misconception of the judiciary's interpretation of the line that
separated the public from the private spheres. It lay in the structural as-
sumption that the communities most immediately affected by the tax levies
would not have a complete right to determine for themselves if the constitu-
tional line between public and private legislation had been crossed in the is-
suance of the public bonds. Cooley contended that the state's unwillingness
to defer to that local determination of the proper demarcation of the pub-
lic/private boundary betrayed the state's unwillingness to respect that
boundary. The Jacksonian suspicion of private legislation that underlay
Cooley's substantive constitutional hostility to public taxation in aid of pri-
vate business therefore gave rise to a structural defense of local govern-
mental independence from state control.
To be sure, Cooley's defense of localism in Township Board of Salem is
less than fully convincing. The state law at issue had merely authorized the
local governments to issue bonds. In the absence of direct state comman-
deering of the municipal taxing power, the argument for local independence
was more than a little strained. Perhaps Cooley meant to suggest that, in
light of the power of the railroads to influence the political process, even an
authorization by the state constituted an imposition on local power. But if
that were so, then what of Cooley's apparent presumption that local gov-
ernments were better suited than states to resist private corruption? Moreo-
ver, the consequence of Cooley's holding was to preclude the state from
authorizing local governmental innovation, a curious consequence for one
truly committed to a structural defense of local prerogatives. Of course, this
paradox may simply show that Cooley's substantive constitutional com-
mitments predominated, but then why did he bother with the express struc-
tural constitutional appeals to local governmental autonomy?
There are no obvious answers to these questions. Cooley clearly strug-
gled to make a case that, at least on its face, did not directly implicate ques-
tions of local governmental autonomy into a case that did implicate such
questions. If the effort to do so is less than persuasive, the impulse to do so
is nonetheless instructive. Cooley's opinion clearly reflected his structural
belief that, by defending the practice of local self-government from state
interference, courts could enforce a constitutional limitation on the private
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use of governmental power that might go unheeded if judges alone were left
to enforce that limitation on the democratic process generally.
Two years before Township Board of Salem, and unburdened by the in-
convenient facts of a particular legal dispute, Cooley had applied his theory
of local constitutionalism more coherently in addressing the same subject.
In the initial edition of his treatise on state constitutional law, Cooley con-
sidered the propriety of a state law that purported to define the rights of mu-
nicipalities to levy taxes on behalf of railroads. Unlike his decision in
Township Board of Salem, however, his treatise discussion hewed to the
distinction between state laws that authorized municipalities to effect such
tax levies, and those that compelled them to do so. The former laws were
far less constitutionally troublesome to Cooley than the latter.
125
Cooley's treatise explained that many courts upheld state legislation
that authorized municipalities to exercise a taxing power on behalf of rail-
roads as permissible exercises of public power.126 Even if those decisions
were correct, Cooley argued, structural constitutional principles of local
governmental independence demonstrated that a state's compulsion of such
a municipal taxing power would surely cross the public/private line.
[T]hose cases which hold it competent for the legislature to give its consent to
a municipal corporation engaging in works of public improvement outside its
territorial limits, and becoming a stockholder in a private corporation, have
certainly, as we think, gone to the very limits of constitutional power in this di-
rection; and to hold that the legislature may go even further, and, under its
power to control the taxation of the political divisions and organizations of the
State, may compel them, against the will of their citizens, to raise money for
such purposes, and invest their funds in these exterior undertakings, seems to
us to be introducing new principles into our system of local self-government,
and to be sanctioning a centralization of power not within the contemplation of
the makers of the American constitutions. We think if any such forced taxa-
tion is resisted by the municipal organization, it will be very difficult to defend
it as a proper exercise of legislative authority in a government where power is
distributed on the principles which prevail here.
127
The treatise discussion laid bare the critical distinction between Coo-
ley's local constitutionalist vision and the conventionally statist approach
that Dillon employed in Hanson, even though both Cooley and Dillon ulti-
mately sought similar substantive constitutional outcomes. The distinction
125 See COOLEY, supra note 77, at 235 (concluding that a state law compelling a
municipality to raise taxes for these purposes crosses the constitutional line).
126 See id. at 214 ("We have.., collected the cases in which it has been held that the
legislature may... authorize cities, townships, and counties to subscribe to the stock of
railroad companies ... and to tax their citizens to pay these subscriptions ... .
127 Id. at 235.
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between a state authorization and a state mandate would have been of no
constitutional relevance to Dillon. For Cooley, however, it was critical.
Constitutional limitations on the exercise of political power did not simply
prohibit public taxation to aid private parties. They also placed structural
limits on the scope of the state's authority to intrude upon the prevailing
system of local governmental independence. After all, was it not the towns,
rather than the state, in Township Board of Salem, that had, in the end, re-
sisted the private railroads' attempt to capture public power?
Cooley's approach to the municipal taxation question in both Township
Board of Salem and his treatise discussion transformed the constitutional
doctrine that Marshall had set forth in Dartmouth College. Private business
corporations would receive less constitutional protection from the intrusion
of politics than their public municipal counterparts. The public realm of
government needed protection from the corrupting influence of the market
at least as much as the market needed to be cleansed of politics. And local
communities, not state legislatures or state judges, constituted the institu-
tions that would resist such corruption. Where Marshall would have ruled
against the towns in Township Board of Salem because they had violated
their constitutional obligation to honor their contracts, Cooley ruled for
them because they had acted as institutional defenders of a public/private
boundary that the state had appeared willing to transgress.
Cooley's decision also transformed Dillon's statist solution to the con-
stitutional problem posed by private legislation. He declined to join Dillon
in defending a broad judicial power to review whether duly enacted laws
served a "public" purpose. Cooley's Jacksonian instincts led him to connect
his substantive constitutional defense of the public/private boundary to the
practice of public politics. The possibility that the line separating the public
from the private would not always be susceptible to direct judicial enforce-
ment was simply the price of a structural constitutional vision that charged
local political institutions with the responsibility for enforcing controversial
and difficult to discern substantive constitutional limitations on public
power. The benefits of a more deferential judicial stance would be reaped
through the practice of local self-government. Popular participation in the
process of constitutional enforcement would imbue constitutionalism with a
penetrative character that it would otherwise lack. Cooley therefore placed
his constitutional faith in the local public sphere in a way that Dillon had
not.
C. The Private Control of Public Politics
In Township Board of Salem, as in his treatise discussion of local
bonding authority, Cooley employed principles of localism to place state
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constitutional constraints on the power of large-scale corporations to capture
the public realm. He employed those principles in People ex rel. Le Roy v.
Hurlbut128 to place state constitutional limitations on the power of political
parties to do the same. The case concerned an attempt by the State of
Michigan to establish and appoint a board of public works for the city of
Detroit. Detroit residents, in a public action on behalf of the city, objected
that the State lacked the power under the Michigan Constitution to appoint
the board members. The court invalidated the state-appointed board, with
Cooley providing an important concurring opinion.
129
The plaintiffs contended that the appointments impermissibly intruded
upon their underlying right to local self-government, although it was evident
that the text of the Michigan Constitution provided no clear support for the
existence of such a general right.1 30 The state defended the act by relying
on the general rule that a state possessed the complete power to structure its
political subdivisions as it wished, a conclusion that, at least on first glance,
appeared to be more consistent with conventional legal assumptions.
In his separate concurrence, Cooley declined to resolve the dispute by
asserting general principles of local sovereignty or by invoking a direct con-
stitutional right to local self-government. 31 As in Township Board of Salem
and his earlier treatise discussion, Cooley recognized local governmental
independence only insofar as it served as a structural limitation on a state
legislature's constitutionally suspect attempt to serve private interests at the
public's expense. He argued that a proper resolution of the case therefore
turned on the following determination: whether the state's assertion of the
local appointing power constituted a legitimate effort to reorganize a mu-
nicipality in distress or constituted an illegitimate attempt by state officials
to secure partisan spoils for a favored class of private persons who pos-
sessed little local support.
Cooley was particularly vexed by overt political partisanship, particu-
larly when it resulted in central intrusions on local political processes. Such
128 24 Mich. 44 (1871).
129 See id. at 92-112 (Cooley, J., concurring).
130 The court stated:
[lit is ... insisted ... that the intention of this provision of the constitution
was ... that judicial officers of cities and villages shall be elected by the electors of
such cities and villages... [a]nd such, I confess, is the inference... which I
draw.... It is, however, true that it is but an inference.
Id. at 64.
131 Cooley stated at one point in his concurrence that the right to local self-government
was "absolute." Id. at 108 (Cooley, J., concurring). That statement should not, however,
obscure the far narrower manner in which he actually framed the constitutional question at
issue.
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politically motivated lawmaking served to preclude the local community
from controlling its own destiny by substituting the will of local residents
with that of powerful private political parties working in tandem with dis-
tant state officials. By posing the constitutional question as one that turned
on an evaluation of the substantive nature of the state law, Cooley implicitly
acknowledged that the right to local governmental independence was far
from absolute. The scope of local governmental independence was con-
fined by an underlying substantive constitutional principle of neutrality-a
principle that was directly violated by the spoils system, through which
victorious state officials handed out local sinecures to party supporters.
Only if the state's interference in local affairs transgressed the underlying
substantive constitutional line, by unduly enhancing the influence of power-
ful private political parties, would there be a basis for the recognition of a
structural constitutional limitation on the state's power to supervise its po-
litical subdivisions.
Cooley began his concurrence by noting that the state statute at issue
provided that "the appointees under it shall be members of two certain po-
litical parties."' 132 That provision was "simply nugatory, because the legis-
lature, on general principles, have [sic] no power to make party affiliation a
qualification for office. 133 Basic notions of constitutional equality made
that much clear. Cooley readily conceded, however, that judges could not
enforce fully the constitutional principle that precluded the people from im-
posing a party affiliation requirement on public officeholders. A judge had
no authority to look behind each election to determine whether a particular
official had been elected for constitutionally impermissible partisan, rather
than constitutionally permissible neutral, reasons. It was therefore inevita-
ble that, unless the people honored their own constitutional obligations to
elect their officials without regard to party affiliation, the substantive con-
stitutional norm of equality that he discerned could not be fully enforced.
134
The restrictions on a judge's power to investigate the motives of the
electorate did not, however, preclude the judicial enforcement of institu-
tional limitations on state power that would guard against the unconstitu-
tional, partisan political capture of the local electoral process. A regime of
state-mandated local appointment would likely result in the effective impo-
sition of an illegal requirement of partisan affiliation for public office.
Without some limitation on the state's appointing power, "[officials] can
132 Id. at 94 (Cooley, J., concurring).
133 Id.
134 See id. (explaining that "[i]t is the duty of every person who has a voice in the
selection of a public officer to choose with single eye to the public good; but we know very
well that it is impossible to exclude other motives").
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and may be sent in from abroad, and it is not a remote possibility that self-
government of towns may make way for ... such influences as can force
themselves upon the legislative notice of [the state capital]., 135 Localism
therefore served as a structural means of securing a substantive constitu-
tional prohibition on party affiliation requirements for public officehold-
ers.
13 6
Under a system of state appointment, Cooley explained,
it is inevitable that parties, from mere personal considerations, shall seek the
offices, and endeavor to secure from the appointing body, whose members in
general are not to feel the burden, a compensation such as would not be
awarded by the people, who must bear it, though the chief tie binding them to
the interests of the people governed might be the salaries paid on one side and
drawn on the other. D
7
As the legislature
could not be compelled to regard the local political sentiment in their choice,
and would, in fact, be most likely to interfere when that sentiment was adverse
to their own, the government of cities might be taken to itself by the party for
the time being in power, and municipal governments might ... become the
spoils of party, as state and national offices unfortunately are now.138
The attention to the substantive constitutional problem occasioned by
partisan appointments revealed that Cooley was careful in his concurrence
not to defend local governmental autonomy as such. He sought to enforce a
substantive constitutional principle that protected against private legislation
through the recognition of a structural constitutional defense of local gov-
ernmental independence. The protection of local political control served
merely as a prophylactic check against state attempts to make public offices
party spoils. As Cooley would later explain:
When therefore an appeal is made to the majority at the state capital, it is made
to ears prepared by political association and kinship in prejudices to listen
willingly in the complaint. But in every case the appeal to the state is in part if
not wholly a fraud. The pretence is that it is made in the interest of good order
and good government when in fact the purpose, either wholly or in part, is to
135 Id. at 106 (Cooley, J., concurring).
136 Although Cooley formally interpreted the state constitution, he did not suggest that
the "general principles" to which he referred did not inhere in the Federal Constitution as well.
Nor did he suggest that those "general principles" were somehow a special feature of
Michigan's founding charter.
13 Hurlbut, 24 Mich. at 106 (Cooley, J., concurring).
138 Id.
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give the local minority certain local offices and local patronage which their
numbers were not sufficient to enable them to secure.
Because a substantive constitutional principle, rooted in a fear of spe-
cial interests and a commitment to public neutrality, defined the scope of
local sovereignty that Hurlbut recognized, Cooley did not actually vote to
strike down the board that the State of Michigan had imposed upon the peo-
ple of Detroit. He voted instead simply to limit the permissible terms of its
members to a period consonant with the state's concededly significant inter-
est in the exercise of its general supervisory authority.
140
Cooley explained that he had "no doubt it was entirely competent for
the legislature to abolish the old boards and provide for a new one to take
the place of all."14' Such an action "would be but the ordinary exercise of
legislative supervision and control in matters of municipal regulation."'
142
Because it was within the state legislature's power to make provisional ap-
pointments to the newly created board in order to put the new system in op-
eration, Cooley explained that "we must suppose the object of the legisla-
ture, in making the first appointments was not to appropriate patronage to
itself, but only to insure the organization of the new system without confu-
sion."'143 To the extent that the state had attempted to supplant the local ap-
pointment power for all time, however, the partisan motives of the legisla-
ture stood revealed and thus this aspect of the legislation could not be given
legal effect.
In Hurlbut, no less than in Township Board of Salem, Cooley inverted
the logic of Dartmouth College to secure the independence of local gov-
ernments. Local governments should not be left to become theaters for the
play of contending factions any more than colleges. They, too, should be
protected from untoward turns in their administration. Indeed, Cooley sug-
gested, it would be an odd constitutional doctrine that would seek to keep
everything pure but the government itself. Local governments, no less than
colleges, had constitutionally protected interests in restraining the popular
will. Judges could therefore preserve the constitutional requirement of neu-
tral public governance by ensuring that distant majorities would not inject
partisan considerations into local politics.
139 Thomas M. Cooley, Lecture III: Analogies in Local Government and when They Fail
26-27 (1879) (unpublished manuscript on file in the Cooley Collection, Bentley Library,
University of Michigan) [hereinafter Lecture III].
140 See Hurlbut, 24 Mich. at 111-13 (Cooley, J., concurring) (holding that it was within
the power of the legislature to make provisional appointments, but permanent appointments
could not be made without serious difficulty).
141 Id. at 111 (Cooley, J., concurring).
142 Id.
143 Id. at 112 (Cooley, J., concurring).
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Moreover, in Hurlbut, as in Township Board of Salem, Cooley broke
from Dillon's statist defense of the constitutional separation of the public
and private realms. His opinion revealed that Dillon's broad defense of
state power was inadequate to ensure that the public realm would govern
itself in accord with a substantive norm of constitutional neutrality. Dillon's
approach would only encourage states to exercise their vast powers over the
public realm in an arbitrary fashion, and it would sap the constitutional re-
solve of those local political institutions that Cooley believed were critical
to the task of securing "constitutional freedom."
IV. COOLEY AND THE RISE OF THE CITIES
A. Introduction
The rise of the great cities severely tested Cooley's contention that the
values of localism and constitutionalism could be harmonized. The arche-
type of local government by the end of the nineteenth century was no longer
the simple village. It was the sprawling urban metropolis-a place of im-
migrants and strangers, thievery and corruption, poverty and fiscal irrespon-
sibility. The evidence that the newly emergent cities rapidly were incurring
seemingly insurmountable debts fueled a growing sense that local constitu-
tional democracy was a thing of the past.
144
Cooley confronted the problem that the new urbanism posed for his de-
fense of local constitutionalism in a remarkable series of lectures he pre-
sented at Johns Hopkins University in 1879. The lectures, entitled On the
Evils of Local Government, have received scant scholarly attention. They
have not been published, and they are written in a sometimes difficult-to-
decipher longhand over several hundred pages contained in a series of
leather-bound volumes. They represent Cooley's most extended commen-
tary on the legal role and status of cities, however, and therefore command
attention.
144 See MARY P. RYAN, Civic WARS: DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC LIFE IN THE AMERICAN
CITY DURINGTHE NINEEENTH CENTURY 183-303 (1997) (discussing the change in the civic,
social, and political structure in cities after the Civil War); ALAN TRACHTENBERG, THE
INCORPORATION OF AMERICA: CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN THE GILDED AGE 101-39 (Eric
Foner ed., 1982) (discussing the growth of cities during the nineteenth century and observing
that they lacked "democratic planning"); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-
1920, at 13, 30-31 (David Donald ed., 1967) (discussing the decrease of "civic spirit" in the
cities due to lack of security and individuals' concerns about their own place in the changing
economy). The fears were hardly new. Jefferson, for example, had predicted in a letter to
Madison that "[w]hen we get piled upon one another in large cities, as in Europe, ... we shall
become corrupt as in Europe, and go to eating one another as they do there." Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 230 (Paul Leicester ed., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1892).
1999]
536 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW
The lectures are in many ways marked by a deep hostility towards the
emergence of the great cities of the late nineteenth century. In them, one
hears, at times, Cooley wistfully remembering the simpler localities of old
that he clearly favored. One also hears the first strands of what was to be a
Progressive Era crusade against the cities as well as a disturbingly cold-
hearted skepticism towards popular sovereignty that the "crisis of the cities"
occasioned. Nevertheless, what is striking is the degree to which the lec-
tures reveal that Cooley remained committed to a defense of local govern-
mental independence even though the modem cities no longer exhibited the
fiscal prudence that he believed to be critical to constitutional govern-
ance.
14 5
The lectures demonstrate that Cooley did not root his belief that local
governmental institutions constituted critical components of constitutional
structure in either a romanticized view of local political life or a defense of
homogeneous communities, immune to urban conflicts. They show that he
rooted his ideas, instead, in a structural belief that constitutionalism de-
pended upon the efforts of local communities, struggling together to prac-
tice self-government in accord with constitutional limitations. Cooley re-
mained committed to that belief, as the lectures show, without regard to
whether local political institutions were the quaint towns of his youth or the
unruly, ethnically diverse cities of the late nineteenth century.
Thus, while Cooley began his lectures by suggesting that one path to
urban reform lay in the imposition of restrictions on the practice of politics
within the city, 146 he concluded them on a far different note. He ultimately
rejected the privatizing tendencies of modem corporate theory and the unre-
strained majoritarianism of positivist conceptions of democracy. He lay
claim instead to a revived vision of city life, in which local communities
145 See Thomas M. Cooley, Lecture I: The Sentiment of Equality in American Politics
(1879) (unpublished manuscript on file in the Cooley Collection, Bentley Library, University
of Michigan) [hereinafter Lecture 1]; Thomas M. Cooley, Lecture II: The Growth of Local
Institutions in America (unpublished manuscript on file in the Cooley Collection, Bentley
Library, University of Michigan) [hereinafter Lecture II]; Cooley, Lecture III, supra note 139;
Thomas M. Cooley, Lecture IV: Protections and Securities in City Government [hereinafter
Lecture IV]; Thomas M. Cooley, Lecture V: The Evils of Municipal Indebtedness
(unpublished manuscript on file in the Cooley Collection, Bentley Library, University of
Michigan) [hereinafter Lecture V]; Thomas M. Cooley, Lecture VI: Remedies in the Hands
of the Individual Citizen (unpublished manuscript on file in the Cooley Collection, Bentley
Library, University of Michigan) [hereinafter Lecture VI].
14 This aspect of Cooley's lectures reflected the late-nineteenth-century idealization of
"[a] middle-class version of the city." TRACHTENBERG, supra note 144, at 107. Because the
people had proven themselves incapable of self-government, "[r]edemption lay in a revived
sense of responsible citizenship among middling property holders and city homesteaders, who
in their good sense would turn to men of intelligence and specialized training, 'experts,' to
reform city government and restore order and harmony to city streets." Id.
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would once again assume their structural constitutional obligations to resist
impermissible public attempts to lend aid to private power.
B. Retreating to the Private City
To make clear the magnitude of the challenge that the newly emergent
cities posed for constitutionalism, Cooley used his second lecture to contrast
Boston in the late eighteenth century with Chicago in the late nineteenth.
The Boston of 1791, he began, had but 12,000 residents 147 and was built
"almost entirely of wood. 148 A dozen constables, one for each of the city's
twelve wards, constituted the entirety of its police force. 149 Cows grazed
freely on city land, 50 and the establishment of a linen factory occasioned a
public celebration.15 ' Sobriety was so strictly adhered to that "a great tan-
ning day might pass off in Boston without a single instance of public drunk-
enness or other disorder."'152 The people were "grave in deportment,"'153 and
they listened intently to sermons on hardbacked wooden benches which de-
lighted them as much as the dogmatic theology that they absorbed. 154 The
picture had "something of Arcadian simplicity."'155 It revealed
an overgrown country town thoroughly democratic in habits and tastes, eco-
nomical in public and private expenditures, a little over boisterous at times no
doubt, but in the main thoroughly deferential and subservient in all things law-
ful to the authority of their plain fellow citizens temporarily set over them, as
well as to that of their elected ministers.
156
By contrast, the Chicago of 1879 was an "ambitious city seated like a
queen at the head of the great lakes."'5 7 Though "founded but yesterday,"'
158
it boasted a population greater than London's. 159 It "gathered together men
from every nationality and from all quarters of the globe and has handed
over to them her municipal government." 160 Many were raised in monar-
147 See Lecture H1, supra note 145, at 33.148 Id. at 41-42.
149 See id. at 42.
ISO See id.
151 See id. at 43.
152 Id. at 44.
153 Id.
154 See id. at 44-45.
155 Id. at45.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 45-46.
158 Id. at 46.
159 See id.
160 Id.
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chies, still others did not speak English, and many more were trained from
infancy "to look upon government as their natural and implacable en-
emy. ',161 Yet another sizeable class of persons had "for [its] bond of union
the principle that property in private hands is robbery." 162 Just one-third of
Chicago's voters paid taxes, and "not one half would take active interest in
an economical administration of public affairs." 163 More troubling still, po-
litical primaries were "held in the haunts of dissipation and vice where re-
spectable people feel contaminated by the place and the surroundings if they
venture to enter, which many never do."'
64
Having established the contrast, the question all but asked itself:
Is this concentration of business and activity and risk; of pleasure and passion
and crime; of arrogant wealth and crushing poverty and devilish hate; of social
extremes wide apart as the poles and yet brought into immediate and hourly
contact; Is this of the same family with the staid and sombre New England
town; capable of being ruled by the same simple methods in the same eco-
nomic ways and by the common consent of all the people harmonizing for the
purpose?1 5
Cooley answered at first by proposing to restructure urban centers along
lines similar to those soon to be proposed by Progressive Era reformers. He
argued that too strong a commitment to democracy would preclude local
governments from performing their critical temporizing function.166 The
cities could not be left to "bosses raised to power by an alliance of scheming
speculators and ignorant immigrant voters, blindly loyal to political chief-
tains." 167 As Cooley explained in concluding his first lecture,
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 49.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 49-50.
166 By contrast, Cooley explained that the old town system of New England had taught
the people "to apply in public affairs the same rules and maxims of policy and prudence which
they applied in their own affairs." Id. at 14. Moreover, the system had "taught them to select
the best men in the community for all public positions. Their chief officers were select men;
so named because they were chosen for their merits and abilities." Id. at 15. Finally, Cooley
explained that the town system had
impressed upon every one the importance of prudence and economy in public
affairs. The man who was not a taxpayer was a rare exception; and every taxpayer
knew and never forgot that nature in this inhospitable region had imposed it as one
of the conditions of reasonable prosperity, that prudence should be the constant
counsellor, and the guide in all pecuniary transactions.
Id. at 16.
167 TRACHTENBERG, supra note 144, at 107. Trachtenberg elaborates on the point.
"Against the rule of bosses and ruthless speculators, of the forces of mystery, the Jeffersonian
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[w]e shall have gained something when we have fully come to understand that
government ... is useful in proportion as it imposes restraints on the passions
of men for the common good and not as it subverts the common good to the
impulses, desires, and passions of an uneducated and inexperienced commu-
nity. 16
Cooley drew upon his general critique of a sentimental attachment to
democracy 169 in his third lecture, entitled Analogies in Local Governments
and when They Fail. He argued that local governments were more like pri-
vate corporations than public governments, such as states. The states had
the power to pass general welfare legislation, 170 but cities "have no corre-
sponding power to make general laws, and they are compelled to accept
such as the state makes for them."'' A city is interested in
its property, its rights which are in the nature of property, or which can be con-
verted into property by the sale or lease of franchises, and with questions as to
how all these can be made to subserve the interests and increase the value of
the estates of its citizens.
172
Because the city concerned itself with the distribution of property among
those who already possessed it,173 "its analogies are all to private corpora-
tions, differing from them mainly in that the interests of citizens are not rep-
resented by stock." 174
ideal of cultivated intelligence in service to the Republic now implied the stewardship of a
qualified elite." Id. at 112.
168 Lecture I, supra note 145, at 56.
169 Cooley had acknowledged in his first lecture that "civil government has its origin in
the agreement of the people," id. at 8, and that the course of constitutional government was
"in the direction of a transfer of power from one or from a few to the many." Id. at 11-11.5.
He explained, however, that the principle of political equality had been qualified even in the
Nation's first local governments. See id. at 8. The New England colonies "did not venture
upon the experiment of universal suffrage; their government was by a select number,
determined either by membership in the Church or by the choice of those previously admitted
as freemen." Id. at 15. While one found "seeds of the doctrine of universal political equality
striking root here and there and attaining for a time some little vitality," id., Cooley argued,
such seeds rested on "a creed of what are called natural rights," id. at 20. The belief in
universal political equality depended upon the "sentimental" supposition that the creator has
conferred "the right to take part" in government on individuals not because of their "natural or
acquired fitness," but because human nature itself "determines" fitness. Id. Cooley went so
far as to contend that arguments for universal suffrage shared a deep affinity with the
discredited doctrine of a "divine, hereditary, or traditionary right to rule." Id. at 22. The
American experiment with universal suffrage therefore constituted an incongruous application
to "republics of the monarchical idea of a hereditary right." Id. at 25.5.
170 See Lecture III, supra note 139, at 32.
171 Id. at33.
172 Id. at 34.
173 See id. (discussing how cities improve public property for the benefit of individual
owners by paving streets, creating water works, and improving parks).
174 Id. at36.
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The public/private division that Cooley drew within the city led him to
propose a restriction on city suffrage. "Giving effect to this view it would
become necessary that city powers of legislation should be apportioned
between two houses, one of which might be limited in its action to matters
relating to the control of city property, the levy of city taxes, and the con-
tracting of city debts." 175 The new legislative body would be charged with
administering "private" functions, and thus the suffrage should be provided
in accord with principles governing private corporations.
Cooley all but conceded that his new proposal for urban reform was in
severe tension with the deep expressions of faith in local self-government
that underlay his decisions in People ex rel. Detroit & Howell Railroad v.
Township Board of Salem176 and People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut.177 The
proposal was, in substance, little more than a sketch for the establishment of
an insulated, propertied bureaucracy, staffed by leading capitalists, immune
from popular accountability. Indeed, in defending the proposal, Cooley
even suggested that state legislatures might be better positioned than cities
to ensure the proper separation between the public and private realms.
Echoing Dillon, he noted that the representatives in the state legislatures, by
reason of their distance from their constituents, might be less likely to suc-
cumb to the pressures of special interests at the local level. 178 The practice
of constitutionalism would no longer be the obligation of citizens struggling
in their local communities to discern their public responsibilities. It would
be a means of protecting the private sphere from popular intrusion, and it
would depend upon bureaucratic structures that sought to strip the city of its
public character.
C. Reclaiming the Public City
As the lectures came to a close, Cooley cast aside his Dillonesque de-
fense of a privatized city, controlled by state-appointed officials and super-
175 Id. at 42.
176 20 Mich. 452, 494 (1870) (holding that a state cannot compel a locality to issue bonds
for the benefit of a private corporation).
177 People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44,92 (1871) (Cooley, J., concurring).
179 See Lecture IV, supra note 145, at 17-18. Cooley stated:
Legislatures are away from their constituents, and are usually exempt from any
extraneous pressure resulting from passion, prejudice, or excitements of any sort
arising subsequent to the time when the representatives were chosen. But the city
constituency is forever at hand, in constant association with the representatives, so
that the passion of the one immediately communicates itself to the other, or if the
representative is not found to be responsive, the constituency assumes a threatening
aspect which the representative will seldom venture to face.
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vised by state judges. He returned to the basic premises of the local consti-
tutionalist vision that he had long advocated, and he applied those premises
to offer a dramatically different set of reforms for the newly emergent cities.
Once again, Cooley constructed a defense of local governmental independ-
ence that portrayed the local public realm as an important institutional
means by which people could discover how to govern themselves in accord
with constitutional principles. Once again, state judges and legislatures ap-
peared as potential obstacles to the constitutional governance of local com-
munities.
Entitled Remedies in the Hands of the Individual Citizen, the final lec-
ture began with the contention that a restriction on city suffrage, and a pri-
vatized conception of city life, was not likely to cure the city's ills. Cooley
proceeded to argue that the cure would instead lay in individual residents
committing themselves to practice urban self-governance. Cooley ex-
plained that
much of the difficulty to be encountered in establishing proper municipal gov-
emment comes from the presence in every city of a very considerable body of
voters-usually a considerable majority of all-who have no such ties binding
them to the city and attaching them to its interests, as are essential to make
them feel that good city government is of personal importance to them-
selves.
179
This diagnosis of the problem resonated with his long-held belief that
constitutional limitations simply could not be imposed from on high. They
could be given full expression only through the practices of an active local
citizenry, focused on the needs of the local community. Cooley therefore
devoted his final lecture to an explanation of how urban centers could be-
come homes to a citizenry attentive to local needs.
Cooley identified three basic changes that would have to be made for
the practice of local self-government to take root within the modem cities.
First, the influence of state and national politics on local political life would
have to be constrained. Second, the business class's withdrawal from active
engagement in city affairs would have to cease. Third, the public as a whole
would have to be educated in the practice of self-government. It was a re-
form program worthier of Cooley's Jacksonian heritage than the privatized
city he had imagined in the preceding lectures. It imagined the restoration
of the public realm within the city, rather than a retreat from the city into
privatism and centralism. Local governments were neither state administra-
tive bureaucracies that would be charged with supplying discrete state serv-
ices nor protected enclaves of private power to be run by the owners of
179 Id. at 6.5-7.
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capital. They were the critical political institutions through which the public
would learn to practice constitutional self-governance.
Cooley's first suggestion for reform, the imposition of constraints on
state and national political influence at the local level, tracked his concur-
rence in Hurlbut. 18  There, as we have seen, Cooley argued that state ap-
pointments precluded city residents from selecting officers on the basis of
city needs rather than partisan interests. In his lectures, he contended that
the dominance of state and national parties in local politics caused city elec-
tions to turn on issues that were not of direct concern to the city itself. "A
local election when it is made improperly to turn upon general politics may
have the effect to encourage the successful party and bring to its aid many
of those collectively known as the floating vote ... ,,181
Cooley asserted that the critical determinants in a city election should
be "the character, ability and purposes of the men to be voted for."182 When
a state or national political party was "allowed to select local candidates for
the party without reference to any other considerations, the selection is a
fraud upon the purposes for which caucuses nominally exist, and is almost
of necessity mischievous."183 Indeed, Cooley noted, oftentimes the party
caucus represented less an election than a means by which party managers
formally ratified their prior decisions. 184 Such a system severed the people
from the public community. It vested legal authority in a distant political
bureaucracy, untutored in the daily experiences of local life which made it
possible to practice self-government in accord with constitutional limita-
tions.
Cooley's second suggested reform, to end the disinterest of the business
class in city affairs, supplemented his plea for constraints on state influence
in the local political process. The fact that the "thrifty businessmen of the
Country hold themselves aloof from politics might not be fatal to good gov-
ernment" if they were replaced by other persons whose "circumstances and
means enabled them to devote their attention to the study of the problems of
government, and who made choice of politics as a calling from patriotic
motives. 185 Such was not the case, however. Those "who make politics a
business in the cities are not of this sort; but they are men who cultivate
180 24 Mich. at 92 (Cooley, J., concurring); see supra notes 111-22 and accompanying
text (discussing this case).
181 Lecture VI, supra note 145, at 10.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 See id. at 16.
185 Id. at 24.
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politics for its personal profits, as the merchant pursues his business for its
rewards."' 
8 6
By holding themselves aloof from politics, prominent citizens had ig-
nored "the unpleasant fact that vigilance is as much the price of free institu-
tions now as it ever was."' 8 7 The "difficulty thus far has been to bring the
businessmen of cities to an understanding of the fact that as business men it
was their duty to take active part in politics."188 Some "ha[d] busied them-
selves in making money while those holding public office have been equally
busy in wasting it."'189 Others attempted to become politically engaged but
withdrew after being discouraged by the current system of party control.
Such retreats were unjustified, however, for there was no reason to assume
that the educated and the propertied could not compete "with the
Tweeds."'
190
Through the participation of the business class, the local political sys-
tem would be transformed, all the way down. As Cooley explained:
The Caucus System being an established institution it is for the time at least
necessary to recognize it as such, and to turn it to useful service. To this end it
is necessary that the best citizens attend it, take part in it, and whenever practi-
cable control it. The mere fact of attendance will be a blessing to the city; the
Caucus will immediately begin to put on a more decent appearance; it will
seek better quarters; the manners of those accustomed to congregate there will
begin to conform to those of decent society and to leave off the habits of bar-
barism.... It then becomes antecedently more probable that good men will be
selected and good measures be advocated, and if they fail, the decencies of de-
liberation are at least likely to be preserved. All this, however, is on the as-
sumption that attendance is habitual, and not on rare and extraordinary occa-
sions only.
191
Cooley's plea to the business class was of a piece with what one histo-
rian termed "the revolt of the capitalist class in late-nineteenth-century mu-
nicipal life." 192 Cooley's final proposed reform, however, suggested that it
was also part of a broader plea for the invigoration of city politics at all lev-
els. Cooley concluded his final lecture by arguing for education of the citi-
zenry as a whole in the art of self-government. He contended that such edu-
186 Id. at 25.
187 Id. at 27.
188 Id. at28.
189 Id. at 28-29.
190 Id. at 29.
191 Id. at31-32.
192 See RYAN, supra note 144, at 271-82.
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cation could be promoted with the aid of general newspapers and through
the system of free public education that already existed.
193
Cooley explained that "of all the institutions whose teachings are now
available to the people at large, the most useful is the press, controlled by
independent men, who have intelligent opinions on political subjects, and
who express them frankly, fearlessly, and candidly, for the instruction of the
people."'194 Indeed, he noted, "[i]t is a deserved compliment to the ability of
the independent political press that today its utterances are more read and
more heeded than are the discussions in Congress."'
195
The press's role in educating the public was, however, only a partial
one. "[A] sovereign cannot wisely be left to mere chance instruction."'
196
Cooley explained that "only in the general instruction of the sovereign
ruler-the people-can there be safety."'197 He concluded that a "general
education of all the people in the existing schools will do something towards
fitting them for their responsibilities as citizens."198 Such general education
"will increase self respect, and cannot fail to open the eyes to some of the
most conspicuous evils in government."'
199
The image, then, was no longer of a city divided between private prop-
erty owners and untutored masses, supervised from above by wise state of-
ficials. It was of an integrated city, bound together by a common destiny,
freed from the powerful private interests and those unconcerned with the
needs of the local public. As Cooley explained at the close of the final lec-
ture,
[t]he purpose of this discourse has been to show that the individual citizen has
duties which he now habitually neglects to the detriment of the public interest,
and of his own .... We must never forget that in America, employer and em-
ployed, rich and poor, educated and ignorant, are embarked with all their inter-
ests in a common vessel with common guidance, and that what endangers one
class endangers all; what will wreck the interests of one class will involve all
.200in a common rum.
193 See Lecture VI, supra note 145, at 41-42.
194 Id. at 47.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 41.
198 Id. at 41-42.
199 Id. at 42.
200 Id. at 54-55.
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D. Conclusion
The lectures that had at first set forth an extended argument for the pri-
vatization of city politics concluded with a call for the restoration of an ac-
tive and inclusive public city life. They reveal that Cooley's defense of lo-
cal political power emanated from a general conception of constitutional
structure. The modem city appeared to embody a set of values that were
inimical to Cooley's essentially conservative substantive constitutional vi-
sion. Nevertheless, Cooley was unwilling to abandon localism in the face of
urbanism.
In the end, Cooley argued that constitutionalism could not survive
without strong local political institutions. Such institutions were needed to
check private power and to involve the public in the practice of governing in
accord with constitutional limitations. The structural connection between
localism and constitutionalism that he drew flowed from Jacksonian in-
stincts which ultimately led to a plea for an urban revival. The rejection of
the positivist conception of local governmental power, and the state creation
metaphor that resulted from it, did not entail an embrace of a privatized
conception of local life. One could strive, as Cooley strove, for a constitu-
tional defense of local governmental power that rejected the extreme posi-
tions that the conventional understanding of the public/private boundary
seemed to require.
At the same time, we may discern in the relatively diffuse and uncon-
vincing nature of the reforms that Cooley proposed for the revival of city
life evidence of a deep incompatibility between his structural constitutional
commitment to localism and his substantive constitutional commitment to a
"night-watchman" state. There was always a paradoxical character to Coo-
ley's localism, for it sought to protect the private market from public power
through the energetic efforts of an invigorated local public community. It
seemingly demanded local communities to adopt an almost ascetic pos-
ture-eager to be involved so that they would be sure to do little. The in-
herent paradox became even more pronounced as the great metropolises
emerged in the late nineteenth century. The new cities served a diverse
populace with increasingly severe demands that could be accommodated
only with an increased degree of governmental intervention. In this new ur-
ban world, one could no longer be confident that a revived public realm
would ensure government inaction.
And so it is perhaps the case that the localism that Cooley defended in
his lectures on the evils of the cities was even then more suited to a consti-
tutional age that was yet to come. It may be that if Cooley's structural de-
fense of localism was to survive, then it was to survive only after the demise
of the long-standing, substantive constitutional hostility to an active public
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government, willing to intervene to adjust relations in the private realm. His
structural defense of localism might survive, in other words, only in an age
in which substantive constitutional limitations took the form of more posi-
tive claims on the public sphere. For then, the structural constitutional de-
fense of an energized public realm would coincide with a substantive con-
stitutional vision that is more compatible with public action. As a result, it
is toward the role that localism might play in modem constitutional law that
we now turn, mindful that Cooley's far different defense of localism may,
paradoxically, supply the critical vocabulary that will permit the explanation
of that role.
V. THE LOCALIST TURN IN MODERN DOCTRINE AND ITS CRITICS
A. Introduction
We have seen that Thomas Cooley synthesized the seemingly contra-
dictory premises of Marshall's and Dillon's prior constitutional visions-the
former which pointed towards public intervention in the private realm, the
latter which pointed away from such intervention-to celebrate the public
city as an important extrajudicial agent of constitutional freedom. Cooley
believed that constitutional freedom depended upon an active local citi-
zenry, eager to govern itself in accord with a constitutional norm of imparti-
ality. That norm would be given a living, breathing spirit through the daily
institutional practice of local self-government, which judges would protect,
from state interference, incident to the judges' enforcement of substantive
constitutional principles.
We have also seen that, as a substantive matter, Cooley relied on local-
ism to enforce a nineteenth-century constitutional distinction between the
public and the private spheres that was intended to secure equality. He be-
lieved that local communities were well positioned to frustrate private cap-
ture because they would be likely to take only those actions that would
serve the broader public interests of the particular local community in ques-
tion. Thus, state attempts to mandate local intervention into the private
market to boost certain industries, or to interfere with local efforts to resist
partisan politics, were suspect, because (but only to the extent that) they
tended to privilege the demands of powerful private interests over the needs
of the local public.
The incorporation of Cooley's defense of local governmental independ-
ence in modem doctrine would appear, at first glance, to be problematic in
light of the substantive constitutional premises on which it depended. The
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advent of legal realism20 1 and the Warren Court's challenge to the Nation's
pervasive racial segregation2°2 cast irrevocable doubt upon the kind of con-
stitutional dichotomy between the public and the private spheres that ani-
mated Cooley's substantive constitutional vision. Modem constitutional
doctrine is far more sympathetic than its nineteenth-century counterpart
with respect to both public attempts to intrude on market affairs2 0 3 and
claims that the protection of individual constitutional rights depends upon
the willingness of public institutions to undertake affirmative efforts to cor-
rect inequities in the private sphere. 20 4 It is tempting to conclude, therefore,
that the modem doctrinal incorporation of Cooley's localist vision
201 See HoRWrrz, TRANSFORMATION II, supra note 60, at 206-08 (describing the legal
realist critique); see also Sunstein, supra note 15, at 876-83 (briefly chronicling the demise of
Lochnerian assumptions in constitutional law).
202 In several modem cases, the Court stretched the limits of the "state action" doctrine to
strike down seemingly "private" acts of racial discrimination. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461 (1953) (holding that the exclusion of blacks from voting in elections held by the
Jaybird Democratic Association was unconstitutional). See generally Black, supra note 15, at
84-85 (explaining that as of 1967, Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), was the last
case in which "the Supreme Court... held that a claim under the equal protection clause,
against racial discrimination, must fail because 'state action' is absent, or present in
insufficient kind or amount to implicate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment").
203 Compare West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-400 (1937) (upholding a
state minimum wage law for women), with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58-65 (1905)
(striking down state minimum hours legislation).
204 There are many discussions of how modem doctrine may be read to be consistent with
an affirmative constitutional vision. See Bandes, supra note 15, at 2342-47 (proposing to
discard the rhetoric of negative rights and instead focus on effectuating constitutional goals);
Black, supra note 15, at 95-107 (discussing the state action doctrine and the initial barriers to
ending racial discrimination); Karst & Horowitz, supra note 15, at 65-78 (examining the
Supreme Court's decision in Reitman v. Mielkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), and its implications for
state sanctioned discrimination); Michelman, supra note 15, at 9-19 (discussing the Court's
treatment of social welfare concerns in the 1968 term and the paradox of requiring the
government to treat everybody equally while requesting that it remedy certain social
inequalities); Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles, supra note 7, at 1190-91
(concluding that the Court's decision in National League of Cities may protect an individual's
right to governmental services); Sager, supra note 15, at 785-98 (discussing the equal
protection doctrine and its application to exclusionary zoning issues in residential areas);
Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space, supra note 15, at 23-38 (applying concepts of
quantum physics to constitutional analysis and examining the effects of court decisions in the
social realm under such a rubric); Tribe, supra note 7, at 1075-76 (concluding that the Court's
decision in National League of Cities may protect an individual's right to governmental
services). There are, of course, formidable obstacles to the recognition of such claims. See,
e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989)
(explaining that "the [Due Process] Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to
act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security"); Currie, supra note
15, passim (contrasting decisions made by the former German Constitutional Court and the
courts of the United States in their treatment of positive versus negative rights in
interpretations of their respective constitutions).
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would serve merely to reinscribe discredited Lochnerian premises into con-
stitutional law.
The standard critique of the localist turn in modem case law has pro-
ceeded along precisely this line. In the view of many scholars, the Court's
recent defense of localism, in cases such as San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez and Milliken v. Bradley, reflects a distressing prefer-
ence for private over public interests. According to this view, these cases
employ the nostalgic rhetoric of localism to favor a vision of suburban
quietude that entrenches inter-local inequalities and traps urban residents
within discriminatorily constructed political boundary lines. Moreover, this
view reads these cases to depict local governments as protected zones of
private freedom and thus to constitute defenses of the private sphere from
the positive demands of modem constitutionalism. 205 Indeed, it has been
suggested that Cooley's own defense of localism in the nineteenth century
reveals the laissez-faire assumptions that must underlie the re-emergence of
localist rhetoric in modem constitutional doctrine.206
In tying the defense of localism in modem case law to a Lochnerian
constitutional vision, the standard critique implicitly argues for a return to
the conventional doctrinal assumption that local governments are merely
creatures of their states, undeserving of special judicial respect. Such a re-
turn, it is suggested, would enable federal courts to break free from the re-
maining shackles of nineteenth-century constitutional theory that have led
them to view with suspicion claims that suburbs have constitutional obliga-
tions to remedy private inequities.
The next two Parts show, however, that a structural defense of local in-
dependence should be understood to be consistent with, and a critical aspect
of, the more affirmative constitutional vision that underlies the standard cri-
tique of the Supreme Court's localist turn. With the aid of Cooley's struc-
tural insights, the modem doctrinal recognition of localism need not be read
to mark a return to a minimalist constitutional vision seeking to protect the
private sphere from public intervention. Such recognition should be read,
instead, to reflect a broader doctrinal framework affording local communi-
ties the freedom to give life to the positive constitutional rights of their resi-
dents that judges are often ill-positioned-and unwilling-to secure. If this
framework accords local governments a measure of freedom from intrusive
judicial remedies that would impose burdensome positive constitutional ob-
ligations upon them, it also accords them constitutional protection against
205 See supra note 5 (citing discussions of the Court's creation of the concept of
"localism").
206 See Williams, supra note 5 (comparing the views of Dillon, Cooley, the Burger Court,
and Justice Brennan on the constitutional constraints upon municipal power).
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state attempts to prevent them from assuming such obligations when they
believe it necessary to do so.
This Part begins the inquiry by examining, in some detail, the conven-
tional critique of those modem, localist cases that have constrained the
scope of federal judicial power. It shows that, paradoxically, the standard
critique of these cases actually applies with greater force against the struc-
tural constitutional vision that underlies Dillon's defense of state power than
it does against the structural vision that underlies Cooley's defense of local
independence. Part VI supplements the discussion by considering a series
of modem cases that may be read to employ localism in order to preclude
state attempts to stifle local constitutionalism.
B. The Standard Critique
Modem doctrine is often criticized for imbuing local power with a tal-
ismanic authority that threatens to undermine necessary constitutional en-
forcement and privilege suburban selfishness. As Richard Briffault has put
it, the modem doctrinal attraction to localism "tend[s] not to build up public
life, but rather contribute[s] to the pervasive privatism that is the hallmark
of contemporary American politics. '20 7 Localist cases, such as Milliken v.
Bradley,208 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,209 and a
series of decisions that have rejected constitutional challenges to local zon-
ing cases,210 are said to reflect the modern Court's distressing attraction to
an impoverished conception of public politics. 211  They are also said to
demonstrate that the modem defense of localism tends to insulate private
inequalities from public interference.
212
For example, in Milliken, the Court emphasized the importance of local
educational control in striking down a district court decree that ordered
more than fifty suburban school districts to assist in desegregating the De-
troit public schools. 213 The Court's nostalgic appeal to iocalism appeared to
207 Briffault, Our Localism Part I, supra note 2, at 2.
208 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
209 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
210 See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977) (upholding a local zoning plan); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S.
668 (1976) (upholding a local zoning referendum); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S.
1 (1974) (upholding a local decision to prohibit a group home); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding a local zoning power).
21 See supra note 5 (citing several commentators' views that these cases allow local
communities to escape from constitutional obligations).
212 See supra note 5.
213 Milliken, 418 U.S. at 717.
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protect a racially stratified private sphere from a judicial attempt to require
local communities to take the affirmative actions necessary to enforce a
constitutional right to equal protection. Moreover, it seemed to sanction a
local political process that displayed little interest in fulfilling constitutional
requirements in order to foster an integrated public educational system and
relieve suburban communities of their obligation to help solve the problems
of segregated cities.
As Richard Ford has explained, by emphasizing the importance of local
autonomy, Milliken "ironically segregated the scope of the remedy to racial
segregation, and thereby may have allowed the historical segregation to be-
come entrenched rather than remedied. '214 Similarly, Laurence Tribe con-
cluded that Milliken offered no explanation "for why it thought district
boundaries were sacrosanct.... The plaintiffs were to be trapped within the
city's boundaries, without even an opportunity to demand that those bound-
ary lines be justified as either rational or innocently nonrational. 215 Joan
Williams has joined in the general criticism, arguing that Milliken is part of
a larger trend "in which the Burger Court extols local autonomy to constrict
the scope of the fourteenth amendment."
216
San Antonio School District, too, has been cited as evidence of the dan-
gers that attend the modem Court's turn towards localism. There, the Su-
preme Court rejected an equal protection challenge to Texas's allegedly in-
equitable system of public school financing by invoking the virtues of local
self-government.217 The Court's defense of localism has been criticized for
upholding a state system of funding public schools that benefited privileged,
wealthy suburbs. As a result, severe wealth disparities between local com-
munities were immunized from constitutional review.
Joan Williams has argued that the Court used localism in San Antonio
School District, in part, to counter the Warren Court's successful attempts to
subject state power to constitutional limitations. She therefore concludes
that the Court's localist turn served to frustrate the more expansive, modem
conception of the permissible scope of constitutional enforcement that
emerged in the wake of Lochner, and thus served to protect private inequal-
ity.218 Moreover, Richard Briffault has contended that San Antonio School
District relieved public institutions of their constitutional obligations to cor-
214 Ford, supra note 5, at 1876.
215 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1495 (2d ed. 1988).
216 Williams, supra note 5, at I 11.
217 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 1 (1973) (upholding state
school financing system against an equal protection challenge).
218 Williams, supra note 5, at 100-20.
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219rect interlocal income inequalities. Indeed, he has suggested that it in-
spired many state courts to use the mantra of "local control... as a shield,
to ward off claims that the state has an obligation to revamp the existing
school finance system.
' 220
Finally, the Court's invocations of localism in a variety of exclusionary
zoning cases have been cited as powerful confirmation that the modem de-
fense of localism tends to privilege private power by protecting wealthy
suburbs. Lawrence Sager advanced this argument with particular force
more than twenty years ago in an article that criticized the Court's decisions
in Warth v. Seldin 21 and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.
222
for their deference to local institutions.223
In Warth, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
challenge a local zoning ordinance that they claimed unconstitutionally dis-
criminated against poor and minority residents. 224 Sager argued that the
Court manipulated modem standing doctrine in order to protect local com-
munities from the demands of constitutional litigation. 225 Moreover, he
noted that in City of Eastlake the Court rejected in cursory fashion a due
process challenge to a city charter amendment that required a majority of
city residents, by citywide referendum, to ratify any zoning change ap-
226proved by the city council. Taken together, Sager suggested, that
Warth and City of Eastlake can be understood as consistent products of the
view that the legislative facilitation of the aggregate will of the members of a
community is to predominate over virtually all other possible concerns in the
land use planning process. On this view, the cases reflect the equation of the
local zoning process with the joint exercise of the prerogatives of private own-
ership; the municipality is a club, which enjoys the mandatory and exclusive
membership of its residents and landowners. And majority will-however, in-
sular, unjust, or irrational-prevails.
227
Convinced that the modem turn towards localism entrenches private
power, critics of these modem localist cases look to central institutions to
promote their more affirmative, substantive constitutional vision. They
suggest that a positive constitutional vision requires courts to return to the
219 Briffault, Our Localism: Part 11, supra note 2, at 411-17, 441.
220 Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 24 CONN. L.
REV. 773, 775 (1992).
221 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
222 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
223 See generally Sager, supra note 5.
224 422 U.S. at 504-07.
225 Sager, supra note 5, at 1376-1402.
226 Id. at 1402-24.
227 Id. at 1425.
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traditional assumption that local governments are merely the administrative
appendages of their states, and thus to avoid the tendency to conceive of
these local institutions as protected private arenas deserving of special judi-
cial solicitude.
Given that local political boundary lines are in some sense arbitrary,
critics suggest that federal judicial intervention to correct for local inaction
in cases such as Milliken and San Antonio School District is relatively cos-
tless. 22  Moreover, critics contend, local suburbs are unlikely to fulfill their
constitutional obligations in the absence of judicial prodding. 229  Thus, to
the extent that the federal judiciary, or perhaps even Congress, is unable to
perform the task, critics of the modem turn towards localism argue that state
courts should fill in for these national institutions.
230
Similarly, critics contend that the Court's apparent embrace of unre-
strained local majoritarianism in Warth and City of Eastlake reflects the
constitutional need for central supervision of local communities. In re-
sponse, Sager offers a variety of solutions to these cases that appear to be
premised on the assumption that local political processes will in fact be
marked by unrestrained majoritarianism. As he explains, "Contemporary
urban zoning decisions are quite likely to involve circumstances in which
the unrestrained self-interest of a community's residents will be drastically
inconsistent with tenets of reasonableness and fairness .... ,231 State courts
228 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 215, at 1495 (noting with disapproval that the Court's
holding in Milliken is "especially puzzling in the wake of the Court's repeated rulings that
neighborhood school assignments enjoy no such sacred status as emblems of local autonomy
and community control of public schools"); Ford, supra note 5, at 1875 (noting with
disapproval that the Court's decision in Milliken is "puzzling unless one views cities not as
mere agents of state power, but as autonomous entities"); id. at 1877 (concluding with respect
to the Court's decision in San Antonio School District that "[i]f respect for local government
were as important as the Court claimed, it would seem strange that the Court should so
casually dismiss the fact that the boundaries that define these governments are arbitrary");
Williams, supra note 5, at 109 (criticizing both Milliken and San Antonio School District for
purporting to defend local autonomy given that "the Supreme Court has long since accepted
Dillon's principle that cities are mere subdivisions of the states").
229 See Briffault, Our Localism: Part IH, supra note 2, at 355 ("Suburbs benefit from the
localist values of courts and legislatures that discourage modification of the highly
satisfactory status quo and protect them from outside interference.").
230 See, e.g., Briffault, Our Localism: Part I, supra note 2, at 18-39 (examining state
court jurisprudence in school financing cases and finding that although these courts split on
the appropriate degree of local autonomy required, the majority reject any calls for reform);
Sager, supra note 5, at 1242-63 (arguing for state judicial authority to enforce the margins of
underenforced federal constitutional norms).
231 Sager, supra note 5, at 1420.
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should therefore provide the judicial review that federal courts are unwilling
to apply.
232
Even those scholars who profess to break from the federalist assump-
tion that localism and constitutionalism are antithetical values often, in the
end, embrace the basic federalist assumption that central institutions must
control local ones. For example, soon after the Court ruled in the subse-
quently reversed National League of Cities v. Usery case,233 Laurence Tribe
offered a sympathetic reading of the Court's decision in which he purported
to connect localism to a more affirmative, substantive vision of constitu-
tionalism. He explained in his article that although the Court's use of lo-
calism generally had tended to constrict the scope of constitutional rights,
there was no necessary connection between decentralization and constitu-
tional minimalism. "[E]ven a Court motivated to cut back on federal vindi-
cation of personal claims," he noted, "might structure such cutbacks in ways
reflecting an inchoate recognition that those claims are propelled by a jus-
tice too insistent to be denied. 234
Tribe proceeded to argue that National League of Cities implicitly rec-
ognized an affirmative constitutional right to the receipt of basic welfare
services from the government. He suggested that its rule protecting integral
state and local functions from congressional interference could be defended
only if it were understood to rest on a desire to protect the underlying indi-
vidual constitutional right to the receipt of certain public services from the
adverse impact of federal regulation on the provision of such services.235
Tribe concluded his putatively localist argument, however, by suggest-
ing a reading of National League of Cities that would actually expand fed-
eral power. "Congress could alter the result of that decision by reenacting
minimum wage regulations for public employees," he explained, "as one
possible vindication of the rights of those employees to equality, liberty, and
property." 236 For, he continued, "[o]nce we have recognized affirmative
rights against government, Congress may claim that it is just such rights that
it is vindicating for public employees by ensuring that they receive a mini-
mum wage.
' 237
232 See id. at 1422 (advocating that state courts become more involved in "restraining
gross excesses of suburban exclusion").
233 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
234 Tribe, supra note 7, at 1104.
235 See id. at 1067-78.
236 Id. at 1103.
27 Id.
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Frank Michelman's defense of the decision in National League of Cities
follows a similar pattern.238 It, too, professes to draw a connection between
localism and constitutionalism. It concludes, however, with the suggestion
that National League of Cities may serve as a strong precedent for a federal
court challenge to a locality's failure to provide sufficient services.23 In-
deed, Michelman's suggestion premises the viability of such a claim on the
contention that "self-interested local voter majorities" cannot be trusted with
determining the proper amount of services that the Federal Constitution re-
quires them to provide. 24  Thus, for Michelman, no less than for Tribe, an
argument that begins as a defense of local autonomy ultimately dissolves in
a flight of federalist fancy.
C. Critiquing the Critique
The standard critique of modem localism, at first glance, appears con-
sistent with the general defense of state power that Marshall and Dillon had
advanced. Like their nineteenth-century predecessors, the modem critics
suggest that constitutionalism depends upon sober, central institutions (the
federal or state judiciary or, perhaps, the national or state legislature) con-
straining the baleful influences of local majoritarian politics. They presume
that local majorities are unlikely to govern in accord with constitutional ob-
ligations, and thus they perceive an implicit rejection of constitutionalism in
the deference accorded local majorities in cases such as Milliken241 and San
Antonio School District.
242
Considered more closely, however, one detects an important disjunction
between the nineteenth-century attack on local power and the modem cri-
tique of the Court's recent respect for it. Both Marshall and Dillon sought
to constrain local power because of their fear that local majorities were pe-
culiarly likely to breach the public/private boundary. 243 By contrast, the
modem critics are hostile to the defense of localism because they believe
238 See Michelman, States'Rights and States'Roles, supra note 7, at 1172-73 (discussing
the responsibility inherent in the decision of states and municipalities to provide social
services).
239 See id. at 1181-91 (discussing potential constitutional challenges based on National
League of Cities).
See id. at 1190 (suggesting that reliance on the local electorate "creates ... an obvious
risk that the general social obligation will not be fairly or adequately weighed in the decisions
that result").
241 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
242 411 U.S. 1 (1973); see supra notes 208-20 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's use of concepts of localism in these two cases).
243 See supra notes 19-58 and accompanying text (describing Marshall and Dillon's
views on localism).
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that it tends to protect the private sphere from public influence. Milliken is
problematic because it appears to insulate the private housing decisions of
suburban dwellers from constitutional reach. San Antonio School District is
troublesome because it renders private wealth disparities irrelevant to con-
stitutional analysis. Warth244 and City of Eastlake245 are wrongly decided
because they transform public institutions, as Sager puts it, into private
homeowner clubs, immune from constitutional review. 246 Thus, these crit-
ics suggest, modem doctrine, through its invocation of localism, tends to fa-
vor private over public interests.
The substantive disjunction between these past and present critiques of
localism may be traced to the substantive shift in our understanding of the
constitutional boundary line between the public and the private in the post-
Lochner, post-Warren Court era. Much of modem constitutional law has
challenged the pre-Lochner, pre-Warren Court conception of the pub-
lie/private distinction. It has suggested that constitutional violations are as
likely to result from governmental inaction in the face of private discrimi-
nation as from majoritarian intrusions into the private realm. Public defer-
ence to private choices may impinge on positive constitutional rights to
public protection. It is just such positive rights to public intervention-in-
terdistrict public school busing in Milliken, equitable public education fi-
nancing in San Antonio School District-that modem scholars implicitly
seek to vindicate when they criticize the modem Court's turn toward local-
ism.
The standard critique of the modem turn toward localism, however, has
largely failed to examine the degree to which the affirmative constitutional
vision that animates localism may comport with the structural conception
(though not the substantive premises) of constitutionalism that underlay
Cooley's nineteenth-century defense of localism. The standard critique
draws upon the fear of local majoritarianism that underlay the nineteenth-
century defense of state power in order to embrace a positive constitutional
vision of a revived public sphere, eager to resist private power. It is Coo-
ley's nineteenth-century defense of localism, rather than Dillon's defense of
statism, however, that may be understood to accord better with the modem
critique's embrace of the public sphere.
Cooley contended that private interests were likely to dominate central
political institutions, and he therefore suggested that local political institu-
tions were likely to play a critical role in securing a neutral public sphere
244 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
245 City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
246 See Sager, supra note 5, at 1425 (concluding that Warth and City of Eastlake support
the view of municipalities as clubs with residents and landowners as the exclusive members).
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that would govern in accord with a constitutional norm of equality.247 He
argued that many constitutional problems were so intertwined with localized
facts and community concerns that no centralized solution was likely to
succeed. Local governments, however, would be sufficiently close to the
concerns of their communities to discern a public from a private purpose
that might elude the judicial eye. State attempts to interfere with the capac-
ity of local governments to make determinations that depended on knowl-
edge of, and engagement with, localized circumstances therefore threatened
to undermine substantive constitutional limitations on public power. A re-
flexive judicial deference to assertions of central power, in other words,
would deprive the courts of an important institutional contributor to consti-
tutional analysis-the local communities that were engaged most directly
with the particular circumstances that had occasioned the constitutional dis-
pute.
Moreover, Cooley believed that a regime of constitutional enforcement
that depended on central institutions, such as the judiciary, to enforce highly
contestable constitutional restrictions on private power, would fail to endure
248over time. He contended that such a regime would not infuse constitu-
tionalism with the "living and breathing spirit" that was needed to secure
constitutional freedom, and thus, it would serve as a poor means by which
to prevent the capture of public politics by powerful private interests.249
The temporary imposition of constitutional principles from on high would
fail to succeed because those charged with carrying constitutional principles
into practice were ultimately the people who lived in the very communities
that would be responsible for abiding the constitutional command. Without
their internalization of the underlying constitutional principle, the principle
itself could never fully take root as an element of self-government.
Cooley also suggested that local governments would serve as the insti-
tutional mechanism by which the contours of constitutional principles them-
selves would become knowable, for it was through communal interactions
at the local level that legal principles were given their definition. Cooley's
belief that the local public could serve as an institutional means by which
substantive constitutional norms could be given full expression suggests that
the local sphere could serve as the crucible through which individual private
lives would interact to forge public constitutional values. In this way, he
247 See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing the role of local governments).
248 See JONES, supra note 11, at 150 (discussing Cooley's recognition of the limits of the
role of the judiciary).
249 People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlburt, 24 Mich. 44, 107 (1871) (Cooley, J., concurring).
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suggested, localism not only comports with constitutionalism, but also cre-
ates it.250
Finally, Cooley's nineteenth-century defense of local constitutionalism
calls into question the view that a modem defense of localism amounts to a
defense of privatized, suburban power. As Cooley's lectures show, a local
constitutionalist vision need not be rooted in a naively romantic attraction to
homogeneous communities. A structural commitment to local constitu-
tional enforcement, which takes constitutionalism to depend upon the active
involvement of local communities in the practice of constitutional enforce-
ment, may be quite compatible with a defense of urbanism. For, as we have
seen, Cooley remained faithful to his localist vision despite the ethnic and
economic heterogeneity of the emerging cities of the late nineteenth cen-
tury. Indeed, Cooley's structural constitutional commitment to localism led
him to seek urban reforms that would build up public life in order to ensure
that cities could be governed in accord with the Jacksonian principles of
equality to which he subscribed.251
It would appear, then, that Cooley's structural insights about the im-
portant extrajudicial role that local governments may play in promoting
constitutionalism are quite relevant to the more positive constitutional vi-
sion that the modem critics of localism seek to promote. Federal judicial
intervention is, after all, a notably problematic means of resolving the diffi-
cult problems of proof and remedy presented in, for example, Milliken and
San Antonio School District. The constitutional claims that are at issue in
such cases call upon federal judges to assume responsibility for a host of
determinations that are normally entrusted to local officials. A deferential
stance by central institutions may be premised, therefore, on an appropriate
respect for the local public sphere (and its capacity to govern itself in accord
with constitutional limitations) rather than a blind faith in the virtues of pri-
vate decision making. 2
250 See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (noting local governments' place in
realizing constitutional values).
251 See supra notes 181-201 and accompanying text (discussing Cooley's proposed
reforms).
52 Even scholars who are sympathetic to a more positive conception of constitutionalism
are aware of the limits of judicial competence, see, e.g., Bandes, supra note 15, at 232642
(discussing objections, such as lack of judicial capacity, to the judicial enforcement of
affinmative constitutional duties), and these scholars have therefore emphasized the need to
distinguish between judicially enforceable positive constitutional obligations and positive
constitutional obligations that should be enforced through the efforts of political institutions.
It may be that the Constitution contains some duties to provide basic necessities and
ensure bodily survival which are not "perfectly enforceable in courts of law." To
deny the existence of these duties based on current judicial reluctance or inability to
enforce them is to risk permanently sacrificing their implementation.
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To be sure, Cooley believed that an energized local public would pro-
tect against untoward public interventions in the private market.25 3 His in-
sight that an energized local public is a critical aspect of robust constitution-
alism, however, clearly resonates with the positive constitutional vision of
the modem critics of localism. For in the modem constitutional context, it
is clear that an energized local public is necessary if the more ambitious
aims of positive constitutionalism are to endure. A federal judicial decree
that imposes affirmative obligations upon a community may not, of its own
force, convince the community that it has constitutional obligations to pro-
vide protection. An injunction against state attempts to preclude local ef-
forts to assume those obligations, by contrast, can ensure that local commu-
nities that have begun the process of transforming abstract constitutional
norms into reality may continue in that most public of endeavors. And,
once a local community has been assured the space to undertake such ef-
forts, the possibility that other communities will be influenced to follow suit
will only increase. There is, then, in Cooley's work, the beginnings of a vo-
cabulary that would permit us to conceive of localism-and even the mod-
em uses of localism-as something other than a cloak for distressing priva-
tism.
Indeed, the conventional reading of modem doctrine's localist caste
does tend to obscure a discernible public constitutional dimension-akin to
that advanced in the nineteenth century by Cooley (and even Marshall)-in
cases such as Milliken, San Antonio School District, and Warth.254 The cri-
tique portrays such cases as if they were merely attempts to defend govern-
mental inaction against the judicial enforcement of positive individual con-
stitutional rights to public assistance. It thus reads such cases as resting
upon an embrace of a minimalist public sphere that merely aggregates pri-
vate preferences. The cases themselves, however, often describe local
communities in terms reminiscent of those that Chief Justice Marshall used
in Dartmouth College255 to describe the civic institutions that would give
life to his constitutional vision, or that Cooley used to describe the public
city he imagined could be revived.
The localist cases often depict the local community, as Cooley depicted
the reformed city, as a public entity, free from the hurly-burly of partisan
See id. at 2342 (footnotes omitted). See generally Sager, supra note 15, at 767 (providing the
classic statement of this position).
253 See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
254 See supra notes 221-32 and accompanying text (discussing a critical analysis that
suggests that Worth's localism is a defense of private power).
255 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 4 Wheat. 250 (1819); see
supra notes 19-47 and accompanying text (detailing the arguments and reasoning of the
Dartmouth College decision).
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political life, intent only on considering the practical, mundane, and there-
fore neutral interests of the public as a whole. They also often emphasize
the degree to which the peculiar nature of affirmative constitutional obliga-
tions requires a heightening of local public involvement. This rhetorical de-
piction at least suggests a reading of modem doctrine that takes local gov-
ernments to be, in the present constitutional context, the important civic
institutions through which constitutional values may be extrajudicially im-
parted to the people.
For example, the seemingly majoritarian logic that underlies Milliken is
tempered by the Court's description of local school boards as deliberative,
participatory entities, concerned with public interests distinct from the ag-
gregated private preferences of the majority. As the Court put it,
local autonomy has long been thought essential to maintenance of community
concern and support for public schools and to quality of the educational proc-
ess.... [L]ocal control over the educational process affords citizens an op-
portunity to participate in decisionmaking, permits the structuring of school
programs to fit local needs, and encourages "experimentation, innovation, and
a healthy competition for educational excellence."
256
If the rhetoric is to be believed, the local sphere is worthy of deference
less because an abstract respect for majoritarian will demands it, or a respect
for private suburban interests compels it, than because public educational
excellence depends, at least in part, upon local community control. San
Antonio School District sounds a similar theme in invoking Justice Bran-
deis's description of the states as "laborator[ies]" of democracy in empha-
sizing the importance of local educational autonomy.
25 7
Even City of Eastlake, as Professor Michelman has shown, may be un-
derstood to rest on an optimistic vision of public life and a corresponding
fear of private power. 25  He explains that City of Eastlake pointedly distin-
guished Eubank v. Richmond,259 which struck down a provision conferring
zoning power to "two-thirds of the owners along any block."260 It did so,
Professor Michelman notes, by explaining that "'[a] referendum ... is far
more than an expression of ambiguously founded neighborhood preference.
It is the city itself legislating through its voters-an exercise by the voters of
256 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973)).
257 411 U.S. at 50 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
258 See supra notes 224-32 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's apparent
embrace of local private interest in this case and in Warth).
259 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
260 Frank Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing
Judicial Models ofLocal Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 164 (1978).
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their traditional right to [determine] ... what serves the public interest.'
261
The Court's "derogation of mere 'neighborhood preference,' in favor of
something called a 'public interest' found by something called the 'city it-
self,' should certainly suggest that the Court was not in direct touch with the
divinities of economic and public choice while ruminating on the Eastlake
case."
262
D. Conclusion
The mere fact that Cooley relied upon a defense of local governmental
independence to promote a constitutional vision that would build up public
political life, and thereby promote substantive constitutional values, does
not mean that the Court's recent use of localism serves a similar end. It
does mean that the Court's reliance upon localism is not necessarily incon-
sistent with a strong defense of constitutionalism or a healthy skepticism
towards both private power and unrestrained majoritarianism. For, as we
have seen, localism has a deeper historical connection to the promotion of
both constitutionalism and a vital public urbanism than is sometimes sup-
posed.
In addition, the mere fact that many of the Court's recent decisions
contain an encouraging description of the deliberative character of the local
political realm does not mean that federal judicial deference to local pre-
rogatives promotes constitutionalism. There is the inescapable fact that in
each of the cases thus far considered, the Court's holding had the conse-
quence of protecting suburban inaction from constitutional challenge. As
the next Part shows, however, cases such as Milliken, San Antonio School
District, Warth, and City ofEastlake do not exhaust the Court's deference to
local power. There is another series of cases that may be read to constitute a
critical component of the Court's localist turn, and this series of cases can-
not be reconciled so easily with the standard critique of modem localism.
VI. TRACES OF THE PUBLIC CITY IN MODERN DOCTRINE
A. Introduction
This Part uses Cooley's structural insights to examine a series of
cases that are not generally understood to rest on a defense of localism-
namely, Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,263 Papasan v.
261 Id. at 182 (quoting City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 678 (1976)
(citation omitted) (emphasis in Michelman)).
262 Id.
263 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
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264 265
Allain,264 and Romer v. Evans. Indeed, these cases are not commonly
thought to rest on much of anything. They are jurisprudential enigmas that
seem to lack any coherent relationship to constitutional doctrine as a whole,
let alone to one another. If none is clearly explicable within the confines of
conventional doctrinal assumptions, however, they may, taken together, be
read to share surprising affinities with Cooley's structural suggestion that
state-created local governments may promote constitutionalism in much the
same manner that Marshall believed that state-created private colleges
could.266 Cooley's localist vocabulary reveals more, however, than an im-
manent logic to cases that might otherwise appear inexplicable. By using
that vocabulary to consider the cases discussed below in conjunction with
those that have been discussed already, we can begin to see that the critique
that has been commonly lodged against the modem doctrinal turn towards
localism is wholly inadequate.
The cases considered below are not described fairly as examples of how
the judicial recognition of localism serves to entrench suburban power or to
insulate the private sphere from public influence. They are better under-
stood as examples of how the federal judiciary's recognition of "our local-
ism,"267 and its rejection of an absolutist vision of state power, serve to ex-
pand the authority of towns and cities to correct private discrimination and
inequity and to impart constitutional values to the public. So read, these
cases cast a new light on the use of localism in cases such as Milliken268 and
San Antonio School District.
269
Considered as a whole, then, the turn towards localism in modem doc-
trine may be understood to reflect a deeper point about constitutional struc-
ture-namely, that the enforcement of positive constitutional rights to pub-
lic assistance depends in important respects upon the active political
engagement of local political institutions. For that reason, the current as-
sumption that local governments are either creatures of their states without
independent constitutional interests or private associations that are immune
from constitutional obligations fails to capture the potential role that local
governments may play as important, extrajudicial components of the federal
constitutional structure.
264 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
265 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
266 See supra notes 19-47 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice Marshall's
decision in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward).
267 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (identifying and defining the use of "our
localism" in Supreme Court opinions).
268 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
269 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); see supra notes
208-20 and accompanying text (analyzing the court's concepts of localism in these two cases).
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Admittedly, the readings of Seattle School District, Papasan, and Ro-
mer that are offered below do not demonstrate that the Court, in some overt
manner, has embraced a kind of local constitutionalism. The cases are not
self-consciously framed as defenses of local governmental autonomy from
state control, and they are suffused with traditional, individual rights rheto-
ric. With Cooley's defense of localism in mind, however, it becomes possi-
ble to understand such cases as instances in which the Court has protected
localism in order to promote constitutionalism.
Before proceeding directly to an examination of Seattle School District,
Papasan, and Romer, it is important to lay a bit of groundwork in order to
dispose of a looming objection that will no doubt occur to many readers. To
the extent that Supreme Court doctrine has addressed the federal constitu-
tional status of local governments, it has often described them as mere
creatures of the states that have created them. A federal constitutional claim
for local governmental independence from state control would therefore ap-
pear to be in direct tension with settled doctrine that establishes state law to
be the sole determinant of the permissible scope of local political power. As
the next Subpart reveals, however, in several cases the Court has cast doubt
directly upon the validity of the state creature metaphor that is so commonly
thought to define the state/local relationship for constitutional purposes. A
brief review of the cases that have rejected the strongest form of the posi-
tivist position is necessary in order to make plausible the more ambitious
localist readings of Seattle School District, Papsan, and Romer that are then
offered.
B. Hunter v. Pittsburgh and the Limits of the "State Creature" Metaphor
Although the cases are legion that assert that state law defines the scope
of local governmental power, none has done so more forcefully, or more
famously, than Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh.270 There, the Court employed
language that, if taken seriously, would appear to foreclose any serious
contention that the Federal Constitution protects a measure of local govern-
mental freedom from state control, or that anything so fundamental as se-
curing constitutional freedom depends upon the independence of our towns
and cities. As the Court explained:
The State, therefore, at its pleasure may modify or withdraw all such powers,
may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other
agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it
with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All
this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent
270 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
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of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the State is
supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state constitu-
tion, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the
United States.
271
Hunter's seemingly unlimited holding is, however, more confined than
it appears. The Hunter Court considered a particular type of federal consti-
tutional claim to local governmental independence, one that invited the
majority to speak more broadly in describing the subordinate legal status of
272towns and cities than the federal constitutional structure warranted. The
federal constitutional claim before the Court arose from an annexation dis-
pute.273 The plaintiffs asserted a vested contractual right in a municipal
charter. They contended that a state annexation law violated the Contract
Clause of the Federal Constitution because it purported to alter retrospec-
tively the terms of the charter.2 74 The contention threatened to make the
Contract Clause a provision that would transform the several states into the
powerless overseers of constitutionally inviolable mini-republics, each free
to enjoin any state attempt at supervision that could be termed an alteration
of the foundational local charter.
Faced with such a dangerous claim, the Court went to great lengths to
make clear that the Federal Constitution did not apply to a state's regulation
of its municipal charters in the same manner that the Constitution applied to
275a state's regulation of its contracts with private parties. To that end, the
Court seized upon the image of local governments as creatures of state law
and emphasized that, implicit in the state's act of creation, was the reserva-
tion of the unlimited future power to alter or modify the creature.276 The
Hunter Court employed sweeping descriptions of local governmental subor-
dination to state control, therefore, to refute a particular kind of federal con-
stitutional claim for local governmental independence--one that rested on a
notion of vested state law property rights that would have dramatically lim-
ited a state's basic supervisory authority.
As a result, while Hunter's positivist description of local governmental
power was necessary to reject the Contract Clause claim in question, it was
also necessarily incomplete. It ignored the degree to which local communi-
ties may provide the vital institutional context within which people live their
public lives in a constitutional democracy. A local community is not simply
271 Id. at 178-79.
272 See id. at 178.
273 See id. at 174.
274 See id. at 176.
275 See id. at 179.
276 See id. at 178.
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a type of state administrative agency to be shaped at will to serve the need
of the central state. It is, in a fundamental sense, the locus for those human
interactions that comprise what we conceive to be democratic life in a con-
stitutional system committed to self-government. So understood, local gov-
ernments are necessarily something more than the mere creatures of state
law, a point that the Hunter Court did not acknowledge.
If Hunter ignored a more social conception of local government, the
modem Court clearly embraced it in several Warren Court-era decisions.
For as much as Hunter's sweeping contentions retain a hold on the legal
imagination, the limits of that extreme, positivist conception of localism are
evident in a set of cases in which the Court has expressly declined to give
broad sanction to the state creature metaphor. These cases, Marsh v. Ala-
27 g~ot278 t279 d obama,2 7 Gomillion v. Ligh foot, and Avery v. Midland County, do not
address the scope of local governmental power to provide extrajudicial con-
stitutional protection in derogation of state law. They clearly demonstrate,
however, that notwithstanding Hunter, state law alone does not define the
legal nature of local governments.
Marsh reveals the Supreme Court's recognition that Hunter's state
creature metaphor is a partial one. Marsh concerned a federal constitutional
challenge to the application of a state trespass law to unauthorized leafleting
on the property of a private company town.28° The State contended that the
federal constitutional right to free expression did not entail a right to tres-
pass on private property. The State contended that, as a private company,
the "town" had no federal constitutional obligation to provide its residents
with a free and open forum for the exchange of ideas, even though public
towns and cities plainly would have been obliged by the Constitution to do
so.28 Thus, the State argued, a state law that in application criminalized the
breach of a private company's rule against leafleting could not infringe
upon the federal constitutional rights of company town residents.
282
The Court rejected the State's contention. Justice Black suggested in
his majority opinion that, embedded within the federal constitutional struc-
ture, lay a conception of what it means to be a "town" or a "city." Justice
Black explained that
[m]any people in the United States live in company-owned towns. These peo-
ple, just as residents of municipalities, are free citizens of their State and
277 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
278 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
279 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
280 See 326 U.S. at 502-05.
281 See id. at 505.
282 See id.
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country. Just as all other citizens they must make decisions which affect the
welfare of community and nation. To act as good citizens they must be in-
formed. In order to enable them to be properly informed their information
must be uncensored. There is no more reason for depriving these people of the
liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is forS .. 283
curtailing these freedoms with respect to any other citizen.
Justice Frankfurter offered a separate concurrence that elaborated on the
intuitions that underlay Justice Black's majority opinion.2S4 He emphasized
that state law alone could not determine whether a place should be concep-
tualized as a community responsible for the practice of constitutional self-
government, or rather as private property immune from constitutional obli-
gations. A determination of such fundamental constitutional importance
could be answered only by consulting the substantive federal constitutional
principles that underlay the First Amendment. Those principles, Justice
Frankfurter argued, implicitly embraced a conception of local community
life independent of state law.
A company-owned town gives rise to a net-work of property relations. As to
these, the judicial organ of a State has the final say. But a company-owned
town is a town. In its community aspects it does not differ from other towns.
These community aspects are decisive in adjusting the relations now before
us .... Title to property as defined by State law controls property relations; it
cannot control issues of civil liberties which arise precisely because a company. . . 285
town is a town as well as a congeries of property relations.
Marsh reveals that, for purposes of federal constitutional law, towns
and cities perform a role that, in a deep sense, operates independent of state
law. The entity before the Court in Marsh was not a town or a city for pur-
poses of state law-the State of Alabama had not created the company town
in the way that it had created the cities of Birmingham or Mobile. The
seemingly private company town nevertheless was considered a public town
for purposes of the federal constitutional right to freedom of speech.28 6 The
Federal Constitution invested the community in question with duties inde-
pendent of, indeed inconsistent with, the state law rules that purported to de-
fine the nature of the place in question. The substantive federal constitu-
tional right in question-the right to the free exchange of ideas within a
community-presupposed the existence of a local community within which
such free exchanges could take place. State law lacked the power to alter
283 Id. at 508-09 (footnotes omitted).
284 See id. at 510-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing the importance of
community aspects of the town in finding that state law controls property relations, but not
issues of civil liberties).
285 Id.
286 See id. at 508.
1999]
566 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
that prior constitutional presupposition through its own definition of what
constituted a "town.,
287
The doctrinal rejection of the extreme positivist conception of local
governmental power is also plain in the two post-Marsh cases: Gomillion v.
2,088 t289ThCordeid mlin
Lightfoot and Avery v. Midland County. The Court decided Gorihion
more than a half century after Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, at a time
when, as a consequence of the civil rights movement, judicial concern about
the arbitrary exercise of state power was at its zenith. Gomillion concerned
Alabama's attempt to manipulate the boundaries of a municipality in a
manner that effectively divested a town's black residents of their citizenship
in that community. Faced with an argument that a state possessed the ple-
nary power to define municipal boundaries-an argument that Hunter ap-
peared to support-the Court limited the "unconfined dicta" that Hunter had
espoused. 9
Gomillion explained that the Court's seemingly broad prior holdings on
the state/local relationship had merely established two relatively limited le-
gal propositions. First, as cases such as Hunter made clear, "no constitu-
tionally protected contractual obligation arises between a State and its sub-
ordinate governmental entities solely as a result of their relationship."
292
Second, although a state's restructuring of its internal organization might
visit economic burdens upon some local communities, "the Due Process
Clause affords no immunity against mere inequalities in tax burdens, nor
does it afford protection against their increase as an indirect consequence of
a State's exercise of its political powers."
293
Having narrowed Hunter's rule, Gomillion explained that "the Court
has never acknowledged that the States have power to do as they will with
municipal corporations regardless of consequences." 294 The Court con-
cluded that the claim for state supremacy was particularly weak in the pres-
ent context given the Fifteenth Amendment right to vote possessed by the
ousted town residents. For although it was true that a state was "insulated
from federal judicial review" when it exercised "power wholly within the
domain of state interest," 295 the Court hastened to add that "such insulation
287 See id. at 509.
288 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
289 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
290 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
291 See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 344.
292 Id. at 343.
293 Id.
294 Id. at 344.
295 Id. at 347.
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is not carried over when state power is used as an instrument for circum-
venting a federally protected right. ' 2 96 Accordingly, the Gomillion Court
invoked the Fifteenth Amendment to invalidate the racial gerrymandering
that had resulted in the disenfranchisement of black town residents.
297
In Avery, the Court built upon the antipositivist conception of localism
apparent in Marsh and Gomillion in applying the one-person, one-vote rule
of Reynolds v. Sims2 98 to local governmental elections.2 99 The Court first
rejected the claim that local governments were somehow insulated from ju-
dicial review on the question presented.300 Notwithstanding the decision of
the Texas Supreme Court that had upheld the county's apportionment, the
Court concluded that the internal electoral methods of local governments in
Texas plainly implicated a protected federal constitutional right-the right
to equal protection of the laws in voting.301 The Court then explained that
the failure of local governments to apportion their own internal political
districts in accord with the Reynolds rule could not be excused by the con-
stitutional apportionment of the state legislature.30 2 In doing so, the Court
emphasized the unique role that local governments play in facilitating the
practice of self-government. In a passage that recalled Justice Black's
statement in Marsh, the Court stated:
Legislators enact many laws but do not attempt to reach those countless mat-
ters of local concern necessarily left wholly or partly to those who govern at
the local level. What is more, in providing for the governments of their cities,
counties, towns, and districts, the States characteristically provide for repre-
sentative government-for decisionmaking at the local level by representatives
elected by the people. And, not infrequently, the delegation of power to local
units is contained in constitutional provisions for local home rule which are
immune from legislative interference. In a word, institutions of local govern-
ment have always been a major aspect of our system, and their responsible and
responsive operation is today of increasing importance to the quality of life of
more and more of our citizens.
3 0 3
Marsh, Gomillion, and Avery demonstrate that there are well-
established constitutional limits to the "state creature" metaphor that Hunter
296 Id.
297 See id. at 346 ("When a legislature thus singles out a readily isolated segment of a
racial minority for special discriminatory treatment, it violates the Fifteenth Amendment.").
298 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
299 See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 476 (1968) (holding that the petitioner
had a right to a vote of "substantially equal weight to the vote of every other resident").
300 See id. at 480.
301 See id. at 478-81 (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits local elections
with voters in districts of disparate populations).
302 See id. at481.
303 Id.
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embraced. They establish that such basic individual constitutional rights as
the right to free expression, equal protection of the laws, and the right to
vote, may presuppose active engagement in local political life. As a result,
the cases demonstrate the Court's unwillingness to insulate from judicial re-
view state laws respecting local affairs when such laws trench on the federal
constitutional rights of local residents.
These cases do not, however, support the further proposition that local
governments are entitled to a degree of constitutional protection from an ex-
ercise of state power that would not interfere with a judicially enforceable
individual constitutional right. Rather, the cases show that a state may not
justify the infringement of an otherwise judicially enforceable individual
constitutional right simply by asserting its power to control its local gov-
ernments. They do not show that local governments themselves may justify
a disregard of direct state law commands by claiming an interest in protect-
ing individual constitutional rights that concededly could not be enforced by
the federal judiciary directly against the locality itself.
Yet it is precisely this latter class of constitutional claims-claims by
local governments against their states for the authority to provide extra-
judicial constitutional protection to their residents-for which the cases
considered in the next three Subparts may be read to provide support. Cases
such as Seattle School District, Papasan, and Romer suggest that local gov-
ernments do have an affirmative role to play in securing federal constitu-
tional norms that lie beyond judicial protection. The cases may further sug-
gest that judges should protect that affirmative role by limiting state
attempts to interfere with local affairs in certain constitutional contexts.
Thus, as we shall see, such cases may be understood as legitimate exten-
sions of the same constitutional conception of local governments that led the
Court in Marsh, Gomillion, and Avery to confine the more extreme state-
ments in Hunter concerning the state creature metaphor.
C. Milliken v. Bradley and Seattle School District No. 1 v. Washington
As we have seen, in Milliken v. Bradley, the Supreme Court invoked lo-
calist principles to reverse a federal district court decree that had been de-
signed to remedy racially segregative policies in the Detroit school sys-
tem.304  The decree required interdistrict busing and compelled the
participation of numerous surrounding suburbs. The Court explained that,
in providing interdistrict relief for an intradistrict violation, the district court
304 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974); see also supra text accompanying note
213 (noting that the Court's appeal to local educational control protected the racially stratified
private sphere from court imposed remedial action).
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erred in assuming that "school district lines are no more than arbitrary lines
on a map drawn for political convenience."305 In fact, the Court explained,
"No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local
control over the operation of schools.... ,"06
Because Michigan provided "for a large measure of local control, 30 7
the Court concluded that the district court's remedy would "alter the struc-
ture of public education in Michigan. 308 Critical questions regarding fi-
nancing, school assignment, the political authority of local boards, and the
authority to impose taxes, all of which the state had left to its local school
districts, would suddenly be removed from local control.30 9
[Tihe District Court will become first, a defacto "legislative authority" to re-
solve these complex questions, and then the "school superintendent" for the
entire area. This is a task which few, if any, judges are qualified to perform
and one which would deprive the people of control of schools through their
elected representatives.
3 1
o
The Court therefore held that an interdistrict school desegregation remedy
could be ordered only if there had been a "constitutional violation within
one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another dis-
trict."
3 11
There would be reason to question whether Milliken's professed respect
for local control contained a public constitutional dimension if it served
merely to constrict the power of federal courts to remedy constitutional
wrongs. If Milliken is read in conjunction with the Court's subsequent deci-
sion in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,312 however, the localist
notes that Milliken sounded may be read to have a constitutionally genera-
tive force. For if the Court's recognition of localism in Milliken served to
sanction suburban segregation, then the Court's recognition of localism in
Seattle School District served to constrain a state's attempt to preclude ur-
ban efforts to foster integration. Taken together, Milliken and Seattle
School District may be read to share important structural ties to Cooley's
earlier constitutional vision that conceived of local governments as impor-
tant, extrajudicial institutions for the promotion of constitutionalism.
305 Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741 (internal quotation omitted).
306 Id.
307 Id. at 742.
308 Id. at 742-43.
309 See id. at 743 (proposing questions that would arise in consolidating the 54
independent school districts historically administered as separate units).
3 Id. at 743-44.
311 Id. at 744-45.
312 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
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In Seattle School District, several State of Washington school districts
challenged Initiative 350, a statewide measure that precluded local school
districts from effecting race-based school assignment plans intended to
achieve racial balance. The school districts claimed that the state law vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause, even though they acknowledged that the
plans they wished to adopt were designed to remedy de facto, as opposed to
de jure, segregation and thus could not have been ordered by a federal
court.313 The Court upheld the school districts' challenge principally by re-
lying upon its earlier decision in Hunter v. Erickson.314 In Hunter, the Court
invalidated a local charter amendment that would have required a super
majority, voting by referendum, to approve any antiracial discrimination or-
dinance before it could be enacted into law. The Court concluded that the
alteration of the ordinary political process for such ordinances amounted to
a racial classification that impermissibly burdened the ability of racial mi-
norities to participate in the political process.3 15 By parity of reasoning, the
Court in Seattle School District explained that, in enacting Initiative 350,
Washington had effectively made it more difficult for minority citizens than
for all others to achieve legislation that inured to their benefit and that, un-
der Hunter, such a restructuring constituted an impermissible racial classifi-
cation.
316
The Court's reliance on Hunter, however, is less than persuasive.
Hunter concerned a restriction on the adoption of conventional antidis-
crimination laws.317 Seattle School District concerned a restriction on race-
based busing, which, as the Court implicitly acknowledged, by the early
1980s had attracted many proponents and opponents on both sides of the ra-
cial divide.31  For that reason alone, the analogy to Hunter was strained.
313 See id. at 459-65 (describing the history of Initiative 350).
314 See id. at 470 (finding that the Hunter analysis is dispositive of the issue and that
"Initiative 350 must fall because it does 'not attempt] to allocate governmental power on the
basis of any general principle."' (alteration in original) (quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S.
385, 395 (1969))).
315 See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391-93 (striking down a city charter amendment making it
more difficult to enact an anti-race discrimination ordinance by limiting the authority of the
city council).
316 See Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 470-75 (finding that "the practical effect of
Initiative 350 is to work a reallocation of power of the kind condemned in Hunter" and stating
that the initiative's "impact falls on the minority").
317 See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 386 (deciding the constitutionality of an amendment to a city
charter that prevented the city council from implementing any ordinance dealing with
discrimination in housing without the consent of a majority of the city's voters).
318 As the Court explained:
It is undeniable that busing for integration-particularly when ordered by a federal
court-now engenders considerably more controversy that does the sort of fair
housing ordinance debated in Hunter... But in the absence of a constitutional
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Seattle School District also expressly avoided affirming the lower court's
decision on the ground that Initiative 350's passage had been motivated by a
racially discriminatory purpose. 319 As a result, the decision appeared to be
without any clear foundation in prior case law. It could neither be easily as-
similated to the political-process theory advanced in Hunter, nor could it be
rooted in those cases that had struck down state laws passed with a racially
discriminatory intent.
320
Considered in light of Cooley's structural defense of local constitution-
alism, and read in conjunction with the localist turn that Milliken took, Se-
attle School District may be understood to rest on a defense of local consti-
tutionalism. The case suggests that, as a matter of federal constitutional
structure, states may not preclude their local political institutions from pro-
moting a norm of constitutional equality that lies beyond direct judicial en-
forcement. Such a reading takes Milliken's respect for localism seriously.
It reads that respect to rest on the premise that broad, local remedial discre-
tion is a precondition for federal judicial restraint in the area of school de-
segregation.
Such a reading finds support in the school desegregation cases that pre-
ceded Milliken and Seattle School District. In Cooper v. Aaron,"' for ex-
ample, a case commonly thought to represent the high-water mark of mod-
em notions of judicial supremacy, the Court was careful to cast its holding
as a defense of a local attempt to give life to the Court's decision in Brown
v. Board of Education.322 The Court explained that the Little Rock School
Board had voted for a remedial plan and had begun to adopt it. It was only
when Governor Faubus prevented the school board from carrying out its
own constitutional obligations that the school board sought relief from the
violation, the desirability and efficacy of school desegregation are matters to be
resolved through the political process. For present purposes, it is enough that
minorities may consider busing for integration to be "legislation that is in their
interest."
Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 473-74 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at
395). The Court's obvious hedge as to whether even the minority community supported
busing for integration further undermined the attempted analogy to Hunter.
3 See id. at 486 n.30 ("Ve... note that singling out the political processes affecting
racial issues for uniquely disadvantageous treatment inevitably raises dangers of
impermissible motivation.").
320 See id. at 484-87 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), for the
proposition that the racially discriminatory impact of a law did not itself give rise to a
constitutional violation, but explaining that Washington did not render Hunter a less relevant
precedent).
321 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
322 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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legal responsibility to craft a detailed remedy.323 It was a responsibility
previously assumed by the school board, because the school board was in a
better position than courts or other institutions to define its terms. The
Court in Cooper recognized this state of affairs: "While the School Board
was thus going forward with its preparation for desegregating the Little
Rock school system, other state authorities, in contrast, were actively pur-
suing a program designed to perpetuate in Arkansas the system of racial
segregation which this Court had held violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
, 324
In his separate concurrence in Cooper, Justice Frankfurter elaborated on
the localist underpinnings of the Court's holding.325 He explained that the
Court's decision demonstrated the vital role that local communities must
play in transforming an abstract constitutional principle regarding the right
to a desegregated public education into a felt reality. His description of the
events in Little Rock makes Cooper a surprising case study in local consti-
tutionalism. It identifies the critical role that local communities must play if
constitutional principles are to have a penetrative character, and it suggests
the importance of local commitment if constitutional rights to the equitable
receipt of publicly provided services are to be realized.
By working together, by sharing in a common effort, men of different minds
and tempers, even if they do not reach agreement, acquire understanding and
thereby tolerance of their differences. This process was under way in Little
Rock.... The Little Rock School Board had embarked on an educational ef-
fort "to obtain public acceptance" of its plan. Thus the process of the commu-
nity's accommodation to new demands of law upon it, the development of
habits of acceptance of the right of colored children to the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed by the Constitution, [amend. XIV,] had peacefully and
promisingly begun.... All this was disrupted by the introduction of the state
militia and by other obstructive measures taken by the State.... The State of
Arkansas is thus responsible for disabling one of its subordinate agencies, the
Little Rock School Board from peacefully carrying out the Board's and the
State's constitutional duty.26
The localist tilt to the Court's school desegregation jurisprudence ex-
tended beyond foundational cases like Cooper. In more direct precedents
for the decisions in Milliken and Seattle School District, the Court had
struggled to resolve how federal courts could enforce Brown against north-
323 See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 5-13 (describing the facts and circumstances underlying the
school board's actions).
324 Id. at 8.
325 See id. at 20 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (detailing the community efforts to support
the local school board's desegregation plan).
326 Id. at 20-22 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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em school districts without unduly intruding upon "the process of the com-
munity's accommodation to new demands of law upon it."3 27 Northern
school districts, like those that brought suit in Seattle School District, were
often highly segregated. They usually had not, however, been subject to
state laws that mandated segregation. Substantial questions therefore arose
as to how federal courts could parse those segregative effects traceable to
direct governmental action from those effects that were the result of numer-
ous, seemingly private choices. Additional questions arose as to how reme-
dies could be constructed for school segregation that appeared to be, in part,
the consequence of "private" residential patterns.328 These questions could
not be elided by pointing to the discrimination that resulted from state-
mandated racial segregation because northern school districts, unlike their
southern counterparts, often did not operate under such laws.
The dilemma the Court faced was a serious one. Adopting too broad a
view of the Brown mandate threatened to place federal courts in the position
not only of running northern school boards but also of issuing decrees that
would place entire northern communities under federal judicial supervision.
Such a view threatened to enlist local school boards as the means through
which federal judges would attempt to effect a major transformation of
American society. At the same time, adopting too narrow a view of
Brown's mandate threatened to permit discredited distinctions between
public action and "private" choices to immunize racial segregation in the
North from constitutional review. These concerns about "judicial role"--
concerns that flowed from the "positive" character of the underlying constitu-
tional right to a desegregated public education-led the Court to adopt the
distinction between judicially unremediable "de facto" segregation and judi-
cially remediable "de jure" segregation that framed the constitutional ques-
tion in Seattle School District.
329
The Court did not easily arrive at the distinction between de jure and de
facto segregation that has become the defining mark of its post-Brown de-
segregation jurisprudence. A critical early test of the eventual compromise
that led to the adoption of this distinction came in Keyes v. School District
No. 1, Denver, Colorado,330 the first northern school desegregation case to
reach the Court. Significantly, in a lengthy separate concurrence in Keyes,
327 Id. at 20 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
328 See generally JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL JR. 289-331 (1994)
(summarizing these cases and the legal dilemmas presented); TRIBE, supra note 215, at
1493-501 (surveying the relevant cases).
329 See generally JEFFRIES, supra note 328, at 289-331; TRIBE, supra note 215, at
1493-501.
330 413 U.S. 189, 213 (1973).
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Justice Powell, who later dissented in Seattle School District, argued that
notwithstanding the vexing problems of proof and remedy that would surely
arise, Brown and its progeny applied with full force to cases that involved
northern school districts.331 He rejected the Court's distinction between de
facto and de jure segregation because he believed that no clear line could be
drawn between the two. Moreover, he contended, drawing such a line
would subject southern school districts alone to federal judicial supervi-
332sion.
Justice Powell further concluded, however, that fundamentally similar
evidentiary and remedial difficulties arose in school desegregation litigation
in both the South and the North.333 He therefore counseled federal courts to
be wary of substituting their own authority for that of local school boards,
even when issuing decrees to correct de jure segregation in the South.334 On
this view, the problem that the Court faced in giving life to Brown stemmed
ultimately from the federal judiciary's institutional limitations, limitations
that hindered its remedial capacities in all desegregation cases. Thus, the
seemingly unique problem posed by segregation in the North could not be
legitimately resolved by drawing a formal constitutional distinction between
public and private segregative action.
Justice Powell did not conceive of his plea for federal judicial restraint
as an abandonment of constitutionalism. He assumed that local school
boards would be responsible for correcting those constitutional violations
that courts could not themselves discern. His plea therefore implicitly as-
sumed that local school boards that attempted to cure de facto segregation
were fulfilling a constitutional obligation and not simply carrying out a
"discretionary" policy. Indeed, Justice Powell explained in Keyes that,
331 See id. at 219-23 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
the Court should "formulate constitutional principles of national rather than merely regional
application" with respect to desegregation).
332 See id. at 218-36 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting in
lieu of the de facto/de jure distinction that "where segregated public schools exist.., to a
substantial degree, there is a prima facie case that the ... public authorities ... are sufficiently
responsible to warrant imposing upon them a ... burden to demonstrate they nevertheless are
operating a genuinely integrated school system").
333 See id. at 252-53 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that
there is ... not a school district in the United States, with any significant minority school
population, in which the school authorities-in one way or the other-have not contributed in
some measure to the degree of segregation which still prevails").
334 See id. at 246 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I do believe that
this Court should be wary of compelling in the name of constitutional law what may seem to
many a dissolution in the traditional, more personal fabric of their public schools."); see also
id. at 253 ("Communities deserve the freedom and the incentive to turn their attention and
energies to this goal of quality education, free from protracted and debilitating battles over
court-ordered student transportation.").
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while the constitutional right to a desegregated education could not be vin-
dicated by federal judicial decree alone, "[n]othing in this opinion is meant
to discourage school boards from exceeding minimal constitutional stan-
dards in promoting the values of an integrated school experience." 335 The
use of the word "minimal" suggests that he believed that there was a con-
stitutional dimension to extrajudicial local efforts to desegregate. Even if
federal courts might be ill-suited to mandate certain desegregation policies,
he explained, "[s]chool boards would, of course, be free to develop and ini-
tiate further plans to promote school desegregation."
33 6
By the time Seattle School District came to the Court, Justice Powell
had abandoned his earlier suggestion that no meaningful constitutional dis-
tinction could be drawn between de facto and de jure racial segregation in
public schooling. He cast his lot with Chief Justice Rehnquist, who had
from the beginning perceived that adherence to a line that distinguished
between de facto and de jure segregation would serve as a powerful means
to circumscribe the federal judiciary's power to assume supervisory author-
ity over local school boards. 337 Nevertheless, Seattle School District may
paradoxically be read to draw upon the earlier analysis that the decision's
chief dissenter, Justice Powell, had supplied in his concurrence in Keyes.
Justice Powell had advocated in Keyes, and the Court had later adopted
in Milliken, a posture of judicial restraint that arguably had been premised
on the precondition that local school boards "would be free" to resolve the
de facto/de jure conundrum that courts were ill equipped to untangle.338 In
Seattle School District, however, the State of Washington had intervened to
ensure that local school boards would not be free to effect remedies that
they thought proper for the de facto segregation that persisted within their
communities. 339 The state's intervention could be understood, therefore, to
have posed a severe constitutional concern. For even if the "remedies" at
issue were not ones that federal courts could have imposed themselves, the
state's intervention had restricted the remedial power of the very political
institutions to which Milliken had instructed the federal courts to defer. The
state had, in other words, arguably cut short the process by which the only
335 Id. at 242 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
336 Id.
337 See JEFFRIES, supra note 328, at 289-331 (detailing Chief Justice Rehnquist's view
that the de facto/de jure line would check federal judicial power).
338 See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 242 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
339 See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 461-63 (1982) (discussing
WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.26.010 (1981), which was "designed to terminate the use of
mandatory busing for purposes of racial integration"); see also supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
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institutions capable of the task-local school boards-would implement a
constitutional, albeit judicially unenforceable, principle of equality.
The Court's opinion in Seattle School District contains language that is
consistent with the local constitutionalist reading that is suggested here. At
the outset of the opinion, the Court explained that it had been called upon to
decide whether "an elected local school board may use the Fourteenth
Amendment to defend its program of busing for integration from attack by
the State." 340 It then expressly acknowledged the important role that school
boards might play in enforcing constitutional rights by awarding them attor-
ney's fees.
[N]o matter what the source of their funds, school boards have limited budgets,
and allowing them fees encourage[s] compliance with and enforcement of the
civil rights laws. While appellants suggest that it is incongruous for a state to
pay attorney's fees to one of its school boards, it seems no less incongruous
that a local school board would feel the need to sue the State for a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
341
The conclusion is difficult to accept if Seattle School District is read
purely as an individual rights case. It is hard to see how the school boards
would have standing to assert the individual rights to participation of mi-
nority citizens. Minority citizens, after all, did not possess rights to receive
a desegregated public school education. The Court's award is easily ex-
plained, however, if the case is understood to recognize a local community's
right to desegregate its schools in accord with a judicially noncognizable,
but constitutionally rooted obligation. Such a "right," would, of course, be
intelligible only if one granted the connection between localism and consti-
tutionalism.
Moreover, the Court suggested that the vice of the state law inhered not
simply in the burdens it placed on minority voters, but also in the damage
done to local communities. The student-assignment plans had been care-
fully crafted to unite diverse populations within local communities, and
"ha[d] functioned for years without creating undue controversy."3 42 As in
Cooper, the plans inspired public opposition only when the state intervened
and subjected those plans to statewide scrutiny. su State intervention could
not be justified as an antidote to faction; instead, state intervention had in-
creased faction.
340 Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 459.
341 Id. at 487-88 n.31 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
342 Id. at 484 n.27.
343 See id. at 461-64 (discussing the statewide initiative placed on Washington's ballot
for the 1978 general election).
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Nor could it be argued that the State had intervened to enforce a con-
stitutional interest of its own-namely, to bar race-based busing. Although
Justice Powell suggested that such an interest might justify the State's ac-
tion,344 the Court noted that the State of Washington had not proffered such
an interest.345 It had simply advanced a desire to promote neighborhood
schooling.346 It was an ironic interest for the State to assert, however, in
light of the local school boards' conclusions that in their communities,
neighborhood schooling would tend only to entrench segregation. Indeed,
the Court noted, local school boards in Washington had long possessed the
general "power to determine what programs would most appropriately fill a
school district's educational needs."347 The determination "whether to pro-
vide an integrated learning environment rather than a system of neighbor-
hood schools" was precisely the type of question that a local school board,
close to the needs of its community, was well positioned to resolve in a
neutral manner.
348
The Court also noted that the fact that Initiative 350 exempted "most
nonracial reasons for assigning students away from their neighborhood
schools ' 349 belied the State's asserted general interest in neighborhood
schools. The citizens of Washington had not chosen to "reserve[] to state
officials the right to make all decisions in the areas of education and student
assignment." 350 They had instead invested their local political institutions
with the general authority to make the various determinations, and weigh
the competing concerns, that would underlie any decision to use race in
making school assignment decisions. In this respect, the opinion may be
read to suggest that the State was in a position akin to the federal district
court in Milliken-removed from the practical and necessarily specific con-
cers of the local communities, whose authority to effect a remedy would be
supplanted by the State's or the court's intervention.
Finally, Seattle School District noted that Milliken had constricted fed-
eral court remedial power out of respect for a long-standing tradition of lo-
344 See id. at 491 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("'Absent a constitutional violation there
would be no basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on a racial basis.... [W]ith
no history of discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their
homes."' (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971))).
345 See id. at 472 n.15 ("Appellants and the United States do not challenge the propriety
of race-conscious student assignments for the purpose of achieving integration, even absent a
finding of prior dejure segregation.").
32 See id. at 479-80 (discussing the motivation and effect of Initiative 350).
347 Id. at 479.
348 Id. at 480.
349 Id. at 474.
350 Id. at 487.
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cal governmental control over public education. The logic of Milliken, the
Court explained, strongly supported the school boards' claims. "If local
school boards operating under a similar statutory structure are considered
separate entities for purposes of constitutional adjudication when they make
segregative assignment decisions, it is difficult to see why a different analy-
sis should apply when a local board's desegregative policy is at issue."
351
School boards, the Court implied, must have at least as much authority to
fulfill Brown's mandate as they did to resist it. By interpreting Milliken in
this manner, the Court may be read to suggest that there is a distinction of
constitutional significance between states and their local governments.
The local constitutionalist reading of Seattle School District finds fur-
ther support in the Court's decision of the same day in Crawford v. Board of
Education,352 which rejected an equal protection challenge to a seemingly
similar California initiative. The California measure amended the state con-
stitution to prevent state courts from issuing decrees to remedy de facto
school segregation. The plaintiffs, relying on Hunter, claimed that the Cali-
fornia law, like the initiative at issue in Seattle School District, constituted
an impermissible racial classification because it singled out, on a racial ba-
353sis, one type of judicial remedy for adverse treatment. The Court, in an
opinion authored by Justice Powell, rejected the plaintiffs' claim.354
The Crawford opinion distinguished Seattle School District on the
ground that the California initiative amounted to a "mere repeal" 355 of an
earlier judicial interpretation of the California Constitution. That earlier in-
terpretation had authorized state courts to provide broader desegregation
remedies than the Federal Constitution required; the state was now simply
49 356repealing" that prior extension of a constitutional principle. The dis-
tinction was weak. The measure at issue in Seattle School District could
also have been described as a "mere repeal." The initiative had arguably
"repealed" the prior authority that the State had granted to its political sub-
351 Id. at 482.
352 458 U.S. 527, 545 (1982) (holding that an amendment to a state constitution that
barred state courts from ordering pupil assignment or transportation to remedy social
segregation except where a federal court would be permitted to do so under federal law did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
353 See id. at 536 ("[The plaintiffs] argue that Proposition I [the state constitutional
amendment] employs an 'explicit racial classification' and imposes a 'race-specific' burden
on minorities seeking to vindicate state-created rights.").
354 See id. at 535 ("We reject an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment so
destructive of a State's democratic processes and of its ability to experiment.").
355 Id. at 539.
356 See id. at 536-42 ("In sum, the simple repeal or modification of desegregation or
antidiscrimination laws, without more, never has been viewed as embodying a presumptively
invalid racial classification.").
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divisions to provide remedies for de facto desegregation.1 7 Crawford did
not explain why the Federal Constitution should permit a state to "repeal"
the remedial discretion of state courts, but not of local school boards.
If Seattle School District is read as an exemplar of local constitutional-
ism, however, the distinction that Crawford offered acquires force. The
Crawford court was in no position to question a state's determination that
expansive state court remedial power would have ill effects on local democ-
racy. Milliken had been predicated on the similar concern that expansive
federal court remedial power would infringe upon an important tradition of
local educational autonomy.35 8 The measure at issue in Seattle School Dis-
trict was therefore consistent with the decision in Milliken because Milliken
pointed in favor of the protection of local school board discretion, not
against it. By contrast, a decision striking down a state's determination that
such central judicial interference with local educational processes was intol-
erable would appear to depart from both Milliken and Seattle School Dis-
trict. Crawford, then, simply followed both Milliken and Seattle School
District in preserving local discretion to remedy segregation.
Not surprisingly, Justice Blackmun, the author of Seattle School Dis-
trict, concurred in Crawford but wrote separately to highlight the distinction
between the political institutions that had been disabled by the state in Seat-
tle School District and the judicial institution that had been disabled in
Crawford. "I cannot conclude that the repeal of a state-created right--or,
analogously, the removal of the judiciary's ability to enforce that right-
'curtail[s] the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities.'
359
It is interesting to note that in the only school desegregation case since
Seattle School District where the Court has ruled for a plaintiff, the Court
used localism to supplement, rather than to constrain, federal judicial power.
That case, Missouri v. Jenkins 1,360 concerned the propriety of a district
court's decision to levy a tax in order to fund its desegregation decree.
357 See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 477-80 (1982) (describing
how the State had given decision-making authority in most educational matters to local school
boards, before removing part of that authority with the measure at issue).
358 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974) (observing that "[n]o single
tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of
schools," and concluding that the "remedy approved by the (district and circuit] courts could
disrupt and alter the structure of public education in Michigan").
3 Crawford, 458 U.S. at 547 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (additional
citation and internal quotations omitted) (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 486).
360 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (striking down a district court's order that imposed a tax to fund a
court-ordered desegregation plan and enjoining the operation of a state law that would limit
the taxing authority of a locality in frustration of remedying a constitutional wrong).
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Though nominally a defendant, the local school board had joined with the
plaintiffs in seeking the tax in order to fund a remedial desegregation plan to
which it had agreed.36'
The Court concluded that Article III prevented a federal court from im-
362posing such a tax in its own right. It went on to hold, however, that a
federal court possessed the power to remedy a constitutional wrong by en-
joining a state law that would have precluded a municipality from imposing
363a tax. The Court emphasized that its constitutional holding was rooted in
a respect for local discretion.
[Olne of the most important considerations governing the exercise of equitable
power is a proper respect for the integrity and function of local government in-
stitutions. Especially is this true where, as here, those institutions are ready,
willing, and-but for the operation of state law curtailing their powers-able
to remedy the deprivation of constitutional rights themselves.
36 4
Indeed, the Court noted that there was a substantial distinction between
a court exercising a taxing power on its own, and a court authorizing a local
government to levy such a tax in derogation of state law. "Authorizing and
directing local government institutions to devise and implement remedies
not only protects the function of those institutions but, to the extent possi-
ble, also places the responsibility for solutions to the problems of segrega-
tion upon those who have themselves created the problems.
365
The point is not that the Court "intended" to embrace local constitution-
alism in deciding Seattle School District. Rather, the decision may be read
to suggest that the criticisms that have been applied to Milliken are less sali-
361 See Missouri v. Jenkins II, 515 U.S. 70, 74-80 (1995) (reviewing the history of the
litigation).
362 See Jenkins 1, 495 U.S. at 50 ("[W]e agree with the State that the tax increase
contravened the principles of comity that must govern the exercise of the District Court's
equitable discretion in this area.").
363 See id. at 52-58 ("It is therefore clear that a local government with taxing authority
may be ordered to levy taxes in excess of the limit set by state statute where there is reason
based in the Constitution for not observing the statutory limitation."). Interestingly, for this
holding the Court relied on the series of nineteenth-century municipal bond cases that had
drawn on Marshall's decision in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518,
710, 4 Wheat. 250, 336 (1819), to expand the scope of local power beyond state law limits.
See infra note 47 and accompanying text. Cooley, of course, objected to these decisions on
substantive grounds because of the protection they afforded private corporate interests.
Clearly, however, the appearance of these nineteenth-century bonding cases in a modem
decision regarding school desegregation demonstrates the potential for a structural connection
between localism and constitutionalism that, paradoxically, owes its origins to the laissez-faire
constitutional context in which Cooley operated and yet may facilitate the development of a
positive constitutionalism within current doctrine.
364 Jenkins 1, 495 U.S. at 51.
365 Id.
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ent than they appear. There is an important constitutional value in permit-
ting local political institutions to operate free from strict central enforce-
ment. If respect for such a value appears costly in a case such as Milliken,
the constitutional recognition of localism may inspire local public action
that will give constitutional enforcement a depth that it would otherwise
lack. It may also justify judicial intervention to preclude state efforts to
block such local remedial efforts, even though the efforts are not themselves
constitutionally required.
Cooley had suggested that a constitutional norm of equality could only
be fully protected if local communities were freed from state interference in
their attempts to govern impartially.366 The norm could take shape, he sug-
gested, only through the institutional process of local governmental decision
making. Such was the case in Seattle School District. Chief Justice Mar-
shall had held in Dartmouth College that the Contract Clause forbade the
state from retroactively intruding upon the educational decisions of the pri-
vate institutions that it had authorized to provide "public" education.367 So,
too, Seattle School District may be read to have employed the Equal Pro-
tection Clause to hold Washington to the "elaborate" institutional structure
that authorized local governments to make critical educational decisions,
when those decisions bore on the right to a desegregated public educational
experience.
D. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
and Papasan v. Allain
The affirmative role that localism may play in the promotion of a posi-
tive constitutionalism may be discerned outside the unique context of the
Court's school desegregation jurisprudence. It may be discerned as well in
the Court's decisions concerning constitutional challenges to inequities in
school financing.
Under the school financing system at issue in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, 36 Texas made a substantial financial contri-
bution to a general public school fund. Local school districts were then
permitted to supplement that state contribution through the imposition of a
tax on property within their jurisdictions. Due to inequalities among local
366 See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (discussing Cooley's belief that the
protection of local governmental independence would further constitutional equality and
freedom).
367 See 17 U.S. at 652-54, 4 Wheat. at 310-12; supra note 20 and accompanying text.
368 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (reversing the decision of the district court, and finding that
Texas's system of funding public education, which resulted in inequitable per pupil
expenditures, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
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tax bases, however, a poor district would have to tax property at a far
steeper rate to supplement the state contribution at a level commensurate
with a wealthy district.369  In San Antonio School District, a group of
schoolchildren residing in districts with low property bases challenged the
state system on constitutional grounds. They argued that the state system
had resulted in impermissibly wide disparities in per pupil expenditures and
thus inequitably burdened their fundamental constitutional right to a mini-
mally adequate public education.
370
The Court was not impressed with the contention that the state system
unlawfully burdened whatever right to public education the Federal Consti-
tution might secure. It explained that the disparities were the consequence
of a state program of public education that depended upon local decision
making, and that the State had appropriately attempted to provide for local
educational control in order to ensure that "[e]ach locality is free to tailor
local programs to local needs. 371  Moreover, the Court explained,
"[p]luralism ... affords some opportunity for experimentation, innovation,
and a healthy competition for educational excellence." 372 Indeed, the Court
concluded, the State had a substantial interest in preserving local decision-
making autonomy in light of the centralizing tendencies of modem life.
373
As Lawrence Sager has explained, it is difficult to understand the con-
cems identified by the Court in San Antonio School District "as speaking
even indirectly to the scope or content of the concept of equal protec-
tion. 374 He contends that instead "they are claims which address the ques-
tion of to what limits the federal judiciary should reach in interpreting and
enforcing that concept. They are, in other words, arguments which support
the underenforcement of the equal protection clause by the federal
courts.
'
,
3 75 Given that the Court premised its holding on a "frankly institu-
tional explanation[] for setting particular limits to a federal judicial con-
struct, ''376 it is fair to consider whether San Antonio School District might be
read to support the protection of local efforts to enforce that norm of equal-
ity from state interference. For when a state seeks to preclude such local
369 See id. at 12-13 (contrasting the tax rates for two San Antonio school districts).
370 See id. at 18. The local school board whose name the case bears was originally sued
as a defendant. It subsequently joined the schoolchildren as a plaintiff in the case and filed an
amicus curiae brief in the Supreme Court in support of their position. See id. at 4 n.2 (noting
the San Antonio Independent School District's support for the plaintiffs' complaint).
371 Id. at 50.
372 Id.
373 See id. at 49 (describing the "merit of local control").
374 Sager, supra note 16, at 1218.
375 Id.
376 Id. at 1219.
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efforts, the institutional concerns that the Court relied upon in San Antonio
School District as a basis for federal judicial restraint are arguably much
diminished.
Significantly, the San Antonio School District dissent challenged the
majority on localist grounds. It attempted to recast the case as one in which
the State had acted to preclude local efforts to provide poor schoolchildren
with equal protection. It contended that the majority's defense of localism
was deeply ironic given the plaintiffs' contention that the state system ef-
fectively precluded poor school districts from demonstrating the intensity of
their commitment to public education in financial terms.377 State law alone
determined the amount of money that local communities could spend on
education, because state law required local communities to use only prop-
erty taxes to finance public education. The dissenters pointed out that if the
state system were understood to have precluded local communities from
providing the full support they wished to provide, then the plaintiffs' claims
appeared much stronger than the Court had allowed.
The majority was not insensitive to the possibility that principles of lo-
cal autonomy actually undermined the state's justification for the school fi-
nancing system. Accordingly, the Court devoted much of its opinion to a
demonstration that judicial deference to localism served to protect the very
right to an adequate public education that the plaintiffs claimed. The Court
emphasized, for example, that the state system for financing public educa-
tion permitted local school districts to supplement the state fund.3 7 8 No one
had argued that the state's contribution was itself so minimal as to be sub-
stantively unconstitutional if not augmented by local entities. Moreover, no
school district had complained that the state law constraints placed on its
taxing authority had prohibited the district from adequately serving its stu-
dents. 379 Thus, the Court contended, the state financing system should be
understood as a state effort to facilitate, rather than to limit, local efforts to
enhance the educational interests of their residents because it authorized lo-
377 See San Antonio Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 68 (White, J., dissenting).
If the State aims at maximizing local initiative and local choice, by permitting school
districts to resort to the real property tax if they choose to do so, it utterly fails in
achieving its purpose in districts with property tax bases so low that there is little if
any opportunity for interested parents, rich or poor, to augment school district
revenues.
Id.
378 See id. at 49 (explaining that the state system "assur[es] a basic education for every
child in the State" and "permits and encourages a large measure of participation in and control
of each district's schools at the local level").
379 See id. at 50 n.107 ("Appellees do not claim that the ceiling presently bars desired tax
increases in Edgewood or in any other Texas district.").
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cal school districts to make additional financial contributions to supplement
the state's funds.
The Court's apparent embrace in San Antonio School District of the
connection between localism and constitutionalism posited by Cooley is
further evidenced by the analogy that the Court drew to Katzenbach v.
Morgan. 38 In Katzenbach, the Court rejected the claim that Congress had
violated the Equal Protection Clause by extending voter protection rights to
non-English speaking people who completed the sixth grade in Puerto Rico
and not to those educated in schools beyond the territorial limits of the
United States.3 8 1 The Court explained in Katzenbach that the challenge had
to be rejected because it was "presented only as a limitation on a reform
measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier to the exercise of the fran-
chise." 382 Similarly, in San Antonio School District, the Court concluded
that the claimed violation inhered only in Texas's failure to extend a meas-
ure-a provision that authorized local governments to supplement the state
fund-that was designed to protect individual rights.383 In this way, the
Court suggested, a local government's action in supplementing the state
fund was like Congress's action in Katzenbach-a reformative effort to ex-
pand legal rights.384
In sum, although San Antonio School District's invocation of localism
served to limit federal court power, the Court did not rely on a simple de-
fense of local majoritarianism or a privatized depiction of the local public
realm. It depicted the practice of local self-government less as a barrier to
educational opportunity than as a means through which the constitutional
(though, perhaps, judicially unenforceable) right to an adequate education
could be obtained. Through the operation of local political processes,
communities would devise their own solutions to the difficult constitutional
task of ensuring equal protection. Indeed, the Court explained that its deci-
sion should not
be viewed as placing [a] judicial imprimatur on the status quo. The need is ap-
parent for reform in tax systems which may well have relied too long and too
heavily on the local property tax.... But the ultimate solutions must come
380 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
381 See id. at 656.
382 Id. at 657.
383 See San Antonio Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 38 (distinguishing "prior cases involv[ing]
legislation which 'deprived,' 'infringed,' or 'interfered' with the free exercise of some such
fundamental personal right or liberty").
384 See id. at 39 ("The Texas system of school financing is not unlike the federal
legislation involved in Katzenbach in this regard.").
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from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who elect
them.
385
Given the justification San Antonio School District supplied for its
holding, the decision may be read to suggest that a challenge to a state's di-
rect attempt to inequitably burden a local government's ability to educate its
citizens might fare differently. Such a challenge would not require federal
courts to define some federally mandated level of public funding. Further-
more, it would not be subject to the localist defense that had been lodged
against the challenge to the method that Texas had selected for permitting
local communities to supplement state educational funding. A challenge of
this type would only require the Court to impose a negative constraint upon
state power in order to free local communities to devise solutions of their
own that would promote equity in public education.
In Papasan v. Allain,386 Justice White, who had dissented in San Anto-
nio School District, authored an opinion for the Court that exploited the
opening created by the localist strains in San Antonio School District.
387
The specific dispute in Papasan concerned the distribution of public school
lands that the United States had granted Mississippi in the mid-nineteenth
century. Pursuant to state law, Mississippi held the lands in trust for the
benefit of public schools. In distributing the proceeds from the sale of these
lands, the State provided substantially greater sums to certain districts. The
disadvantaged school districts brought suit, claiming that the resulting
funding disparities deprived their schoolchildren of an equal right to a
minimally adequate education.
388
Given the nature of the claim at issue in Papasan, the case could not be
framed, in the fashion of San Antonio School District, as simply a dispute
between individuals and their government. Moreover, because the school
districts brought the constitutional challenge, principles of local autonomy
could not easily be advanced on behalf of the state's distribution scheme.
Drawing on the localist character of the school districts' constitutional
claim, Justice White contended that Papasan differed critically from San
Antonio School District. In San Antonio School District, "the differential
financing available to school districts was traceable to school district funds
available from local real estate taxation, not to a state decision to divide
385 Id. at 58-59.
386 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
387 See id. at 287 (arguing that San Antonio School District was not controlling because
in that case state resources were not divided unequally among school districts).
388 See id. at 274 (stating the petitioners' central argument that "the disparity between the
financial support available to Chickasaw Cession schools and other schools in the State"
deprives Chickasaw Cession schoolchildren of equal protection of the laws).
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state resources unequally among school districts."389 For that reason, he ex-
plained, San Antonio School District, "which rested on the fact that funding
disparities based on differing local wealth were a necessary adjunct of al-
lowing meaningful local control over school funding," did not suffice to
"settle the constitutionality of the disparities alleged in this case."390 Thus,
although Justice White followed San Antonio School District in declining to
apply strict scrutiny, he upheld the school districts' constitutional challenge
and remanded it for an assessment of the rationale for the State's conced-
edly inequitable distribution to local school districts.39t
Papasan demonstrates that the defense of localism relied upon in San
Antonio School District was potentially both a shield and a sword. If a
commitment to local self-government served to justify the State's financing
plan in Texas, it cast suspicion on the inequitable distribution scheme in
Mississippi. Moreover, San Antonio School District's deference to local
autonomy may be understood to be rooted less in an acceptance of private
inequity than in a faith in the positive role that local school boards could
play in giving life to a constitutional right to equitable public educational
opportunities. Indeed, just as Cooley suggested that judges could enforce
substantive constitutional limitations by protecting local communities from
state interference,392 Justice White suggested in Papasan that the Constitu-
tion placed limits on a state's authority to burden a local community's effort
to provide for the education of its residents.
E. Romer v. Evans
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Romer v. Evans3 93 reveals that
the connection between localism and an affirmative constitutionalism is not
a relic of a bygone era in constitutional law. The decision concerned an
equal protection challenge to Amendment 2, a Colorado constitutional ref-
erendum that prevented the State's municipalities (and the state legislature)
from enacting measures designed to protect gays and lesbians from private
discrimination. 394 Romer is a notably obscure opinion, and it is therefore
389 Id. at 288.
390 Id.
391 Id. at 289-92.
392 See supra Parts IlI.B-C (discussing the Township Board of Salem and Hurlbut
decisions).
393 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
394 The referendum, known as Amendment 2, did not stop with a ban on the enactment of
antidiscrimination ordinances. As the Court explained, "[i]t prohibit[ed] all legislative,
executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect the
named class, a class we shall refer to as homosexual persons or gays and lesbians." Id. at 624.
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difficult to attribute a single rationale to it.3 95 Romer may be understood,
however, to rest upon the same structural connection between localism and
constitutionalism that Cooley drew in a different constitutional context more
than a century ago.
3 9 6
The Court began its brief opinion by noting that Amendment 2 was
passed in response to the decision by several municipalities to enact ordi-
nances that barred private discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion.397 It further noted that the plaintiffs were not limited to "homosexual
persons" 398 who contended that Amendment 2 "would subject them to im-
mediate and substantial risk of discrimination on the basis of their sexual
orientation." 399 They also consisted of "three municipalities whose ordi-
nances we have cited and certain other governmental entities which had
acted earlier to protect homosexuals from discrimination but would be pre-
vented by Amendment 2 from continuing to do so.
'"O°
By expressly mentioning the municipalities, the Court suggested that
the case did not pose a traditional contest between the rights of private indi-
viduals and the rights of the public. Here, too, as in Seattle School Dis-
395 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95
MICH. L. REv. 203, 203 (1996) (rooting the decision in the prohibition against bills of
attainder); J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2313 (1997) (rooting
the decision in a broader principle of the social structure and hierarchy); Daniel Farber &
Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 258 (1996) (rooting the
decision in a broader anticaste principle); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Amendment 2 Really a Bill
ofAttainder?: Some Questions About Professor Amar's Analysis ofRomer, 95 MICH. L. REv.
236, 252-53 (1996) (rooting the decision in a prohibition against irrational legislation); Joseph
S. Jackson, Persons of Equal Worth: Romer v. Evans and the Politics of Equal Protection, 45
UCLA L. REV. 453, 456 (1997) (rooting the decision in a constitutional principle of "equal
worth"); Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and Democracy's Domain, 50 VAND. L. REV. 361,
362 (1997) (rooting the decision in a particular conception of constitutional democracy);
Seidman, Romer's Radicalism, supra note 15, at 72 (rooting the decision in a positive
conception of constitutionalism).
396 A few analyses of Romer have emphasized its localist aspects. See, e.g., Clayton P.
Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized Governments, 83 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1410-
11 (1997) (discussing Romer in connection with localities' "exit options" and rights of
secession); Pamela Karlan, Just Politics?: Five Not So Easy Pieces of the 1995 Term, 34
Hous. L. REv. 289, 293-304 (1997) (tying the motivation of Amendment 2 to the expression
of an illegitimate animus against the political participation of gays and lesbians); Nicholas S.
Zeppos, The Dynamics of Democracy: Travel, Premature Predation, and the Components of
Political Identity, 50 VAND. L. REV. 445, 447-55 (1997) (addressing Romer in connection
with a discussion of the conflict between "democratic" outcomes at two levels of
government).
397 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-24 (explaining that antidiscrimination ordinances passed
by the cities of Aspen, Boulder and Denver were the impetus of the action).
398 Id. at 625.
399 Id.
400 Id.
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trict40 1 and Papasan,4°2 local communities sought the freedom from state
power that would enable them to protect the rights of their residents. Just as
the local governments were the true parties to the cause in Township Board
of Salem403 and Hurlbut 44 - to say nothing of Seattle School District and
Papasan-the cities of Denver, Aspen, and Boulder may have been the ap-
propriate plaintiffs in Romer.
Moreover, at its heart, Romer's underlying constitutional claim sought
to free the local public sphere to check private discrimination, rather than to
constrain public interference with private rights. It was rooted in a charac-
teristically modem belief that constitutionalism requires more than the im-
position of constraints upon public power. The Court was receptive to the
claim. As Louis Seidman explained, "Romer used equal protection doctrine
to attack constitutional law's traditional conservative bias in favor of nega-
tive rights. 405
It is important to emphasize, however, that the Court embraced positive
constitutionalism in a tempered fashion. The Court did not hold that there
was "substantive inequality inherent in denying gay people the protection of
antidiscrimination laws when so many other groups are protected. ' 40 6 It did
not purport to require local communities to enact antidiscrimination meas-
ures for gays and lesbians consonant with those that had been provided for
racial minorities and women, or to preclude local communities from re-
pealing such ordinances once they had been enacted. It concluded only that
equal protection had been denied by the State's decision to disable its local
407communities from choosing whether to enact such measures.
Indeed, Justice Scalia made this very point in his dissent from the
Court's decision that same term to grant certiorari, vacate, and remand the
401 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); see supra notes 312-21
and accompanying text (discussing Seattle School District as a practical exemplar of the
connection between localism and constitutionalism).
402 Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986); see supra notes 386-91 and accompanying
text (discussing the Court's focus on placing limits on a state's authority over local
community functions in Papasan).
403 People ex rel. Detroit Howell R.R. v. Township Bd. of Salem, 20 Mich. 452 (1870);
see supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text (explaining the concepts of localism embodied
in Township Board of Salem).
404 People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 (1871); see supra notes 128-43 and
accompanying text (providing an analysis of Hurlbut and the State's attempt to appoint a
public works board for the city).
405 Seidman, Romer's Radicalism, supra note 15, at 70.
406 Id. at 80.
407 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) ("A law declaring that in general it
shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the
government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.").
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petition in Equality Foundation, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati.4 °8 There, a
challenge had been brought to a citywide referendum that precluded the city
council from adopting ordinances protecting gays and lesbians from private
discrimination.40 9  Justice Scalia explained that Equality Foundation in-
volved "a determination by what appears to be the lowest electoral subunit
that it does not wish to accord" gays and lesbians the protection of antidis-
crimination ordinances. 41 By contrast, he explained, Romer had involved a
state constitutional amendment that prohibited local communities from ex-
pressing their own "democratic preference.' '411 Thus, the Equality Founda-
tion case involved a direct challenge to local democratic rule in a way that
Romer simply did not.
Romer may be read to suggest, then, that there is a deep connection
between localism and positive constitutional enforcement. Federal courts
are necessarily poorly positioned to assess the degree of affirmative "pro-
tection" that citizens are owed from private power. Federal courts could di-
rectly enforce a broad constitutional norm that prohibited private discrimi-
nation only by intruding deeply into the practices and functions of local self-
government, and thereby calling their own legitimacy into substantial doubt.
Such a declaration would obliterate the line between the public and private
and threaten to make any private action subject to constitutional challenge.
Moreover, as the Court ioted at the outset of its opinion in Romer, there
were limits as well to the scope of congressional power to provide constitu-
tional protection from private discrimination. "[I]t was settled early that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress a general power to prohibit
discrimination in public accommodations .... 2,412 The constitutional obli-
gation to provide public protection from private harms, therefore, was left,
as a matter of federal constitutional structure, to the states and their local
governments. Indeed, the Court noted, "[i]n consequence'A13 of its early
holding limiting congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, most states "have chosen to counter discrimination by enacting
408 518 U.S. 1001 (1996).
409 See Equality Found., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 421 (S.D. Ohio
1994), rev'd and vacated, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 518 U.S. 1001
(1996), on remand to 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997), and cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998).
The Court subsequently denied certiorari after the Sixth Circuit distinguished Romer in part
on localist grounds. See 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998).
410 518 U.S. at 1001 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
411 Id.
412 517 U.S. at 628. The Court cited to the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883), for
this proposition.
I Romer, 517 U.S. at 628.
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detailed statutory schemes. ' 414 In this way, the Court implicitly linked the
provision of such state and local statutory protection against private dis-
crimination to the guarantee of equal protection of the laws set forth in the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
Given this background, Colorado's blanket action to bar all of its local
political institutions from determining that a certain class of persons needed
statutory protection appeared to upset the careful structure of the federal
constitutional framework. Such state action, as Justice Blackmun had noted
in Crawford v. Board of Education, "'curtail[s] the operation of those politi-
cal processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities." 4"15 As the
Romer Court explained, "[t]he change Amendment 2 works in the legal
status of gays and lesbians in the private sphere is far reaching, both on its
own terms and when considered in light of the structure and operation of
modem antidiscrimination laws.'' 416 The State had chosen to reserve to it-
self the power to determine the statutory protection that should be afforded
homosexuals. "This is so no matter how local or discrete the harm, no mat-
ter how public and widespread the injury.' '417 Precisely because the State
had purported to preclude all localities from providing protection against
private discrimination against gays and lesbians, there was "nothing special
in the protections Amendment 2 withholds.' 
8
The breadth of the state's prohibition ensured that it would preclude the
adoption of those "protections taken for granted by most people either be-
cause they already have them or do not need them; these are protections
against exclusion from an almost limitless number of transactions and en-
414 Id. As Professor Michelman has explained:
[The Civil Rights Cases] reasoning proceeds from the premise that the right to
nondiscriminatory service may well be one that states are affirmatively obligated to
protect by law (or rather, to speak more finely, it may well be a right that "law"
simply does protect and that the states as engines of law are, accordingly,
affirmatively obligated to vindicate through their remedial institutions). The holding
is that federal authorities (an Act of Congress was in question, but the analysis
presumably applies as well to the federal judiciary) are not authorized by the
fourteenth amendment to provide remedies for privately wrought violations of rights
that the state is affirmatively obligated to vindicate, unless and until it appears that
the state itself is failing to perform this obligation.
Michelman, The Case of Pornography Regulation, supra note 7, at 307 n.54 (citation
omitted).
415 458 U.S. 527, 547 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (additional
citation and internal quotations omitted) (quoting Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458
U.S. 457 (1982)).
416 Romer, 517 U.S. at 627.
417 Id. at 631.
418 Id.
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deavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society. ' 419 It ensured, in
other words, that private discrimination would persist no matter how "pub-
lic" the resulting injuries. Such a broad-based state prohibition against the
excesses of local action to provide protection for a group of residents is it-
self a "denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.
'A2 °
One hears in the passages quoted above echoes of Cooley's own appeal
to constitutional freedom. Cooley, too, believed that equal protection could
not be won solely through the private realm. 421 His substantive conception
of equality was rooted, of course, in a far different age, and one that was
much less solicitous of public intervention in the private market. His struc-
tural insight, however, that local political institutions must play a role in
giving life to constitutional norms of equality shares an affinity with the
logic of Romer. Cooley argued that only through the active efforts of local
communities, attentive to their obligations to enforce a norm of impartial
governance, could such freedom be secured.422 Colorado, however, had
sought to prohibit its local communities from governing in accordance with
that ideal.423 As the Court explained:
It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort. Central
both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution's guarantee of
equal protection is the principle that government and each of its parts remain
open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.
424
Thus, the Court may be understood to have recognized a positive right to
governmental assistance by framing it as a traditionally negative right
against state power and on behalf of local discretion.
In this respect, Romer comports with the Court's earlier decision in
425Reitman v. Mulkey, which struck down a California voter initiative that
precluded all levels of state government from enacting fair housing legisla-
426tion. The case was controversial in its day because it appeared to press
the boundaries of the state action doctrine. The state had, after all, merely
419 Id.
420 Id. at 633.
421 See supra notes 71-76, 103-13, and accompanying text (presenting Cooley's view on
whether private entities could compel a constitutional right).
422 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (providing Cooley's belief in the
importance of local involvement in "constitutional freedom").
423 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623 ("The impetus for the amendment and the contentious
campaign that preceded its adoption came in large part from ordinances that had been passed
in various Colorado municipalities.").
424 Id.
425 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
426 See id. at 378-79 (holding that the initiative "would involve the State in private racial
discriminations to an unconstitutional degree").
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removed a public protection against private discrimination. It had not
commanded the private discrimination at issue. Professor Black, however,
has offered a powerful defense of Reitman that may illuminate the possible
meaning of Romer.
427
Professor Black argued that Reitman properly rejected a simple dichot-
omy between the public and the private realms of social life in holding that
the state law constituted something more than a passive pronouncement that
permitted the private market to do its work. As he explained, "[the state
has not commanded discrimination against Negroes, but it has assured the
discriminator, exactly with respect to the discrimination, of a special immu-
nity-as complete an immunity as the state can within its constitutional
forms grant-from any political assault on his practice of discrimination."
428
He explained further that, at least with respect to racial discrimination,
the public/private distinction codified by the state action doctrine was over-
drawn. As he put it:
If one race is, identifiably as such, substantially worse off than others with re-
spect to anything which the law commonly deals, then "equal protection of the
laws," is not being extended to that race unless and until every prudent af-
firmative use of law is being made toward remedying the inequality.
429
Given the effect of the California law, Professor Black dismissed the
argument that the Court had violated basic principles of federalism by de-
nying the state the power to control the lawmaking functions of its political
subdivisions. Such complaints were simply tired defenses of official dis-
crimination dressed up in the (only slightly) more respectable clothes of
federalism.
When and where has respect for "localism" or "federalism" (which is too of-
ten, in this context, but old states' rights writ large) done any good in the racial
sphere-any good, that is to say, worthy of being mentioned alongside the
massive grinding racial oppression which has stayed unwhipped of justice pre-
cisely because of that "respect"?
430
In conflating "federalism" and "localism," however, Professor Black
did not explore the possibility that the very case he purported to defend sup-
plied the answer to his question. For if ever there were a case in which re-
spect for "localism" had done some good, surely it was Reitman. The case
turned in large part upon the constitutional authority of California to protect
private discriminators from "political assault" by local governments. And
427 See generally Black, supra note 15.
428 Id. at 79.
429 Id. at 73.
430 Id. at 106-07.
[Vol. 147:487
LOCAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
the Court held that the Federal Constitution required that those local gov-
ernments be insulated from state control so they could lead that assault. In-
deed, the Court was arguably able to perceive that the State had not simply
announced a neutral rule precisely because California had acted in an un-
precedented fashion to constrict the authority of its local governments to
combat private discrimination. The difficult "state action" doctrine ques-
tions apparently posed by the case dissolved once one understood that the
State had acted to prevent local communities from providing public protec-
tion for private harms. So, too, Romer could be understood to have turned
on a recognition that the State had acted to prevent local communities from
undertaking constitutionally important protective actions on behalf of the
residents.
As if to acknowledge the formidable connection between localism and
constitutionalism that appeared to serve as the foundation of the majority's
opinion in Romer, Justice Scalia invoked federalist constitutional theory to
bolster his dissent. He portrayed Amendment 2 as a legitimate state attempt
"to counter both the geographic concentration and the disproportionate po-
litical power of homosexuals.' 431 In this way, he drew upon the federalist
assumption that the genius of the Constitution inheres in the checks it pro-
vides against the unreasoned factionalism that localism breeds. As Madison
explained in The Federalist No. 10, "[a]mong the numerous advantages
promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately
developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction."
' 32
The establishment of a central government, he contended, would ensure the
containment of local passions.
Moreover, Justice Scalia implicitly drew upon Dillon's defense of state
power to counter the Court's seemingly localist logic. Scalia suggested that
state intervention had been designed to enforce a separation of the public
and the private realms. The state sought to prevent local majorities from
conferring "special" rights on certain favored classes of persons.433 Respect
for impartiality in governmental administration, Justice Scalia suggested,
led to the conclusion that Amendment 2 should be upheld.
The Court implicitly countered Justice Scalia's centralist attack with a
rejoinder reminiscent of Cooley. It offered the image of strong municipali-
ties attempting to comply with an "emerging tradition of statutory protec-
tion,' 434 and to act consistent with "the principle that government and each
431 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 647 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
432 THE FEDERALISTNo. 10, at 56 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
433 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
434 Id. at 628.
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of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.
'A35
For the majority, the State constituted the antirepublican villain, the gov-
ernmental actor so infused with excitement that it had lost sight of basic
constitutional limitations. Colorado had enacted "class legislation, 436 in di-
rect violation of the Constitution; it had been swayed by passionate "ani-
mus"; 437 and it had therefore declined to act consistent with "the rule of
law.' 438 Employing a Jacksonian indignation worthy of Cooley, the Court
concluded that "[a] State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its
laws." 39 In this way, localism was placed on the side of constitutionalism
to protect a public norm of equality from a state majority.
44 °
The essentially unifying rhetoric of Romer, the integrationist impulse
that lay at its heart, and the communitarian essence of its constitutional rule,
all seem consistent with understanding the case as something other than a
judicial attempt to protect a particular class of persons from governmental
power. In a deep sense, it resonates with the Jacksonian conception of
equality that underlay Cooley's own defense, presented more than a century
before, of local independence from state control. Moreover, the decision
reveals the limits of reading the modem Court's turn towards localism as a
means of insulating private power from public influence. For Romer stands
as an important indication of the degree to which localism may be under-
stood to advance a positive constitutionalism. Finally, it reveals that local-
ism need not be a proxy for suburban homogeneity. It may be the means by
which diverse communities, often as plaintiffs, unite to promote constitu-
tional values that their states have ignored.
F. Conclusion
The readings offered above do not show that the Court "intended" to
draw a connection between localism and constitutionalism in cases such as
Seattle School District,441 Papasan, 44 and Romer.443 Indeed, in none of the
435 Id. at 633.
436 Id. at 635 ("[C]lass legislation ... [is] obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment ..... (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883))).
437 Id. at 632 ("[T]he amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the
class it affects... *').
438 Id. at 633 ("Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and each of its parts remain
open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.").439 Id. at 635.
440 See id. at 633.
441 See supra notes 313-20 and accompanying text.
442 See supra notes 386-91 and accompanying text.
443 See supra notes 393-440 and accompanying text.
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cases thus far considered, other than Cooper v. Aaron444 and Missouri v.
Jenkins j,445 did the Court state that it was protecting a local governmental
effort to vindicate a constitutional right. The readings do suggest, however,
the continuing relevance of Cooley's nineteenth-century belief that local
governments are critical institutional components of the constitutional
framework.
No doubt the substantive constitutional claims at issue in these modem
cases would have been unimaginable to Cooley. They directly challenged
the substantive divide between the public and private realms that he sought
to enforce through the application of local constitutionalism in his time.
Cooley's substantive understanding of equality differed in important, and
historically contingent, respects from the one that animates the decisions
discussed above. At the level of constitutional structure, however, the cases
resonate with Cooley's belief that general legal maxims about the subordi-
nate status of local governments proved a poor substitute for a deep under-
standing of constitutionalism. These cases suggest, therefore, as Cooley's
own localist writings suggested more than a century ago, that there is a sur-
prisingly public constitutional dimension to the conferral of judicial respect
for local prerogatives against broad claims of state power.
VII. TOWARDS LOCAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
A. Introduction
While important traces of the connection between localism and consti-
tutionalism may be discerned within modem case law, it remains to be con-
sidered how a local constitutionalist doctrine might actually be understood
to work. There are benefits to such an inquiry. The frank recognition of lo-
cal constitutionalism may free the Court from squeezing difficult cases into
ill-suited doctrinal boxes-as appears to be the case in Seattle School Dis-
trict.446 It may clarify otherwise obscure reasoning that is not tethered to
any clear conception of constitutionalism-as arguably is the case in Ro-
mer.447 It may focus the Court's attention on whether the constitutional
right recognized is intended to protect the free working of local political
processes, or, whether it is instead intended to constrain governments at
both the state and local level. Romer again comes to mind. Finally, the ex-
444 See supra notes 321-26 and accompanying text.
445 See supra notes 360-65 and accompanying text.
446 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); see supra notes 313-21
and accompanying text.
447 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see supra notes 393-440 and accompanying
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press recognition of local constitutionalism may engage local communities
more directly in the public practice of constitutional interpretation and ac-
cord constitutional recognition to the diverse conceptions of constitutional-
ism that local communities embrace.
The frank recognition of local constitutionalism in modem doctrine
would, of course, give rise to myriad difficult questions regarding when, and
to what extent, federal judges should accord constitutional recognition to
local prerogatives. There are no simple answers to such questions. A few
general principles may be divined, however, from what thus far has been
considered and from the general literature that addresses the institutional
dimension to substantive constitutional enforcement.
B. Local Constitutionalism as a Limitation on
Central Institutional Power
As an initial matter, the recognition of local constitutionalism would re-
quire courts to distinguish between constitutional rights that are susceptible
to direct judicial enforcement against a locality and those that may be en-
forced only indirectly through the imposition of constraints upon a state's
authority to control its political subdivisions. The recognition of local con-
stitutionalism would not, therefore, expand federal court power directly to
protect positive constitutional rights to public assistance. If one accepts a
localist dimension to federal constitutional enforcement, then one must also
accept that, as a matter of federal constitutional structure, central institutions
(the national legislature, the federal judiciary) may be dependent upon local
action in some constitutional contexts.
Cooley's decisions in People ex rel. Detroit & Howell Railroad v.
Township Board of Salem448 and People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut4 49 show
that the substantive constitutional right a court enforces when it frees a local
government from state law constraints is inseparable from the local commu-
nity's own judgment as to the scope, but not the existence, of that right. A
doctrine of local constitutionalism may thus be understood as a particular
subset of the more general doctrine of structural due process.450 In such
448 20 Mich. 452 (1870); see supra notes 101-17 and accompanying text.
449 24 Mich. 44 (1871); see supra notes 128-41 and accompanying text.
450 See TRIBE, supra note 215, at 1673-87 (presenting a model of structural justice that
unites individual rights and institutional design); Sager, supra note 5, at 1411-18 (arguing that
elected bodies are charged with "the responsibility of mediating majority sentiment with
judgments of reasonability and fairness"); Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975) (suggesting a theory of constitutional limitation that
focuses on the "structures through which policies are both formed and applied, and formed in
the very process of being applied"); Laurence H. Tribe, The Emerging Reconnection of
Individual Rights and Institutional Design: Federalism, Bureaucracy, and Due Process of
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cases, the Court has extended the sphere of substantive individual constitu-
tional protection through the allocation of decisional power among existing
governmental institutions, rather than by enforcing substantive individual
rights against governmental institutions in general.451 That the Constitution
may authorize a local community to exceed state law constraints in order to
protect the constitutional rights of its residents does not mean that federal
courts would have the independent power to place limitations directly upon
that local community. The nature of the underlying substantive constitu-
tional right in such cases would take the form of a limited right to a local
governmental decision-making structure for the resolution of how that right
should be protected
52
It is important to remember in this regard that just as cases such as Mil-
liken v. Bradley4 53 and San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez454 should not be considered apart from cases such as Washington v.
Lawmaking, 10 CREIGHTON L. REv. 433 (1977) (same); Laurence H. Tribe, The Supreme
Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973) [hereinafter Tribe, Toward a Model of Roles] (documenting the
resurgence of structural due process rights in Supreme Court decisions); see also Cole, supra
note 7, at 730 (discussing structural due process in public school administration); Stanley
Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The First Amendment in
Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1, 95-96 (1990) ("mhe chief judicial task is to ensure
institutional policy is reached through decisional structures that promote widespread
participation by treating participants with respect and prohibiting officials... from simply
imposing their will.").
451 See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 548 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment "does impose a special obligation to scrutinize
any governmental decisionmaking process that draws nationwide distinctions between citizens
on the basis of their race"), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116 (1976) (striking down a regulation that
burdened a liberty interest because of the institutional limitations of the bureaucratic decision
maker); see also TRIBE, supra note 215, at 1685-86 (explaining that the rule established in
such cases not only "created a process which respected fairness at the time of the Court's
decision, it also shaped a process which both 'incorporate[s] evolving visions of law and
society into constitutional principle' and 'minimizes the justices' discretionary role in
decreeing' the substance of the change" (quoting Tribe, Structural Due Process, supra note
450, at 293, 295-96)).
452 See Sager, supra note 5, at 1414. Sager explains that there may be
a right to procedural due process which requires that some legislative actions be un-
dertaken only by a governmental entity which is so structured and so charged as to
make possible a reflective determination that the action contemplated is fair, reason-
able, and not at odds with specific prohibitions in the Constitution.
Id.; see also id. at 1418 (explaining that the "claim for such a process requirement seems quite
strong" in cases "where substantial Constitutional values are placed in jeopardy by the
enactment at issue" and "where substantive review of the enactment by the judiciary is largely
unavailable and hence cannot secure these constitutional values").
453 418 U.S. 717 (1974); see supra notes 305-12 and accompanying text.
454 411 U.S. 1 (1973); see supra notes 368-85 and accompanying text.
1999]
598 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Seattle School District No. 145 and Papasan v. Allain,456 the reverse is true
as well. It would be a mistake, in light of Seattle School District, to read
Milliken to mark an unconscionable federal judicial retreat from constitu-
tionalism. It would be equally wrong, in light of Milliken, to read Seattle
School District as evidence of the federal judiciary's obligation to remedy
de facto desegregation directly. Similarly, it would be a mistake to read
Romer v. Evans457 to have recognized a judicially cognizable right to the
passage of antidiscrimination legislation.
The recognition of local constitutionalism also would not, in and of it-
self, mean that Congress, exercising its powers under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, possessed expanded authority to right local
wrongs. The recognition of localism in modem constitutional law results
from a determination that the practice of local self-government serves an
important public constitutional function and that local communities are pe-
culiarly positioned to determine the scope of their positive constitutional
obligations. The modem doctrinal connection between localism and con-
stitutionalism, therefore, should not be understood, as was suggested by
Professor Tribe's and Professor Michelman's readings of National League
of Cities v. Usery,458 to demonstrate that the scope of centrally enforceable
positive constitutional rights to governmental action is broader than is often
supposed.459 Such a reading would ignore the degree to which constitution-
alism and localism are mutually reinforcing values, neither clearly separable
from the other.
Indeed, the Court's recent decision in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 46 strik-
ing down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, serves as an important
cautionary reminder of the limits of the federal government's power to en-
gage in extrajudicial constitutional enforcement. When considered in light
of the cases just reviewed, City of Boerne may even support the connection
between localism and extrajudicial constitutionalism that is offered here. In
City of Boerne, the Court concluded that the unusual scope of the central
authority's intrusion on local sovereignty revealed that the underlying leg-
455 458 U.S. 457 (1982); see supra notes 313-21 and accompanying text.
456 478 U.S. 265 (1986); see supra notes 386-91 and accompanying text.
457 517 U.S. 260 (1996); see supra notes 393-440 and accompanying text.
458 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
459 See Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles, supra note 7, at 1194 (interpreting
the National League of Cities decision as vesting the states with an affirmative duty towards
their citizens); Tribe, supra note 7, at 1102 (arguing that National League of Cities reflects an
effort by the Court to allow state governments to provide their citizens with access to basic
services guaranteed by the Constitution).
460 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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islation was not intended to remedy a constitutional wrong. 46  By contrast,
in Romer, the Court may be understood to have concluded that the unusual
scope of the central authority's intrusion on local sovereignty revealed that
the underlying legislation was intended to preclude the remedying of a con-
stitutional wrong.
Taken together, the Court's emphasis on the unusual breadth of the
legislative preemption in both Romer and City of Boerne462 might lead one
to conclude that the Court continues to embrace extrajudicial constitutional
enforcement, but that it perceives local, rather than national, political insti-
tutions to be better suited to the task. Indeed, Romer suggested that local
governments must be free to step in to fill the constitutional gaps that limi-
tations on Congress's Section 5 power inevitably leave.463 Moreover, San
Antonio School District specifically analogized the State's decision to en-
hance local discretion to supplement state public school funding to an exer-
cise of the congressional power under Section 5.
The notion that some measure of constitutional enforcement is depend-
ent upon local political institutional action is hardly surprising when one
considers that, in lieu of Section 5, Congress would lack the power to en-
gage in such enforcement absent some other source of power. It is difficult
to believe that, prior to the passage of Section 5, judges alone bore the re-
sponsibility for enforcing the Constitution. If we take seriously the concep-
tion of local governments as not simply creatures of state law, but also as
creatures of the Constitution, then it follows that local governments have an
important obligation to give life to federal constitutional principles. That
obligation is no less an imperative for towns and cities than for the states
that have "created" them.
C. Local Constitutionalism as a Limit on Local Institutional Power
At the other end of the spectrum, the recognition of local constitution-
alism would not accord local governments an independent claim to consti-
461 See id. at 532 ("[The Religious Freedom Restoration Act] is so out of proportion to a
supposed remedial or preventative object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.").
2Compare Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (explaining that the state
initiative bars the provision of "specific protection against discrimination" of gays and
lesbians "no matter how local or discrete the harm, no matter how public and widespread the
injury"), with City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532 (explaining that "[s]weeping coverage ensures
[the Act's] intrusion at every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting official
actions of almost every description and regardless of subject matter").
463 Romer, 517 U.S. at 628 (showing, by example, that "most states have chosen to
counter discrimination by enacting detailed statutory schemes").
464 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 38-39 (1973).
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tutional recognition akin to that of their states. As Cooley recognized, local
governments are, in an important sense, creatures of their states, subject to
state supervision, even though they are also important components of the
federal constitutional structure.465 Local constitutionalism would not call
that general view into question, nor would it support a constitutional defense
of localism qua localism. It would suggest only that local governmental
sovereignty, understood as local freedom from state law constraints, merits
federal constitutional protection when such recognition would serve some
independent substantive constitutional value. Adherence to that proposition
would work no change in the federal constitutional structure because basic
principles of federal supremacy preclude states from structuring their inter-
nal governance in a manner that conflicts with federal constitutional
rights.
466
Nor would local constitutionalism afford local governments the right to
disregard state law commands in the absence of some demonstration that
such disregard would be supported by an independent federal constitutional
limitation on state power. There is no general federal constitutional princi-
ple of localism that circumscribes traditional state power. There is only the
possibility that the recognition of the importance of localism may expand
the scope of already extant federal constitutional limitations on state power
beyond those bounds that are necessitated by the institutional characteristics
of the federal judiciary. For this reason, and because of federalism con-
cerns, states' efforts to compel their local political subdivisions to assume
positive, judicially (or congressionally) unenforceable constitutional obliga-
tions to correct for private discrimination, would not themselves raise fed-
eral constitutional concerns. They would represent merely an instance in
465 See supra notes 128-43 and accompanying text (discussing Cooley's use of localism
princ 6les in People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut).
Justice Frankfurter stated the point most clearly in his opinion in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, which struck down a racial gerrymander. See 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960) ("When a
state exercises power wholly within the domain of state interest, it is insulated from federal
judicial review. But such insulation is not carried over when state power is used as an
instrument for circumventing a federally protected right."). He further explained that the
broad statements concerning the plenary nature of a state's power to control its political
subdivisions contained in cases such as Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907),
should be considered with an awareness of the limited contexts in which they were offered:
[I]t is imperative that generalizations, based on and qualified by the concrete
situations that gave rise to them, must not be applied out of context in disregard of
variant controlling facts. Thus, a correct reading of the seemingly unconfined dicta
of Hunter and kindred cases is not that the State has plenary power to manipulate in
every conceivable way, for every conceivable purpose, the affairs of its municipal
corporations, but rather that the State's authority is unrestrained by the particular
prohibitions of the Constitution considered in those cases.
Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 344.
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which a state had undertaken to promote a constitutional norm on its own
initiative. 67
Moreover, the recognition of local constitutionalism would not confer
independent interpretive authority over the Federal Constitution on local
governments. Local governments would still be governments and thus their
actions, no less than the actions of their state, would still have to accord
with those constitutional norms that are judicially enforceable. Local gov-
ernments could not, in the guise of extending federal constitutional protec-
tion, violate a federal constitutional norm prescribed by the Supreme
Court.468 Nor, at least as the doctrine is imagined here, could local govern-
ments purport to extend a constitutional norm that the federal courts had
determined was not in fact rooted in the Federal Constitution. These essen-
tial limitations on the permissible scope of extrajudicial constitutional en-
forcement, though not commanded by the recent decision in City of Boerne,
are certainly suggested by it.4 69 For, even when Congress seeks to exercise
its powers under Section 5, it must demonstrate that the right it claims to be
enforcing is one legitimately within the scope of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. A similar limitation would apply to local governmental attempts to
engage in extrajudicial constitutional enforcement.
It is, of course, no mean feat to divine a constitutional norm that, al-
though not susceptible to direct judicial vindication, is nonetheless suffi-
ciently related to an enforceable constitutional command as to justify the
judicial invalidation of a state's attempt to preclude local action. As City of
Boerne demonstrates, there are clearly limits to the kinds of extrajudicially
implemented norms fairly deemed to be of "constitutional" stature. But
what are the limits? What makes it plausible to describe the school deseg-
regation plan at issue in Seattle School District4 70 or the antidiscrimination
ordinances at issue in RomerA and Reitman47 as efforts to enforce a con-
467 See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336
A.2d 713 (N.J.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (overhauling state zoning practices to
correct for perceived racial and economic discrimination at the local level).
468 See Sager, supra note 16, at 1240 (making a similar point with respect to the scope of
Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
469 They are not commanded by City of Boerne because that case involved separation of
powers questions that are not presented by instances of state or local, extra-judicial
constitutional enforcement. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2162 (1997)
(discussing limitations resulting from the separation of powers doctrine).
470 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); see supra notes 312-20
and accompanying text.
471 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see supra notes 393-440 and accompanying
text.
472 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); see supra notes 425-30 and accompanying
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stitutional norm rather than simply a progressive political policy? Is it sim-
ply that the decisions themselves appear to have characterized the policy
choices in question in quasi-constitutional terms, or is there something
about the policies themselves that calls forth such characterizations? And
what principles would distinguish such quasi-constitutional local actions
from decisions to adopt rent control ordinances that intuitively seem less
tethered to any underlying federal constitutional principle?
Professors Sager and Eisgruber have recently attempted, in connection
with the City of Boerne decision, to give further content to the as yet ill-
defined category of underenforced constitutional norms. 473 Further elabo-
ration of the category would require a separate inquiry, however, that lies
beyond the examination undertaken here and would require a detailed in-
vestigation of the individual substantive policies themselves. The important
point, though, is that the category itself has been thought to have meaningful
content (in other words, discernible limits) in the Section 5 context. There
would seem to be no a priori reason why it could not have a similarly
meaningful content in the localist context as well.
This last point is important because, unless some meaningful content
can be given to the category of underenforced constitutional norms, local
constitutionalism would in practice simply devolve into an unlimited de-
fense of localism for its own sake. Local constitutionalism, at least as Coo-
ley imagined it, however, commands attention precisely because it consti-
tutes something other than an absolutist preference for local decision
making.474 It is intended to ensure that the practice of public politics will
not devolve into mere majoritarianism. Cooley believed that his localist
conception of constitutional structure would encourage local communities to
practice self-government in accord with substantive constitutional limita-
tions.475 It would be a perversion of that conception if the connection be-
tween localism and constitutionalism were employed to invite local gov-
ernments to extend the scope of their unchecked sovereignty through mere
assertions of federal constitutional authority. Thus, the recognition of a
doctrine of local constitutionalism should not be confused with a defense of
a locality's right to engage in either constitutional nullification476 or unlim-
473 See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and
Religious Liberty After City of Boerne v. Flores, 1997 StP. CT. REV. 79, 83-84.
See supra notes 59-97 and accompanying text.
4 See supra notes 179-200 and accompanying text.
476 See Powell, supra note 7, at 740-43 (contemplating state review of constitutional
judgments by the federal judiciary).
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ited constitutional expansionism. In this sense, a doctrine of local constitu-
tionalism rests on what are, more conventionally, federalist premises.
477
Finally, the defense of local governmental independence offered here
differs markedly from the now-ascendant formalist defense of state inde-
pendence from federal control. The defense offered here would not prohibit
states from "commandeering" their local governments, even though the
modem defense of federalism holds that Congress may not conscript a
478state. Nor would a defense of local constitutionalism preclude states, as a
general matter, from attempting to coerce their political subdivisions into
complying with a statewide rule. This is true even though the principles of
modem federalism may justify judicially enforceable constraints upon the
federal government's exercise of coercive power over the states.479 A de-
fense of local constitutionalism also does not seek to define any category of
traditionally local governmental functions-such as police protection-that,
as the Supreme Court once suggested in its federalist doctrine, are immune
from centralized control.480
The local constitutionalist defense offered here is simply not predicated
on a formalist notion that there is some residual core of local governmental
sovereignty, written silently into the Federal Constitution, that must be pro-
tected from central intrusion for its own sake. This defense proceeds in-
stead from a structural conclusion that substantive constitutional rights
sometimes presuppose the existence of a local decision-making process ca-
pable of ensuring the protection of those rights. That conclusion in turn
supports the determination that it is appropriate for courts to protect the lo-
cal decision-making process from state interference incident to the enforce-
ment of the underlying substantive constitutional right even though that
right would not be susceptible to more direct judicial protection. The de-
fense proceeds, in other words, from a conception of individual constitu-
tional rights as partially dependent upon local political action.
That does not mean, of course, that a theory of local constitutionalism is
uncontroversial or susceptible to simple enforcement. There will remain
contentious questions over whether a state attempt to control its political
subdivisions in fact infringes upon a constitutional norm. And there is an
undeniable danger in permitting courts broad reign to characterize some-
477 See Robert F. Nagel, Real Revolution, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 1005 (1997)
(explaining that a radical federalism could require state review of constitutional holdings by
the Supreme Court).
47P See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
479 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
480 See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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thing as a norm rather than a right, if only because such a power threatens to
free the judiciary to clothe policy predilections in the garb of constitutional
enforcement. That danger is particularly great when one considers that such
judgments are in some respects relatively costless, as federal courts would
not bear the burden of fashioning the decrees that must ordinarily be crafted
when a judicially enforceable right is recognized.
D. Local Rights and State Interests
Within these broad parameters, complicated questions remain as to the
circumstances under which the Federal Constitution may be understood to
protect local governmental action from state interference. The literature re-
garding underenforced constitutional norms again sets forth the basic prin-
ciples that may inform the inquiry.4 8 ' In connection with his discussion of
the scope of Congress's power under Section 5, Lawrence Sager has pro-
vided useful guidance. He explained: "Congress' section 5 power to pro-
hibit state conduct which the Supreme Court would not find to violate the
substantive norms of the fourteenth amendment is limited to those catego-
ries of conduct which the Court has condemned to analytical limbo because
of its institutional concems.
'A82
Similarly, when the Court's institutional reasons for declining to en-
force a credibly identifiable constitutional norm are expressly rooted in fed-
eral judicial deference to local political processes, then a state's attempt to
interfere with those same processes may justify federal judicial intervention
to protect those processes. This logic may explain the Court's reliance in
Seattle School District48 3 and Papasan4s upon its earlier emphasis on the
importance of local educational control in, respectively, Milliken485 and San
Antonio School District.4 86 A similar logic also may explain the Court's
481 See generally Sager, supra note 16 (exploring the underenforcement of constitutional
doctrine and the role of governments and the federal judiciary); Lawrence Gene Sager,
Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and Rules of
Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959 (1985) (exploring when state judges should defer to
the Supreme Court on constitutional issues).
487 Sager, supra note 16, at 1239-40.
483 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); see supra notes 313-20
and accompanying text.
494 Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986); see supra notes 386-91 and accompanying
text.'
485 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); see supra notes 304-12 and accompanying
text.486 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); see supra notes
368-85 and accompanying text.
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emphasis in Romer487 on a long tradition of local governmental efforts to
provide legal protections against private discrimination.
In light of this analysis, local constitutionalism is likely to have a par-
ticular role to play in connection with positive constitutional claims that
seek public assistance from local institutions that have been assigned broad
powers respecting such assistance. As we have seen, virtually all of the
cases in which localism figures prominently involved instances in which the
underlying claim differed dramatically from the conventional claim for a
negative immunity from governmental power. Moreover, virtually all of
these cases involved claims for assistance from local political institutions
that states had vested with substantial regulatory authority. A state's deci-
sion to vest its local institutions with such broad regulatory authority sug-
gests that the state may be no better positioned than a federal court to per-
form a constitutional calculus regarding the propriety of the locality's
specific exercise of one of those powers.
At the same time, basic principles of federalism preclude local govern-
ments from insulating themselves from state control merely by demonstrat-
ing that there is a connection between their continued independence and the
enforcement of an underlying federal constitutional norm. States have le-
gitimate institutional interests of their own that may justify the preclusion of
local constitutionalism, even when a local government's autonomy may
credibly be identified with the enhanced protection of an underlying sub-
stantive constitutional norm. It is exceedingly difficult to determine which
state interests are sufficient to trump a local community's attempt to extend
an underenforced constitutional norm. No general answer is possible to the
questions that arise.
As an initial matter, it appears clear that a state's determination that the
continued exercise of local power itself would violate a competing and un-
derenforced constitutional norm should command substantial federal judi-
cial respect. The Court implicitly conceded this point in Seattle School
District. It did not respond to Justice Powell's assertion that Initiative 350
could be defended as a permissible state attempt to restrict race-conscious
busing.488 The Court instead simply noted that the State had not advanced
such an interest.
48 9
487 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see supra notes 393-440 and accompanying
text.
488 See Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 491-92 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that "in
the absence of a finding of segregation by the School District," mandatory busing on the basis
of race is constitutionally impermissible).
489 See id. at 472 n.15 ("[Washington] do[es] not challenge the propriety of race-
conscious student assignments for the purpose of achieving integration....").
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The point is further demonstrated by the recent dispute over the consti-
tutionality of California's Proposition 209, a statewide measure that dra-
matically constricts the authority of local governments to institute race- and
gender-based affirmative action programs that comply with federal consti-
tutional requirements.490 Unlike the asserted state interests in Seattle School
District, Papasan, Romer, and Reitman, California rooted its claimed inter-
est in placing restrictions on local affirmative action efforts in an interpreta-
tion of the Federal Equal Protection Clause and, thus, in a concern about
unconstitutional racial discrimination at the local level.491 For that reason,
as the Ninth Circuit concluded in upholding the measure, the State's intru-
sion on local prerogatives could not easily be characterized as an attempt to
preclude necessary local remedial discretion. 2
While states must be given a fair degree of latitude to engage in their
own brand of local constitutionalism, federal courts should not simply defer
to a state's contention that substantive federal constitutional principles
would be furthered by the state's constriction of local authority. In Reitman,
after all, the State argued that a constitutional norm of privacy justified its
prohibition of local fair housing ordinances.493 The Court declined, how-
ever, to grant that contention.494 As Professor Black explains, the Court
acted appropriately in doing so.
I suppose we can save the state or local judgment from being one in aid of dis-
crimination... if we make it a very abstract judgment in favor of "freedom of
choice," rendered without care for the facts, without care for the sorts of
choices likely to be made, or actually made. But why should anybody defer to
such a judgment, or regard it as a respectable attempt to solve a problem? Is it
not lacking in just that instructed regard for local conditions which is supposed
to make respect for local judgments expedient?
495
490 See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that
Proposition 209 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution).
491 See id. at 1446 ("Plaintiffs counsel ... urged ... that '[t]he people of the State of
California are not entitled to make a judgment as to whether compelling state interests have
been vindicated. That is for the courts.' Au contraire! That most certainly is for the people
of California to decide, not the courts.").
492 See id. ("To hold that a[n]... affirmative action program is constitutionally
permissible because the people have demonstrated a compelling state interest is hardly to hold
that the program is constitutionally required. The Fourteenth Amendment, lest we lose sight
of the forest for the trees, does not require what it barely permits.").
493 See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 377 (1967) ("[California] announced the
constitutional right of any person to decline to sell or lease his real property to anyone to
whom he did not desire to sell or lease.").
494 See id. at 378-79 ("Here the California court ... has determined that the provision
would involve the State in private racial discriminations to an unconstitutional degree. We
accept this holding of the California court.").
495 Black, supra note 15, at 107.
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It is this kind of criticism of the State's assertedly constitutional interest
in Reitman that renders somewhat questionable the Ninth Circuit's sweep-
ing vindication of Proposition 209's constitutionality. The Ninth Circuit
engaged in no review of whether the state initiative would serve to check
racially discriminatory local policies, as the State claimed, or whether it
would instead impede constitutionally significant local efforts to remedy
discrimination. States no doubt deserve substantial discretion in making
such judgments, but deference to the judgments of a state differs from un-
questioning acceptance of state assertions.
Moreover, the more significant the scope of central intrusion, the more
reason there is to view the state's action with circumspection, even when it
purports to vindicate an underenforced constitutional norm. For example, in
San Antonio School District, the Court was relatively untroubled by the
limits that the State had placed on the local taxing power, given the local
school districts' authority to supplement the state's fund for financing public
education. 496 By contrast, in Romer, the Court noted the unprecedented
sweep of the State's intervention in the traditionally local process of pro-
viding protection against private discrimination.
497
It may also be useful to recall Cooley's concurrence in Hurlbut.4 98 He
concluded that the State's assertion of a broad right to appoint local officials
in perpetuity belied the State's asserted interest in providing necessary su-
pervision over local affairs and suggested a partisan motivation. 99 He was
willing, however, to uphold the state appointments on a temporary basis
precisely because such a limited central intrusion appeared to be within a
state's right to engage in neutral administrative oversight of its political
subdivisions.
500
In addition, state interests that appear only tenuously related to the ac-
tual restriction on local discretion should not be sufficient to justify state in-
trusion on local efforts to enforce the Constitution extrajudicially. Both the
Seattle School District and Romer Courts ultimately rested on a similar de-
termination about the adequacy of the State's interest, as did the Papasan
Court, which remanded the case for an inquiry into the State's reasons for
parceling out funds on an uneven basis.
The frank recognition of local constitutionalism would inevitably re-
quire federal courts to make difficult judgments about the "public" character
of state laws that impede local efforts to extend a constitutional norm. That
496 See supra notes 378-79 and accompanying text.
497 See supra note 405 and accompanying text.
49" People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 92-112 (1871) (Cooley, J. concurring).
499 See id. at 93.
500 See id. at 96.
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fact, however, should not in and of itself render a doctrine of local constitu-
tionalism indefensible. As we have seen, such a "public purpose" review
ultimately underlies decisions like Seattle School District and Romer, which
the Court has already decided. The express recognition of local constitu-
tionalism as the basis for decision in such cases might therefore serve the
salutary function of explaining why the Court should engage in such "pub-
lic purpose" review in the first instance. Additional scrutiny would be ap-
propriate because of the underlying local attempt to extend a cognizable, al-
beit judicially unenforceable, constitutional norm.
Indeed, Cass Sunstein has suggested that "public purpose" review, at
least with respect to modem equal protection doctrine, may be endemic to
any effective regime of judicial enforcement.5 1 He explains that modem
equal protection doctrine rests on the premise that "[l]egislation may not be
merely the adjustment of private interests or the transfer of wealth or op-
portunity from one person to another; it must be in some sense public-
serving."50 2 For that reason, he concludes that the doctrine requires judges
to ensure that "differential treatment [is] justified by reference to some pub-
lic value." 503 Indeed, he points to Seattle School District as an exemplar of
this "public value" approach.0 4
Interestingly, Cooley also suggested that there was an important con-
nection between localism and the enforcement of a constitutional norm of
equality precisely because courts are appropriately reluctant to substitute
their own judgment of "public values" for those that the people have them-
selves asserted. Present doctrine makes similar connections. State laws that
do not facially discriminate on the basis of race or sex, are not motivated by
invidious discrimination, and do not burden fundamental rights, are gener-
ally upheld so long as they reflect a rational connection to some public pur-
pose. As we have seen, however, the Court has appeared to depart from (or
at least to elaborate upon) this traditionally deferential approach in certain
cases where local communities have asserted their own authority to protect
their residents despite state-imposed obstacles. Thus, in both Seattle School
District and Romer, the Court applied what appears to have been heightened
scrutiny to the State's asserted interests even though the state laws at issue
did not in any obvious respect burden a suspect class. Similarly, in Pa-
501 See Cass R. Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection
Clause, 1982 SUP. CT. REv. 127 (discussing equal protection doctrine and its development by
the Supreme Court).
50? Id. at 134.
503 Id. at 131.
504 Id. at 150-64 (discussing Seattle School District and the Court's analysis of the Equal
Protection Clause).
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pasan, the Court appeared willing to apply heightened scrutiny to Missis-
sippi's grant allocation process even though no underlying fundamental
right to equal educational opportunity had been expressly recognized.
Finally, even more difficult questions arise when local governments
themselves enact the kind of broad prohibitions against local governmental
action that were at issue in Seattle School District and Romer. Such local
precommitments to underenforce the Constitution might be defended as the
consequence of local political choice and therefore distinguished from state
preclusions of local constitutional enforcement. The Sixth Circuit recently
adopted this view, concluding on remand in Equality Foundation, Inc. v.
City of Cincinnati?05 that Cincinnati's enactment of its own version of Colo-
rado's Amendment 2 did not violate Romer's rule. The Sixth Circuit ex-
plained that the city's charter provision, unlike Colorado's state constitu-
tional amendment, serves as a means of shifting decisional power from the
city council to the people of the city as a whole. The Court concluded that
such an internal shift in institutional power did not raise the same concerns
presented by a state's attempt to deny local governments the authority to act
through whatever institutional mechanism they might prefer.
506
There is an undeniable force to this argument if Romer is rightly under-
stood as a case that is rooted in localist concerns. A local community's own
determination about how contentious questions of gay rights should be re-
solved stands on a different footing from a state's generalized distaste for
antidiscrimination protection. In the former instance, one may fairly pre-
sume the local community has considered the difficult questions raised with
sensitivity to the unique local circumstances. The application of such a pre-
sumption is more difficult to justify when a sweeping statewide prohibition
is under review.
On the other hand, local precommitment may be problematic when it
takes the form, as it did in Cincinnati, of a general proscription on local en-
forcement that is written into the locality's basic charter of governance. The
measure at issue in Cincinnati did not, after all, purport to be simply a limi-
tation on city council power. It instead proclaimed itself to be a general
statement of the city's intent to ensure, through the only legally available
mechanism, that ordinances outlawing private discrimination against homo-
sexuals would not be enacted. A federal court might be wary, for reasons of
institutional deference, of compelling local governmental action in the face
of a locality's decision not to enact an ordinance, or of questioning a city's
505 128 F.3d 289, 301 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that a city charter amendment precluding
protection according to sexual orientation does not violate the Constitution), reh'g denied,
1998 WL 101701, cert. denied, 1195 S. Ct. 365 (1998).
506 See id. at 300-01 (contrasting Cincinnati's amendment with Colorado's in Romer).
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preference for decision by referendum rather than by ordinance. These in-
stitutional considerations would not apply with the same force, however, in
a case in which the locality declares a bare intent to preclude local protec-
tion through all of its institutional mechanisms. Indeed, the Cincinnati
amendment is notably distinguishable from the provision upheld in City of
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,507 which approved a provision requiring
the approval of certain zoning decisions by referendum. The Cincinnati
measure does not purport to enhance the people's power to decide matters
by referenda. It purports only to ensure that local protection will not be
provided.
Alternatively, cases of local precommitment may simply require the
Court to confront directly the degree to which its constitutional rule is in
fact rooted in localist concerns. There are strong indications that Romer
rested on localist principles. As others have suggested, however, Romer
may also rest on a more general anticaste principle that applies to constrain
governmental power generally.50 8 Cases that involve local precommitments
to underenforce the Constitution, such as Equality Foundation, would there-
fore require courts to confront directly their own conceptions of constitu-
tionalism and of constitutional structure.
E. Reviving the Local Public Realm
More broadly, the recognition of local constitutionalism would serve
the useful function of framing state/local disputes as disputes between gov-
ernments about the scope of governmental responsibility for constitutional
enforcement. Indeed, in each of the cases thus far reviewed in which local
governments received constitutional protection from state interference, ei-
ther the local community in a public action or the relevant local govern-
mental institution in a suit of its own brought the constitutional challenge.
Such suits recast traditional private versus public contests as disputes that
occur within the public sphere. In doing so, local constitutionalist chal-
lenges diminish the extent to which abstract appeals to majoritarian power,
or democratic formalism, resolve more subtle questions of constitutional
meaning.
The recognition of local constitutionalism would also afford local gov-
ernments an important constitutional role in enforcing the Constitution-a
role that all other levels of government, as the Equal Protection Clause im-
plicitly recognizes, are charged with fulfilling. That is a welcome result in
507 426 U.S. 668 (1976) (holding that a referendum to approve changes in land use is
constitutional).
508 See supra note 395.
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light of current doctrine, which tends to make local governments uniquely
liable for the commission of constitutional wrongs but otherwise formally
depicts them as the passive administrative agents of their states,50 9 with "no
set place" in the federal constitutional structure. 51 Indeed, some lower fed-
eral courts have even read Supreme Court case law, often without attention
to decisions such as Seattle School District, Papasan, and Romer, to pre-
clude local governments from asserting standing to bring a constitutional
challenge against their states.5n Such a cramped understanding of the con-
stitutional structure denies the important role local communities may play in
enforcing constitutional norms on behalf of their residents.
Finally, the recent literature on the important role that local political in-
stitutions may play in reviving republican politics strongly supports a con-
ception of constitutional structure in which local governments are critical
512components. There is a tremendous diversity among and within local
communities. The traditional city/suburb divide only begins to touch on the
differing perspectives that communities in different regions, with different
histories, and comprised of different groups would bring to constitutional
interpretation. If local constitutionalism would protect those communities
predisposed not to take a broad view of their constitutional obligations, then
it might also free those communities more eager to extend constitutional
protection from current state law constraints. By broadening the range of
permissible constitutional interpreters, local constitutionalism might
broaden the range of constitutional protections. It would, at the least, en-
gage diverse local communities directly in the public practice of constitu-
tionalism and force states to confront the substantive constitutional conse-
quences of their assertions of control over the communities they claim to
have created. Thus, regardless of the degree to which such a doctrine would
in the end protect local governmental independence from state control, it
would remind local governments in a direct way that they are ultimately
509 Compare Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (suggesting that civil rights plaintiffs
cannot sue states under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because states are not "persons" within the meaning
of the statute), with Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (holding that
civil rights plaintiffs can sue cities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because cities are "persons" within
the meaning of the statute).
510 See Williams, supra note 5, at 83.
511 See, e.g., City of South Lake Tahoe v. California Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 625
F.2d 231 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1039 (1980) (holding that the City had no standing
to challenge the validity of a state statute as a result of the Supremacy Clause).
512 See Ford, supra note 5, at 1906-18 (arguing that a connection exists between
desegregated local space and participatory democracy); Frug, The City as a Legal Concept,
supra note 6 (discussing the connection between city power and public freedom); Frug, City
Services, supra note 9, at 35-45 (discussing community building as a city function); Frug, The
Geography of Community, supra note 6, at 1081 (same).
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creatures of the Federal Constitution, and not simply creatures of their
states.
CONCLUSION
Too much of our daily experience with self-government occurs at the
local level for us to dismiss localism as an embarrassing feature of constitu-
tional democracy. Local governments are too central to the lives of too
many people to serve as passive administrative agents of state majorities
without an independent interest in enforcing constitutional norms. Local
governments are also too intimately involved in resolving the central public
questions of our time to be protected arenas for the aggregation of private
preferences, free from constitutional obligations to resist central or private
power.
True, the constitutional text does not mention the special role that local
governments play in giving life to constitutional principles. As Thomas
Cooley concluded more than a century ago, however, "[s]ome things are too
plain to be written."513 Local governments, the political structures that gov-
ern our lives on a daily basis, may be the means through which we discover
our constitutional rights. That, at least, is the promise of Cooley's City. It
is a promise that constitutional doctrine would do well to fulfill.
513 People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 107-08 (1871) (Cooley, J.,
concurring).
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